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Christine Todd WHITMAN, Administrator of Environmental Agency, et al.,
Petitioner
V.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al., Petitioner
V.
Christine Todd Whitman, et al.
Nos. 99-1257 and 99-1426
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided February27, 2001
Gean-Air Standard Powers Upheld
The Associated Press
Tuesday, February 27, 2001
Laurie Asseo
The nation's premier environmental law
withstood a major industry challenge
Tuesday as the Supreme Court upheld
the way the government sets air-quality
standards under the Clean Air Act.
The court unanimously rejected industry
arguments that the Environmental
Protection Agency must consider
financial cost as well as health benefits in
writing standards.
The American Lung Association called
the ruling "a victory for the Clean Air
Act and for the health of the American
people."
The Clean Air Act became law in 1970,
and the challenge by industry groups was
viewed as the most significant
environmental case before the Supreme
Court in years.
The justices rejected industry arguments
that the EPA took too much lawmaking
power from Congress when it set
tougher standards for ozone and soot in
1997.
Nevertheless, the court threw out the
EPA's policy for implementing new
ozone rules and ordered the agency to
come up with a more "reasonable"
interpretation of the law.
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Edward Warren, the lawyer for industry
groups that challenged the law, said they
retain a right to challenge the ozone and
soot standards in a lower court under
traditional legal rules. "There's a good
chance that both of these standards will
fall," he said.
The American Trucking Associations,
leader of the industry group, said it was
"clearly disappointed" by the ruling. It
said its goal in the case was "to obtain
clear, understandable legal standards to
promote clean air in a sensible fashion."
EPA Administrator Christie Whitman
said the decision was "a solid
endorsement of EPA's efforts to protect
the health of millions of Americans from
the dangers of air pollution." She gave
no indication of what EPA might do to
implement the tougher standards, which
had been withdrawn to await a ruling
from the Supreme Court.
Frank O'Donnell of the (lean Air Trust
environmental advocacy group, called
the decision a "huge victory for
breathers."
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the
court that the clean-air law
"unambiguously bars cost
considerations" from the process of
setting air-quality standards.
The federal law, which "we interpret as
requiring the EPA to set air quality
standards at the level that is 'requisite' -
that is, not lower or higher than is
necessary - to protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety, fits
comfortably within the scope of
discretion permitted by our precedent,"
Scalia wrote.
All nine justices agreed on the result of
the ruling, although sometimes for
different reasons.
In setting air-quality standards, the EPA
is required to use criteria that "accurately
reflect the latest scientific knowledge"
for identifying pollution's effects on
health.
Business groups that long have chafed
under the clean-air law argued that the
EPA was setting standards without clear
criteria and without considering the
financial costs of complying with them.
Scalia said that even though the law bars
the EPA from considering economic
costs in setting clean-air standards, the
agency can consider costs in its
instructions for implementing the rules.
A federal appeals court had ruled that
the EPA went too far, interpreting the
federal law so loosely that it took over
Congress' lawmaking authority. But the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia also refused to
require the government to weigh
financial costs against health benefits.
The Supreme Court decided the appeals
court was right in ruling the EPA could
not consider costs in setting air-quality
standards, but wrong in saying the
agency unlawfully usurped Congress'
authority.
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Scalia said the EPA's authority was
similar to the Federal Communications
Commission's authority to regulate the
airwaves in the "public interest."
On ozone, the justices ruled against the
EPA's implementation of revised ozone
standards, saying the agency ignored a
section of law that restricted its decision-
making authority.
In addition, the lower court had ruled
that in setting the ozone standard, the
EPA must consider any beneficial health
effects of ozone, such as protection
against skin cancer.
The 1997 air standards limited ozone, a
major component of smog, to 0.08 parts
per million instead of .12 parts per
million under the old requirement. States
also were required to limit soot from
power plants, cars and other sources to
2.5 microns, or 28 times smaller than the
width of a human hair.
Industry groups that challenged the
clean-air rules included the American
Trucking Associations, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers and three
states - Michigan, Ohio
and West Virginia.
The cases are Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, 99-1257, and
American Trucking Associations v.
Whitman, 99-1426.
Copyright 0 2001 The Associated Press
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00-1543 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
Ruling Below (Fed. Cir. (en banc), 234 F.3d 558, 69 U.S.L.W. 1362, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865):
Prosecution history estoppel acts as complete bar to application of doctrine of equivalents
when amendment has narrowed scope of patent claim for reason related to patentability.
Questions Presented: (1) Does everyclaim-narrowing amendment designed to comply
with any provision of Patent Act- including those provisions not related to prior art-
automatically create prosecution history estoppel regardless of reason for amendment? (2)
Does finding of prosecution history estoppel completely bar application of doctrine of
equivalents?
FESTO CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
SHOKETSU KINSOKU KOGYO KABUSHIKI CO, LTD, et al. Defendants-
Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Decided November 29, 2000.
SCHALL, Circuit Judge
This is an appeal from the judgment of
the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts that Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.
(also known as SMC Corporation) and
SMC Pneumatics, Inc. (collectively,
"SMC") infringed U.S. Patent No.
4,354,125 (the "Stoll patent") and U.S.
Patent No. BI 3,779,401 (the "Carroll
patent"), both owned by Festo
Corporation ("Festo"), under the
doctrine of equivalents. We took the
case en banc to resolve certain issues
relating to the doctrine of equivalents
that remained in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct.
1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997).
Specifically, we asked the parties to
brief the following five questions for
rehearing en banc:
1. For the purposes of determining
whether an amendment to a claim
creates prosecution history estoppel, is
"a substantial reason related to
patentability," Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
33, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146
(1997), limited to those amendments
made to overcome prior art under § 102
and § 103, or does "patentability" mean
any reason affecting the issuance of a
patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a
"voluntary" claim amendment--one not
required by the examiner or made in
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response to a rejection by an examiner
for a stated reason--create prosecution
history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel, under
Warner-Jenkinson what range of
equivalents, if any, is available under
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim
element so amended?
4. When "no explanation [for a claim
amendment] is established," Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33, 117 S.Ct.
1040, thus invoking the presumption of
prosecution history estoppel under
Warner-Jenkinson, what range of
equivalents, if any, is available under
the doctrine of equivalents for the claim
element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in
this case violate Warner- Jenkinson 's
requirement that the application of the
doctrine of equivalents "is not allowed
such broad play as to eliminate [an]
element in its entirety," 520 U.S. at 29,
117 S.Ct. 1040. In other words, would
such a judgment of infringement, post
Warner-Jenkinson, violate the "all
elements" rule?
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1381-
82, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959, 1959-60
(Fed.Cir.1999) ("Festo V").
We begin with a brief synopsis of our
answers to the en banc questions and a
summary of how those answers affect
the disposition of this appeal. In
response to En Banc Question 1, we
hold that "a substantial reason related
to patentability" is not limited to
overcoming prior art, but includes other
reasons related to the statutory
requirements for a patent. Therefore, an
amendment that narrows the scope of a
claim for any reason related to the
statutory requirements for a patent will
give rise to prosecution history estoppel
with- respect to the amended claim
element. * * *In response to En Banc
Question 2, we hold that "voluntary"
claim amendments are treated the same
as other claim amendments; therefore,
any voluntary amendment that narrows
the scope of a claim for a reason related
to the statutory requirements for a
patent will give rise to prosecution
history estoppel with respect to the
amended claim element. In response to
En Banc Question 3, we hold that when
a claim amendment creates prosecution
history estoppel, no range of
equivalents is available for the
amended claim element. In response to
En Banc Question 4, we hold that
"unexplained" amendments are not
entitled to any range of equivalents. We
do not reach En Banc Question 5, for
reasons which will become clear in our
discussion of the specific case before
us.
In view of our answers to the en banc
questions, we reverse the judgment that
claim 1 of the Stoll patent and claims 5,
6, and 9 of the Carroll patent were
infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents. The claim elements that
were found to be infringed by
equivalents were added during
prosecution of the Stoll patent and
during reexamination of the Carroll
patent. The amendments that added
those elements narrowed the scope of
the claims. Festo has not established
explanations unrelated to patentability
for these amendments; accordingly, no
range of equivalents is available for the
amended claim elements. Because the
parties agree that SMC does not
produce a device that literally satisfies
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those claim elements, the judgment of
infringement must be reversed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Doctrine of Equivalents and
Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of equivalents prevents an
accused infringer from avoiding
liability for infringement by changing
only minor or insubstantial details of a
claimed invention while retaining the
invention's essential identity. Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854,
94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950). The doctrine of
equivalents is utilized " '[t]o temper
unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of
the invention.' " Id. (quoting Royal
Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692, 77 U.S.P.Q.
517, 518 (2d Cir.1948) (Hand, J.)). In
pursuing these goals, the doctrine
attempts to strike a balance between
ensuring that the patentee enjoys the
full benefit of his patent and ensuring
that the claims give "fair notice" of the
patent's scope. London v. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1456, 1458-59
(Fed.Cir.1991). This balance can be
easily upset, however, because "the
doctrine of equivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional
and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement."
Warner- Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 117
S.Ct. 1040.[2]
Prosecution history estoppel is one tool
that prevents the doctrine of
equivalents from vitiating the notice
function of claims. Charles Greiner &
Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d
1031, 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1526, 1529-
30 (Fed.Cir.1992). Actions by the
patentee, including claim amendments
and arguments made before the Patent
Office, may give rise to prosecution
history estoppel. Pharmacia & Upjohn
Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d
1373, 1376-77, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033,
1036 (Fed.Cir.1999). "Prosecution
history estoppel precludes a patentee
from obtaining under the doctrine of
equivalents coverage of subject matter
that has been relinquished during the
prosecution of its patent application."
Id. at 1376, 170 F.3d 1373, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036. Therefore, "[t]he
doctrine of equivalents is subservient to
... [prosecution history] estoppel."
Autogiro Co. v. United States, 181
Ct.CI. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01, 155
U.S.P.Q. 697, 705 (1967). The logic of
prosecution history estoppel is that the
patentee, during prosecution, has
created a record that fairly notifies the
public that the patentee has surrendered
the right to claim particular matter as
within the reach of the patent.
1H. Answers to the En Banc Questions
A. Question 1
We answer Question I as follows: For
the purposes of determining whether an
amendment gives rise to prosecution
history estoppel, a "substantial reason
related to patentability" is not limited to
overcoming or avoiding prior art, but
instead includes any reason which
relates to the statutory requirements for
a patent. Therefore, a narrowing
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amendment made for any reason
related to the statutory requirements for
a patent will give rise to prosecution
history estoppel with respect to the
amended claim element.
It is true that in Warner-Jenkinson the
Supreme Court focused on claim
amendments made to overcome or
avoid prior art. Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 30-34, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
However, there are a number of
statutory requirements that must be
satisfied before a valid patent can issue
and that thus relate to patentability. In
addition to satisfying the novelty and
non- obviousness requirements of 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, 35 U.S.C.A. §§
102, 103 (West 1994 & Supp.2000),
the claims must be directed to
patentable subject matter and the
claimed invention must be useful, as set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
Additionally, the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112 requires that the patent
specification describe, enable, and set
forth the best mode of carrying out the
invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1994),
while the second paragraph of section
112 requires that the claims set forth
the subject matter that the applicant
regards as his invention and that the
claims particularly point out and
distinctly define the invention, 35
U.S.C. § 112, 1 2 (1994). The Patent
Office will reject a patent application
that fails to satisfy any one of these
statutory requirements. See Man. Pat.
Exam. P. 2100-1 to -173 (7th ed. rev. 1
1998). And any one of these
requirements may be a ground for
invalidating an issued patent. E.g., 35
U.S.C. § 282 (1994); Atlas Powder Co.
v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1943 (Fed.Cir.1999)
(holding a patent invalid because the
claims were anticipated under 35
U.S.C. § 102); Mitsubishi Elec. Corp.
v. Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1910 (Fed.Cir.1999)
(holding a patent invalid because the
claims were obvious under 35 U.S.C. §
103); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596
(Fed.Cir. 1998) (discussing the
patentable subject matter requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 101); Process Control
Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d
1350, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029
(Fed.Cir. 1999) (holding a patent invalid
because the claims were inoperative
and therefore failed to satisfy the utility
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101);
Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v.
Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d 1607 (Fed.Cir.1999)
(considering whether a patent claim
was invalid under the written
description requirement of § 112, 1);
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,
134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1498
(Fed.Cir.1998) (holding claims of a
patent invalid for failing to comply
with the written description
requirement of § 112, 1 1); Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188
F.3d 1362, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129
(Fed.Cir.1999) (holding a patent invalid
because the claims were not enabled, as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1);
United States Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1388 (Fed.Cir.1996)
(holding a patent invalid for failing to
satisfy the best mode requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112, 1); Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d 1190 (Fed.Cir.1993)
(holding a patent invalid because the
claims failed to satisfy the definiteness
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2).
An amendment related to any of these
356
statutory requirements is an amendment
made for "a substantial reason related
to patentability."
The law has been clear that
amendments made to avoid prior art
give rise to prosecution history
estoppel. E.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 30-31, 117 S.Ct. 1040
(discussing Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace
Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 62 S.Ct.
513, 86 L.Ed. 736 (1942), and Keystone
Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp.,
294 U.S. 42, 55 S.Ct. 262, 79 L.Ed.
747 (1935)). In view of the functions of
prosecution history estoppel--
preserving the notice function of the
claims and preventing patent holders
from recapturing under the doctrine of
equivalents subject matter that was
surrendered before the Patent Office--
we see no reason why prosecution
history estoppel should not also arise
from amendments made for other
reasons related to patentability, as
described above. Indeed, the functions
of prosecution history estoppel cannot
be fully satisfied if substantial reasons
related to patentability are limited to a
narrow subset of patentability issues.
Rather, substantial reasons related to
patentability include 35 U.S.C. §§ 101
and 112 issues, as well as 35 U.S.C. §§
102 and 103 issues.
B. Question 2
We answer Question 2 as follows:
Voluntary claim amendments are
treated the same as other amendments.
Therefore, a voluntary amendment that
narrows the scope of a claim for a
reason related to the statutory
requirements for a patent will give rise
to prosecution history estoppel as to the
amended claim element.
Both voluntary amendments and
amendments required by the Patent
Office signal to the public that subject
matter has been surrendered. There is
no reason why prosecution history
estoppel should arise if the Patent
Office rejects a claim because it
believes the claim to be unpatentable,
but not arise if the applicant amends a
claim because he believes the claim to
be unpatentable.
Our answer to this question is
consistent with the doctrine of
argument-based estoppel. Arguments
made voluntarily during prosecution
may give rise to prosecution history
estoppel if they evidence a surrender of
subject matter. E.g., KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351,
1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 1841-42
(Fed.Cir.2000) (concluding that "KCJ's
statements [during prosecution] reflect
a clear and unmistakable surrender" of
subject matter that cannot be reclaimed
through the doctrine of equivalents);
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research
Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1711, 1719 (Fed.Cir.2000)
(finding that "through [Bayer's]
statements to the PTO and the
declarations it filed, Bayer made
statements of clear and unmistakable
surrender of subject matter" which it
could not recapture through the
doctrine of equivalents); Pharnacia &
Upjohn, 170 F.3d at 1377, 50U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036 ("A number of
activities during prosecution may give
rise to prosecution history estoppel, ...including arguments made to obtain
allowance of the claims at issue."(citation omitted)); Southwall Techs.,
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Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570,
1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1682
(Fed.Cir.1995) ("Clear assertions made
during prosecution in support of
patentability, whether or not actually
required to secure allowance of the
claim, may ... create an estoppel.");
Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States
Int'1 Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165,
1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018, 1025
(Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that arguments
made during prosecution that
emphasized one feature of the
invention estopped the patent holder
from asserting that a device lacking that
feature infringed the patent under the
doctrine of equivalents). There is no
reason why an amendment-based
surrender of subject matter should be
given less force than an argument-
based surrender of subject matter.
C. Question 3
We answer Question 3 as follows:
When a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with
regard to a claim element, there is no
range of equivalents available for the
amended claim element. Application of
the doctrine of equivalents to the claim
element is completely barred (a
"complete bar").
We think it is fair to say that the
question of the scope of equivalents
available when prosecution history
estoppel applies to a claim element has
not been directly addressed or
answered by the Supreme Court, at
least in circumstances where the claim
was amended for a known patentability
reason. In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court
focused its attention more on the
circumstances under which prosecution
history estoppel arises than on the
range of equivalents that might
generally be available despite the
existence of prosecution history
estoppel. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S.
at 30-34, 117 S.Ct. 1040. The Court did
not discuss the upper pH limit of 9.0,
other than to note that the upper limit,
which narrowed the claim, was selected
to overcome prior art. Id. at 32, 117
S.Ct. 1040. The range of equivalents, if
any, that could be asserted for the upper
pH limit was not discussed by the
Court. The only statements in Warner-
Jenkinson as to the range of equivalents
that is available when prosecution
history estoppel applies are found in the
Court's discussion of unexplained
amendments. Id. at 33-34, 117 S.Ct.
1040. For those amendments, the Court
held that "prosecution history estoppel
would bar the application of the
doctrine [of] equivalents as to that
element." Id. at 33, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
2. Because the Supreme Court has not
fully addressed the range of equivalents
that is available once prosecution
history estoppel applies, we must
independently decide the issue.
Congress specifically created the
Federal Circuit to resolve issues unique
to patent law, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390,
116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577
(1996) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 97-312,
pp. 20-23 (1981)), such as those
regarding prosecution history estoppel,
which is a judicially created doctrine,
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039, 1044
(Fed.Cir.1990). Congress contemplated
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that the Federal Circuit would
"strengthen the United States patent
system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial
innovation." Markman, 517 U.S. at
390, 116 S.Ct. 1384. Issues such as the
one before us in this case are properly
reserved for this court to answer with
"its special expertise." Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct.
1040 (reserving explicitly for the
Federal Circuit the task of formulating
the proper test(s) for infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents).
3. Today, we revisit the question we
first addressed in Hughes I and come to
a different conclusion as to the proper
scope of equivalents that is available
when prosecution history estoppel
applies than we did in that case. We
hold that prosecution history estoppel
acts as a complete bar to the application
of the doctrine of equivalents when an
amendment has narrowed the scope of
a claim for a reason related to
patentability. Our decision to reject the
flexible bar approach adopted in
Hughes I comes after nearly twenty
years of experience in performing our
role as the sole court of appeals for
patent matters. In those years, the
notice function of patent claims has
become paramount, and the need for
certainty as to the scope of patent
protection has been emphasized. A
problem with the flexible bar approach
is that it is virtually impossible to
predict before the decision on appeal
where the line of surrender is drawn.
The patentee would draw the line just
at or slightly short of the prior art,
leaving a wide range of equivalents
untouched by prosecution history
estoppel. The accused infringer,
however, would draw the line close to
the literal terms of the claims, leaving
little or no range of equivalents. These
considerations, we think, contribute to
the difficulty under the flexible bar
approach in predicting with any degree
of certainty the scope of surrender that
will be found when prosecution history
estoppel applies.
We believe that the current state of the
law regarding the scope of equivalents
that is available when prosecution
history estoppel applies is
"unworkable." In patent law, we think
that rules qualify as "workable" when
they can be relied upon to produce
consistent results and give rise to a
body of law that provides guidance to
the marketplace on how to conduct its
affairs. After our long experience with
the flexible bar approach, we conclude
that its "workability" is flawed.
Moreover, in overruling Hughes I, we
are not acting "on grounds not
advanced by the parties." SMC and
amici curiae have urged us to follow
the strict approach to prosecution
history estoppel that we adopt today. In
Banc Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants
SMC Corp., et al., at 49- 53; see also
Br. for Amici Curiae Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., Eastman Kodak Co., and Ford
Motor Co., at 14-20 (arguing that no
range of equivalents should be
available for narrowing claim
amendments).
We also believe that the flexible bar
approach "poses a direct obstacle to the
realization of important objectives."
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105
L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (setting forth the
"traditional justification[s] for
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overruling a prior case"). These
objectives include giving effect, when
prosecution history estoppel arises, to a
narrowing amendment's operation as a
disclaimer of subject matter, see, e.g.,
Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136-37, 62
S.Ct. 513, preserving the notice
function of patent claims, see, e.g.,
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 117
S.Ct. 1040, and promoting certainty in
patent law, see, e.g., Markman, 517
U.S. at 390, 116 S.Ct. 1384. The
realization of these objectives cannot
help but be frustrated by the uncertainty
inherent in the flexible bar approach.
By making prosecution history estoppel
act as a complete bar, we enforce the
disclaimer effect of a narrowing claim
amendment. By narrowing his claims, a
patentee disclaims subject matter
encompassed by the original claims.
E.g., Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136-
37, 62 S.Ct. 513; Magic City Kennel
Club, 282 U.S. at 790, 51 S.Ct. 291;
Shepard, 116 U.S. at 598, 6 S.Ct. 493
(noting that a patentee who has
narrowed a claim during prosecution
cannot "enlarge her patent by argument
so as to cover elements not falling
within its terms, and which she had
explicitly abandoned"). As the Supreme
Court has stated, "By amendment [the
patentee] recognize[s] and
emphasize[s] the difference between
the" original claim and amended claim
"and proclaim[s] ... abandonment of all
that is embraced in that difference."
Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136, 62
S.Ct. 513. Amendments "must be
strictly construed against the inventor
and in favor of the public, and looked
upon as in the nature of disclaimers."
Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 83-84, 21 S.Ct.
24. In order to construe such
amendments strictly against the
patentee, no scope of equivalents can
be afforded to a claim element that was
narrowed because of patentability
concerns. Although we do not
understand older Supreme Court cases
to have spoken directly to the question
before us, we think the language used
in those cases suggesting a strict
measurement of the scope of
equivalents is consistent with our
answer to this question.
Allowing some range of equivalents
gives the patentee some benefit of the
doubt as to what was disclaimed, a
benefit that comes at the public's
expense. A complete bar therefore best
serves the notice and definitional
function of patent claims. "The object
of the patent law in requiring the
patentee [to specifically define his
invention] is not only to secure to him
all to which he is entitled, but to
apprise the public of what is still open
to them." McClain v. Ortmayer, 141
U.S. 419, 424, 12 S.Ct. 76, 35 L.Ed.
800 (1891). But "the doctrine of
equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory
claiming requirement." Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 117 S.Ct.
1040. If prosecution history estoppel
acts as a complete bar to application of
the doctrine of equivalents, both the
patentee and the public are on notice as
to the scope of protection provided by a
claim element narrowed for a reason
related to patentability. The patentee
and the public can look to the
prosecution history, a public record, to
determine if any prosecution history
estoppel arises as to any claim element.
If so, that element's scope of protection
is clearly defined by its literal terms.
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A complete bar also eliminates the
public's need to speculate as to the
subject matter surrendered by an
amendment that narrows a claim for a
reason related to patentability. There
are several aspects of the prosecution
history estoppel inquiry where
speculation is not allowed. The
Supreme Court has noted that we need
not inquire into the correctness of the
examiner's rejection that led to a claim
amendment. Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 33 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (citing
Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. at
789-90, 51 S.Ct. 291). Even if the
rejection is improper, the amendment
may still give rise to prosecution
history estoppel. Id. In addition, we do
not speculate as to whether any given
amendment was material to the
prosecution of the patent because "[t]he
patentee makes them all material by the
restricted form of his claim." Hubbell,
179 U.S. at 84, 21 S.Ct. 24 (citations
omitted). In view of the reluctance to
entertain speculative inquiries in other
aspects of prosecution history estoppel,
a speculative inquiry should not be
required to determine the scope of
equivalents still available for a claim
element narrowed for a reason related
to patentability. A complete bar avoids
such an inquiry.
Under the flexible bar approach,
however, the exact range of equivalents
when prosecution history estoppel
applies is virtually unascertainable,
with only the prior art marking the
outer limits of the claim's scope. There
is no precise metric to determine what
subject matter was given up between
the original claim and the amended
claim. Consider, for example, a claim
that originally recited a value "less than
twenty" that was amended to recite a
value "less than five" in light of a
rejection over prior art disclosing a
value of fifteen. * * * What subject
matter was abandoned under the
flexible approach? Is the patentee
limited to values that are closer to five
than fifteen, or can he reach any value
less than fifteen? Can the patentee
encompass by equivalents a value of
ten, or would that recapture part of the
surrendered subject matter? Put simply,
it is impossible, even under this basic
example, for the public or the patentee
to determine the precise range of
equivalents available under the flexible
bar approach. This creates a "zone of
uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the
risk of infringement claims ... [and
which] discourage[s] invention only a
little less than unequivocal foreclosure
of the field." Markman, 517 U.S. at
390, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (quoting United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317
U.S. 228, -236, 63 S.Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed.
232 (1942)). "The public [would] be
deprived of rights supposed to belong
to it, without being clearly told what it
is that limits these rights." Markman,
517 U.S. at 390, 116 S.Ct. 1384
(quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S.
568, 573, 24 L.Ed. 235 (1876)).
A complete bar, unlike a flexible bar,
thus lends certainty to the process of
determining the scope of protection
afforded by a patent. With a complete
bar, both the public and the patentee
know that once an element of a claim is
narrowed by amendment for a reason
related to patentability, that element's
scope of coverage will not extend
beyond its literal terms. There is no
speculation or uncertainty as to the
exact range of equivalents that might be
available. This certainty aids both the
public and the patentee in ascertaining
the true scope and value of the patent
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without having to resort to litigation to
obtain a case by case analysis of what
subject matter the claims can cover.
With a complete bar, neither the public
nor the patentee is required to pay the
transaction costs of litigation in order to
determine the exact scope of subject
matter the patentee abandoned when
the patentee amended the claim.
Thus, under the complete bar approach,
technological advances that would have
lain in the unknown, undefined zone
around the literal terms of a narrowed
claim under the flexible bar approach
will not go wasted and undeveloped
due to fear of litigation. The public will
be free to improve on the patented
technology and design around it
without being inhibited by the threat of
a lawsuit because the changes could
possibly fall within the scope of
equivalents left after a claim element
has been narrowed by amendment for a
reason related to patentability. This
certainty will stimulate investment in
improvements and design-arounds
because the risk of infringement will be
easier to determine. In general, the
difficulty in counseling the public and
the patentee on the scope of protection
provided by an amended element is
greatly reduced under the complete bar
approach due to the certainty and
predictability such a bar produces.
Finally, we see no overriding benefit to
the flexible bar approach. Although a
flexible bar affords the patentee more
protection under the doctrine of
equivalents, we do not believe that the
benefit outweighs the costs of
uncertainty. The Supreme Court noted
in Warner-Jenkinson that the doctrine
of equivalents has "taken on a life of its
own, unbounded by the patent claims."
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29,
117 S.Ct. 1040. A complete bar reins in
the doctrine of equivalents, making
claim scope more discernible and
preserving the notice function of
claims. The Court indicated that the
application of a complete bar allowed
prosecution history estoppel to place
"reasonable limits on the doctrine of
equivalents, and further insulate[ ] the
doctrine from any feared conflict with
the Patent Act." Id. The application of a
complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents whenever a claim
amendment gives rise to prosecution
history estoppel similarly reduces the
conflict and tension between the patent
protection afforded by the doctrine of
equivalents and the public's ability to
ascertain the scope of a patent.
D. Question 4
We answer Question 4 as follows:
When no explanation for a claim
amendment is established, no range of
equivalents is available for the claim
element so amended.
This question is answered by Warner-
Jenkinson:
Where no explanation is established,.
prosecution history estoppel would bar
the application of the doctrine [of]
equivalents as to that element.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33, 117
S.Ct. 1040 (emphasis added). In
answering this question, we affirm
what we stated in Sextant, 172 F.3d at
832, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875: when "the
Warner-Jenkinson presumption is
applicable, ... the prosecution history
estoppel arising therefrom is total and
completely 'bars' the application of the
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doctrine of equivalents as to the
amended limitation."
E. Question 5
We do not need to reach this question
for reasons which will become clear in
our discussion of the specific case
before us. Accordingly, we leave for
another day any discussion of the "all
elements" rule.
TV. Infringement of Festo's Patents
Festo is the owner by assignment of the
Stoll patent and the Carroll patent, both
of which are directed to magnetically
coupled rodless cylinders. * * *
As discussed above, under Warner-
Jenkinson, Festo bears the burden of
establishing that the amendment was
made for a reason unrelated to
patentability. Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. at 40-41, 117 S.Ct. 1040. It has
failed to do so. Festo admits that there
is "[n]o specific mention of the sealing
rings" in the prosecution history record.
En Banc Responsive Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee Festo Corp., at 49. Moreover,
in view of our answer to En Banc
Question 2, the voluntary nature of the
amendment is irrelevant to the inquiry.
The prosecution history of the Carroll
patent reveals that the amendment that
added the pair of sealing rings claim
element was motivated by at least one
reason related to patentability: a desire
to avoid the prior art. In the remarks
accompanying the amendment that
introduced claim 9, which recites the
pair of sealing rings, Carroll stated that
the amendment defined the "features of
the patentee's invention that distinguish
over the art of record, including" the
German patent cited in the request for
reexamination. Thus, although the
German patent disclosed a piston with
sealing rings, Carroll did argue that the
combination of features recited in the
claims, which includes the pair of
sealing rings, distinguished the claims
over the German patent. Moreover,
when the examiner allowed the
reexamined claims, he stated that "the
prior art does not teach or render
obvious the claimed combination which
includes the plurality of magnets, end
members, and cushion members in the
claimed relationship." (Emphasis
added.) Although the examiner did not
specifically reference the pair of
sealing rings in his statement of reasons
for allowance, his statement
emphasizes that it is the claimed
combination of elements that was
found to be patentable. In view of this
prosecution history, Festo cannot
establish that the amendment that
added the pair of sealing rings element
was made for a reason unrelated to
patentability. Indeed, the prosecution
history indicates that the amendment
was made for a reason related to
patentability. In accordance with our
answer to En Banc Question 3,
prosecution history estoppel bars
application of the doctrine of
equivalents to the pair of sealing rings
element. Accordingly, we must reverse
the judgment that claims 5, 6, and 9 of
the Carroll patent were infringed under
the doctrine of equivalents.
CONCLUSION
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The claim elements of the Stoll and
Carroll patents that were found to be
infringed by equivalents were added to
the pertinent claims during prosecution
of the Stoll patent and during
reexamination of the Carroll patent
through amendments that narrowed the
scope of the claims. As explained
above, Festo has not established
explanations for these amendments
unrelated to patentability. The
amendments therefore gave rise to
prosecution history estoppel. Under
these circumstances, the amended
claim elements are entitled to no range
of equivalents. Thus, they cannot be
infringed by equivalents. The court's
judgment of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents of both the Stoll
and Carroll patent is therefore
PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
(Deleted).
REVERSED.
PLAGER,
(Deleted).
LOURIE,
(Deleted).
Circuit Judge, concurring.
Circuit Judge, concurring.
MICHEL, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-
part, dissenting-in-part, with whom
Circuit Judge RADER joins. (Deleted).
RADER, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-
part, dissenting-in-part. (Deleted).
LINN, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-
part, dissenting-in-part, in which
Circuit Judge RADER joins. (Deleted).
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High Court Will Hear Patent-Law Case
The Wall Strretjoumal
Tuesday, June 19, 2001
Robert S. Greenberger
The Supreme Court agreed to resolve a
dispute over patent protections and
would-be imitators.
The case involves a suit filed by Festo
Corp., a New York unit of Germany's
Festo AG, which claimed a Japanese
company copied two of its patented
designs of a machine part. The outcome
could affect the value of about 1.2 million
existing patents that go back 20 years,
according to Festo.
Festo filed its lawsuit in August 1988
against both Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., also known as SMC Corp.,
and its Indianapolis subsidiary, SMC
Pneumatics Inc. The patented devices
involve a piston, cylinder and sleeve used
to move machinery or other equipment
on a conveyer system.
Under a long-established principle of
patent law known as the doctrine of
equivalents, a product or process may
infringe a patent if there is "equivalence"
between it and the patented item. In other
words, even though a patented device isn't
copied exactly, an accused copier still
violates the patent if his product performs
substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same result, courts have
held.
The U.S. District Court for
Massachusetts, following this doctrine,
agreed with Festo. But the full U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Washington, which has jurisdiction over
all patent matters, reversed that niling.
In the complex world of patent law, an
inventor applying for a patent usually
negotiates with the patent examiner over
language describing the invention. Before
the appeals court's ruling, most changes
resulting from these negotiations couldn't
be used to narrow the inventor's
protection under the patent.
But the appeals court's ruling held that a
competitor's product with only minor
changes wouldn't. infringe the patent.
"That's because even minor changes made
during the patent negotiation process
could allow competitors to 'invent' a
different product or process," said Gerald
Bodner, a lawyer for Festo and a partner
at Hoffmann & Baron LLP, Syosset, N.Y.
Therefore, the patent holder's protection
has been diluted under the appeals-court
ruling, he said.
A brief filed by the Association of Patent
Law Firms urged the high court to end the
"upheaval" created by the appeals court's
decision. Scott Blackman, a patent lawyer
with the Washington office of Lyon &
Lyon who wrote the brief, added that the
uncertainty created by the decision
"means a lot of time and expense for
people applying for patents."
In its filing to the Supreme Court, SMC
had praised the appeals court, saying it
had decided the case "in performance of
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its essential role of refining the rules
governing assertions of infringement."
(Festo v. SMQ
In separate action, the high court ruled 8-
1 that U.S. Customs Service classification
rulings don't have as much legal weight as
regulatory decisions. The decision limits
agencies' discretion in carrying out and
interpreting Congress's laws, and makes it
easier for companies to seek review.
The case involves the Customs Service's
1993 decision to classify as "bound
diaries" certain daily planners imported by
Mead Corp., Dayton, Ohio. Previously,
the item had been in a different category
that didn't require an import duty. The
new classification ruling would have
required Mead to pay a 3.2% import duty
on the goods. Mead argued that the goods
were loose-leaf planners and shouldn't be
classified either as "bound" or as "diaries."
Mead didn't initially seek judicial review of
the classification. But six months later,
after the company imported more of the
items, it filed an appeal. The Court of
International Trade upheld the agency's
ruling, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, reversed the trade
tribunal. The appeals court said that
classification rulings don't have the force
of law or even of regulations issued by the
agency, so they aren't entitled to the same
deference. It classified them in a category
not subject to tariff.
Writing for the majority, Justice David H
Souter said there was "no indication that
Congress meant to delegate authority to
Customs to issue classification rulings
with the force of law."
(U.S. v. Mead)
The Court refused to delay today's
scheduled execution in a federal prison of
Juan Raul Garza, who was found guilty of
murder in connection with a drug ring he
ran.-
Copyright 0 2001, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc
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Top Court to Review Festo Case
LI Robotics Firm Claims Patent Infringement
Newsday
Tuesday, June 19,2001
Gaylord Shaw
A Hauppauge- based robotics company
yesterday won a full Supreme Court
review of the 13-year legal battle it has
waged to protect its patents from what it
claims is infringement by Japanese firms.
The high court's announcement that it
will consider the case this fall was a
major step forward for Festo USA
Corp., the U.S.
subsidiary of German-based Festo AG &
Co., in a lawsuit it first filed in 1988 after
it learned its Japanese competitors were
manufacturing a slightly modified
version of a device for which it held the
patent.
"Hurrah," said Horst Saalbach, chairman
of the company that has about 200
employees at its Long Island
headquarters and about the same
number in a dozen offices across the
country.
"I'm elated. I say hurrah for honesty,
hurrah for the Constitution," added
Saalbach, who fled communism in the
former East Germany at age 13 to
become a leader in the new-world fields of
automation and robotics.
The case has captured the attention of the
world's intellectual-property community.
The patent dispute-known in court files as
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., aka SMGis an appeal
from a federal Circuit Court's 8-4 ruling
last year that limited the range of patent
modifications that inventors could protect
from competitors.
That decision by the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Federal District was a
victory for the Japanese industrial giant,
which disputed Festo's claims that it had
copied Festo's patented magnetic rodless
cylinders. The devices are used, among
other things, to simulate motion by the
underwater robotic characters at Disney
World.
Critics of the lower court decision said it
would stifle innovation in some of the
most creative sectors of the economy,
including computer products and
biotechnology. Smaller inventors, who
depend on patents to protect their
investments, would be harmed at
the expense of very large corporations,
Festo and its backers claimed.
Festo's appeal to the Supreme Court was
supported in eight "friend of the court"
briefs, with signers including the
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Co., the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States and Melville-based
Chyron Corp.
Other friend of the court briefs supported
the Japanese firm, with signers including
IBM Corp. and the Applera Corp.
At the heart of Festo's appeal is the
interpretation of the so-called doctrine of
equivalents, which grants patent holders
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broad protections against inventions that
may infringe on their work by slightly
altering the original design. Festo's lawyers
argued that a less protective interpretation
of the doctrine could harm innovation.
Kenneth Starr, former independent
counsel who headed a years-long
investigation of then-President Bill
Cinton, was Festo's original lawyer.
Starr dropped out of the case because of a
potential conflict of interest-his Chicago
law firm also has represented Honeywell
Corp., one of the large U.S. high-tech
firms opposing Festo's position.
The Long Island firm then signed up
Robert Bork, former U.S. solicitor general
whose nomination to the Supreme Court
was rejected by the Senate in the 1980s.
Bork, in briefs filed for Festo, said the
high court should reverse the appeals
court because its ruling "has given a free
hand to copyists."
Saalbach estimated that the infringement
has cost his company-with annual
revenues of about $100 million-an
estimated $50 million.
Copyright *D 2001 Newsday, Inc.
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00-832 National Cable Television Association, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co.
Ruling Below (GdfPouer Ca v FCC, 11" Cir., 208 F.3d 1263, 68 U.S.L.W. 1637, 20 Comm.
Reg. (P&F) 265):
Federal Communications Commission does not have authority under 1996 Pole Attachment
Act to regulate placement on utility poles of wireless communications equipment and
attachments for Internet service.
Questions Presented: (1) Do provisions of Pole Attachments Act directing FCC to set"
just and reasonable" rates that utility may charge for "any attachment by a cable television
system or providers of telecommunications service," 47 U.S.C %§ 224(b)(1), 224(a) (4), apply
to attachments by cable televisions systems that are simultaneously used to provide high-
speed Internet access and conventional cable television programming? (2) Do those
provisions of Pole Attachments Act apply to attachments by providers of wireless
telecommunications services no less then to attachments by providers of wireline
telecommunications services?
00-843 FCC v. Gulf Power Co.
Ruling Below (11' Cir., 208 F.3d 1263, 68 U.S.L.W. 1637, 20 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 265):
Federal Communications Commission does not have authority under 1996 Pole
Attachments Act to regulate placeme3nt on utility poles of wireless communications
equipment and attachments for Internet service.
Questions Presented: (1) Do provisions of Pole Attachments Act directing FCC to set"just and reasonable" rates that utility may charge for "any attachment by a cable television
system or providers of telecommunications service," 47 U.S.C 5 224(b)(1), 224(a) (4), apply
to attachments by cable televisions systems that are simultaneously used to provide high-
speed Internet access and conventional cable television programming? (2) Do those
provisions of Pole Attachments Act apply to attachments by providers of wireless
telecommunications services no less then to attachments by providers of wireline
telecommunications services?
GULF POWER COMPANY, et al., Petitioners
V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Respondents
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided April 11, 2000
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TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
The 1996 Pole Attachment Act, 47
U.S.C § 224 (Supp.II.1996) (the "1996
Act"), gives providers of cable and
telecommunications services the right to
attach wires to the poles of power and
telephone companies. If the power and
telephone companies will not accept the
rent the providers offer to pay, the
Federal Communications Commission
(the "FCC" or "Commission") sets the
rent. In In m Inpennzation jSewcim 703(e)
f the Td wzcat A ct j 1996, 13
F.CCR. 6777, 1998 WL 46987 (1998)
(codified at 47 CF.R. % 1.1401-1.1418
(1999)47CFRS1.1418CFRLQ) ("Repot
and Onler "), the FCC promulgated a
formula for computing that rent. The
FCC also ruled (in the Repo& and One)
that the 1996 Act precluded utilities
(power and telephone) from receiving
rent for wires that were "overlashed" to
wires previously attached to their poles;
* * * that the 1996 Act gave it authority
to regulate the placement of wireless
communications equipment and
attachments for Internet service on
utility poles; and that the Act precluded
utilities from receiving rent for unused
wires contained within fiber optic cables,
"dark fiber," * * * attached to the poles.
In these consolidated petitions for
review of the Repon and Oder, several
power companies * * * (the
"Petitioners") challenge the FCC's
formula for determining rent on the
ground that, when implemented, the
formula will operate to take their
property without just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. We
decline to reach this takings claim,
because it is not ripe. The Petitioners
also challenge the FCC's other rulings.
As to those rulings, we find unripe their
challenge to the overlashing provision of
the Report and Oler, we hold that the
FCC lacks authority to regulate the
placement of wireless equipment on
utility poles and attachments for Internet
service; and that its decision regarding
dark fiber constitutes a reasonable
interpretation of the 1996 Act.
I.
A-
From its inception, the cable television
industry has attached its cables to the
utility poles of power and telephone
companies. * * * They have done so
because factors such as zoning
restrictions, environmental regulations,
and start-up costs have rendered other
options infeasible. Despite this dearth of
alternatives, the attachment agreements
between cable television companies and
utility companies have generally been
voluntary. But, the lack of alternatives
has given the power and telephone
companies an advantage in negotiating
attachment agreements: their monopoly
in the supply of poles that could
accommodate television cables has
allowed them, in the past, to charge
monopoly rents.
In an effort to solve the monopoly
pricing problem, Congress, in 1978,
enacted the Pole Attachment Act, Pub.L.
95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (1978) (codified at 47
U.S.C 5 224 (1994)) (the "1978 Act"), as
an amendment to the Communications
Act of 1934. The solution Congress
articulated in that act was to specify a
range of rents telephone and power
companies could charge the cable
television companies they allowed to
attach to their poles. * * "Congress'
solution, in the 1978 Act, did not,
however, change the voluntary nature of
the attachment arrangement. As before,
the cable television companies had no
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right to attach; thus, utilities could reject
a cable television company's offer to
attach. As for the attachments already in
place, the 1978 Act effectively changed
their terms.15 In the event the parties
could not agree to the rent and
conditions of an attachment, and the
State chose not to regulate the terms of
attachments, the FCC would settle the
issue.16
The rule the FCC promulgated to
implement its authority under the 1978
Act reflected its limited authority; that
rule merely "provided complaint and
enforcement procedures to ensure that
rates, terms and conditions for cable
television pole attachments [we]re just
and reasonable." 47 CF.R. S 1.1401
(1978). The rule set forth (1) the
procedure for filing a complaint about
rents or conditions of attachment, see id;
(2) factors to be considered by the
administrative law judge in determining
the lawfulness of the rent or conditions
the utility sought, se id; and (3) a
formula for determining the maximum
rent the utility could receive, see 47
C.F.R. S 1.1409. Under the formula, the
15 Since the 1978 Act did not give the cable
television companies the right to attach, the
utilities could have avoided the FOC's regulation of
rent and conditions of attachment under the Act
by canceling the existing arrangements, and having
the attachments removed. For obvious reasons,
the utilities did not take this step.
16 The FOC already possessed regulatory
authority over the telephone industry. See 47
U.S.C § 151 (1994). The passage of the 1978 Act
gave the FCC the authority to regulate power
companies as well, albeit in the limited manner
described in the text. Sw 47 U.S.C. 5 224(a)-(c)
(1994).
maximum rent a utility could charge was
the attacher's proportionate share * * *
of the bare costs of maintaining the pole
and the "carrying charges" * * *
associated with the pole.
After the FOC promulgated its rule,
several cable television companies in
Florida filed complaints with the FCC,
contending that Florida Power
Corporation was charging them
unreasonable rents to attach. See FCC v
Florida Pouer Cp., 480 U.S. 245, 248-49,
107 S.Ct. 1107, 1110, 94 L.Ed.2d 282
(1987). The FCC agreed that the rents
were unreasonable and set a lower rent.
Florida Power appealed the FOC's
decision to this court, which held that
the rent the FCC had set effected a
taking of Florida Power's property
without just compensation. Florda Poer
COp. v FC1 772 F.2d 1537, 1546 (11th
Cir.1985). The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that no taking occurred because
Florida Power had voluntarily agreed to
the cable companies' attachments. Had
Congress, in the 1978 Act, required
utilities to allow the attachments, a taking
may have occurred, the court suggested.
SW Floida Pozeer Cap. 480 U.S. at 251 n.
6, 107 S.Ct. at 1111 n. 6.
The Florida Pouer decision clarified two
fundamental precepts underlying the
1978 Act and the FCCs implementing
regulations: (1) the FCC had narrow
authority under the 1978 Act; it could
regulate the power companies only to
ensure that, once they consented to an
attachment, the conditions of attachment
and the rent they were to receive were
reasonable; and (2) the FCCs rent
formula was not subject to judicial
review under the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause because the 1978 Act's
voluntary attachment provision effected
no taking for which just compensation
would be due.
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Not long after the Court decided Florida
Pouer Congress decided to foster
competition in the cable television
industry. To that end, it enacted the
Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. U 521-559
(1994)) (the "Cable Act"). Prior to this
enactment, cable television companies
operated under exclusive franchises
granted by a local government, usually a
municipality. Because these franchises
effectively gave the companies
monopolies in the franchise territory, the
local governments regulated the rates
they could charge subscribers. Se
HRRep. No. 98-934, at 23-24, mpimd
i 1984 U.S.CCA.N. 4655, 4660-61. * *
*The approach Congress adopted to
encourage competition was to eliminate
the power of local governments to set
rates for "basic" cable service. Congress
realized that, in the short run at least, this
would give incumbent cable operators
the ability to charge their subscribers
monopoly prices. Prices would decrease
in the long run, however, as local
governments granted additional
franchises for a given territory. See
Jobson E tes., Ir v FPL Gnup, Inc, 162
F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir.1998). New
cable companies would be able to enter
the market and compete with the
incumbent cable company though, only
if they could obtain utility pole
attachments on the same terms as those
given to the incumbent.
In addition to these new demands for
pole space, a host of new
telecommunications carriers (such as
new long distance telephone carriers and
wide area telephone service providers),
which used wires to carry their signals,
began calling on the power and
telephone companies to lease them
space. They did so because utility poles
afforded the only feasible means for
stringing their wires. Since the 1978 Act
only regulated the rents utilities could
charge cable television companies, many
utilities demanded monopoly rents from
telecommunications carriers. In an effort
to alleviate this problem, Congress, in
1996, amended the 1978 Act to give
entities providing telecommunications
and cable television service the right to
"nondiscriminatory access" to utility
poles. Sw 47 U.S.C § 224(f (Supp. II
1996).17 In the event the parties could
not agree to the terms of the attachment,
including the rent, the 1996 Act
authorized the FCC to set "just and
reasonable" terms. Se id S 224(b)(1).
The 1996 Act also (1) redefined "utility,"
changing the definition from "any
person whose rates or charges are
regulated by the Federal Government or
a State" to "any person who is a local
exchange carrier, or a electric, gas, water,
steam, or other public utility," * * * (2)
redefined "pole attachment" to include
attachments by providers of
telecommunications service; * * * (3)
directed the FOC to create a formula for
determining the attachment rent a utility
could charge a telecommunications
service provider, * * * and (4) instructed
utilities on how to apportion the costs of
17 Section 224(f) provides:
(1) A utility shall provide a cable television
system or any telecommunications carrier with
nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct,
conduit, or right-of-wayowned or controlled by
it.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a utility
providing electric service may deny a cable
television system or any telecommunications
carrier access to its poles, ducts, conduits, or
rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory basis where
there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of
safety, reliability, and generally applicable
engmeenng purposes.
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"unusable" and "usable" space on their
poles among telecommunications service
providers. * * *
On February 6, 1998, the FCC
promulgated regulations implementing
its authority under the 1996 Act. See
Report and Oe;r, 13 F.CCR 6777, 1998
WL 46987. In the Repot and Onler, the
FCC interpreted section 224(f) of the
1996 Act to require that utility
companies give Internet providers access
to their poles because the Internet was a
cable service. Se id at 6795- 96. Further,
it interpreted the language of section
224(a)(4), which states that pole
attachment meant any attachment, and
section 224(d)(3), which provides that
the FCC's rate applied to any attachment
by a telecommunications carrier, to mean
that telephone and power companies
would have to accept pole attachments
for wireless telephone equipment. See id
at 6798-99; * * *. The agency also
determined that the Act precludes
utilities from receiving rent for
overlashed wires unless those wires
significantly increase the burden on the
pole. Se id at 6807. Finally, the FCC
interpreted the Act to prohibit utilities
from receiving rent for dark fiber. See id
at 6810.
Having thus interpreted the scope of its
authority, the FCC articulated formulas
for determining the attachment rents
utilities may charge telecommunications
service providers. See id at 6820-30. Until
February 2001, the 1978 Act's maximum
rent formula for cable providers applies
to attachments by telecommunications
service providers. After that, the
maxinum rent will equal the sum of the
"unusable" and "usable" rate factors. * *
In this amended rule, the
incorporated almost verbatim
FCC
the
complaint process articulated in its 1978
rule. See 47 CF.R % 1.1404, 1.1409
(1999). If the parties cannot agree to the
rent or other terms of an attachment (or
if the utility denies access to its poles),
the party contending that the rent or
other terms are unjust and unreasonable
may petition the Commission to settle
the matter. That party bears the burden
of establishing a prim face case that the
other partys position is unjust and
unreasonable. * * * If the complainant
fails to make out a prim face case, the
FOC must dismiss its complaint, in
which case the rent or conditions offered
or demanded govern the transaction. * *
*If a pnm face case is established, the
Commission determines the mairtan
just and reasonable rent allowed under
the rule's formula. Then, it decides the
specific just and reasonable rent the
complainant should pay or receive for
the attachment. This determination
involves reviewing items such as costs,
rate of return on investment, the utility's
filings before state or federal regulatory
agencies, and engineering studies, see 47
CF.R. § 1.1404(g)(1)-(13) (1999), in
addition to considering the maximum
rent the FCCs formula yields. The FCC's
final rate order, like any of its final
orders, is then subject to judicial review
under 47 U.S.C S 402(a) (1994)
(providing for judicial review of FCC
orders) and 28 U.S.C $5 2342, 2344
(1994) (providing for judicial review of
FCC orders in a United States Court of
Appeals).
B.
In response to the FCCs Repot and
Onler, power companies across the
country filed petitions for review in
vanous courts of appeals. * * *
In their petitions for review, thePetitioners challenge (1) the
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implementation of the FCC's formula for
computing attachment rents as a taking
without just compensation; (2) the
implementation of the FCC's overlashing
interpretation as a taking without just
compensation; (3) the FCC's authority to
include wireless communications
equipment within the 1996 Act's
regulated rate framework; (4) the FCCs
authority to include Internet service
providers within the 1996 Act's regulated
rate framework; and (5) the FCC's
decision not to count dark fibers as
separate attachments. We discuss each of
these challenges below, in parts III-VI.
On the day Gulf Power Company and its
co-plaintiffs filed their joint petition for
review, Gulf Power and several other
utilities * * * brought an action in the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Se Gulf
Pouer Ca v Unital Stats, 998 F.Supp.
1386 (N.D.Fla.1998). Contending that
the range of rental compensation the
1996 Act provided would in every case
operate to deny a utility just
compensation, these plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the 1996 Act was facially
invalid under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, and a permanent
injunction prohibiting the Commission
from enforcing the 1996 Act. See id at
1389. The plaintiffs also claimed that
allowing the FCC to determine just
compensation violated the Separation of
Powers doctrine. The district court
granted the United States' motion for
summary judgment. It concluded that,
although the 1996 Act authorized a
taking of the plaintiffs' property, it did
not deny the plaintiffs just
compensation. Rather, it provided a
procedure--a proceeding before the
Commission--for determining just
compensation which did not violate the
Separation of Powers doctrine because
the Commission's decision was subject
to judicial review. Se id at 1397- 98.
The plaintiff utilities appealed. A panel
of this court upheld the district court's
conclusion that the 1996 Act authorized
a taking of the plaintiffs' property, but
declined to review the court's ruling on
just compensation. That issue was not
ripe for review because the plaintiffs had
not shown that the 1996 Act would
operate to deny them just compensation
in every case. Se Gulf Pouer Co v Unital
State, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th
Cir.1999) (Gulf Pouer I ). Finally, the
panel affirmed the district court's
holding that allowing the FCC to
determine just compensation in the first
instance did not violate the Separation of
Powers doctrine. Id at 1332-37.
II.
In their petitions for review, the
Petitioners do not present the same
challenges the plaintiffs made in Gulf
Power I Instead of attacking the facial
validity of the Act under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and the
Separation of Powers doctrine, the
Petitioners question the facial validity of
several aspects of the FCCs Report and
OnLer.
We review constitutional challenges to
agency regulations de nom See Rural Td
Coditin v FCQ 838 F.2d 1307, 1313
(D.CCir1988); se alo 5 U.S.C S
706(2)(B) (1994). We use the two- step
Chazn analysis to review agency
Interpretations of a statute. Se C1xuan
US.A., Irc v Natural Rsuzrs Dykme
Camu4 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); LqlEnztL Assitarxe
Food, Inc v EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1473
(11th Cir.1997). Under Cheutn step one,
we determine whether Congress has
spoken unambiguously to the question at
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issue. If it has, our inquiry ends; we give
effect to Congress' intent. See Ceuv
467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781.
Under xrn step two, if we determine
that Congress' intent is ambiguous, we
defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation of Congress' intent. See id
at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. In resolving
whether an ambiguity exists, we use
normal tools of statutory construction,
without affording agency interpretations
any deference. See [NS v Cdma-Farmea,
480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221,
94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); Nadard Ming
Ass'n u Smreary cfLabo;r 153 F.3d 1264,
1267 (11th Cir.1998).
III.
The Petitioners' primary challenge to
the FCC's Report ard Onler is that the
rate formula it establishes cannot pass
muster under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. The Petitioners'
challenge presents two separate
questions: will the Commission's
formula, when implemented, effect a
taking of part of utility poles, and if so,
will the formula operate to deny the
utilities just compensation in every case.
The GulfPouer I panel decided that the
1996 Act authorized a taking of utilities
property, but concluded that the issue
of whether the statute would operate to
deny just compensation in every case
was not ripe for review. * * * The
panel's resolution of the takings issue
constitutes binding precedent. * * * We
therefore begin with the premise that
the 1996 Act authorizes the
Commission, when faced with a
complaint filed by an entity providing
cable television or telecommunications
services, to take a utility's property.
Thus, our answer to the first question
the Petitioners pose is yes: when the
Commission rules on a complaint, a
taking may result.
The second question the Petitioners
present is whether the Commission's
formula will operate to deny utilities
just compensation in every case. The
Gulf Pover I panel held that the just
compensation question, when raised in
a facial challenge to the 1996 Act, was
not ripe unless the plaintiffs could
show that just compensation would be
denied in all cases. The compensation
limits--the maximum and minimum
rents--that the Commission's rule
prescribes mirror the compensation
limits prescribed by the 1996 Act.
Carpe 47 U.S.C. § 224(b), (d)(1), uith
47 C.F.R. 5 1.1409. Under the 1996
Act, the lowest rent that may be
considered just and reasonable is an
amount equal to the incremental cost of
adding the new attachment to the
utility's pole; the highest rent that may
be considered just and reasonable is an
amount equal to the fully allocated
costs of the pole. * * * A rent that is
higher or lower than these statutory
limits would be unjust and
unreasonable. Because the outer
boundaries of the FCC's formula are
identical to those of the 1996 Act, Gulf
Poer I 's ripeness standard binds us.
Thus, we inquire whether the
Petitioners have shown that the
Commission's formula will always deny
utilities just compensation.
In this case, we are not called upon to
review an FCC determination that a
utility provide pole space at a rent that
does not amount to the just
compensation mandated by the Takings
Clause. All that is before us is a facial
attack on the Commission's formula
and the Petitioners' allegation that
factors the Commission took into
account in fashioning the formula could
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never provide just compensation. This
is essentially the same argument the
utilities made to the GulfPouer I panel.
The panel's response was that the
utilities failed to establish that " 'no set
of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid., " GfPouer, 187
F.3d at 1336 (quoting Umtal Statz v
Sakr, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct.
2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)).
Although the Petitioners posit
circumstances in which the FOC's
formula will deny just compensation,
we are not confident, given the record
at hand, that the formula will deny just
compensation in all cases. The
Petitioners' facial challenge to the
formula is therefore unripe, and we do
not address it. ***
IV.
The Petitioners challenge the FCC's
decision to include wireless carriers
within the "nondiscriminatory access"
provision of section 224(f), claiming that
the FCC has no statutory authority to
regulate wireless carriers under the 1996
Act.18 We agree.
The FCC contends that Congress'
frequent use of the word "any" in the
1996 Act indicates an intent to have the
Commission broadly regulate pole
attachments. * * * As long as an
attachment is made by a cable television
company or a telecommunications
service provider, the FCC contends, the
attachment may be regulated under
18 As stated in part II stpra, questions of pure
statutory construction fall within a Cxur step
one analysis. We therefore owe no deference to an
agency's construction of a statute. Sw Gmisa-
Fcrsa, 480 U.S. at 446, 107 S.Ct. at 1221; Natimal
MimrgAss'4 153 F3d at 1267.
section 224(d) or (e), no matter what
kind of attachment it is. This position is
contrary to the Commission's nanow
authority to regulate power companies.
The FCC's organic statute does not give
it authority to regulate power utilities. * *
*Congress placed power companies
within the agency's regulatory authority
for pole attachment purposes only. * * *
Section 224(a)(4) defines a pole
attachment as "any attachment by a cable
television system or provider of
telecommunications service to a pole,
duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
controlled by a utility." A utility,
according to section 224(a)(1) is "any
person ... who owns or controls poles,
ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in
whole or in part, for any wire
communications." * * * Read in
combination, these two provisions give
the FCC authority to regulate
attachments to poles used, at least in
part, for iuM communications, and by
negative implication does not give the
FOC authority over attachments to poles
for uinis communications. * * *
That wires are integral to the FCC's
authority is supported by the legislative
history of the 1978 Act. * * *Congress'
reason for passing it was that the
Commission did not believe it had
authority to regulate power companies
since pole attachment arrangements
"d[id] not constitute communication by
wire or radio." S.Rep. No.95-580, at 14,
printai in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 122
(internal quotation marks omitted). The
FCC reasoned that:
The fact that cable operators ha[d] found
in-place facilities convenient or even
necessary for their businesses [wals not
sufficient basis for finding that the
leasing of those facilities [wa]s wire or
radio communications. If such were the
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case, we might be called upon to regulate
access and charges for use of public and
private roads and right of ways essential
for the laying of wire, or even access and
rents for antenna sites.
Id Before 1978, the FCC's regulatory
authority did not extend to power
companies because power companies did
not use their poles primarily for
communication by wire or radio. This
hindered the growth of the cable
television market. The FCC could
regulate what telephone companies
charged to attach, but could not regulate
what the power companies charged to
attach. Because telephone and power
poles generally did not run side-by-side,
the cable companies at times were forced
to attach to power company poles
instead of telephone poles, and to pay
monopoly rents. To prevent the power
companies from taking unfair advantage
of their bottleneck facilities in this
manner, Congress brought them under
the FCC's regulatory umbrella,
permitting "[f]ederal involvement in pole
attachments matters ... where space on a
utility pole ha[d] been designated and.
[wa]s aaually hlng ua for amicatia
serasf by wive or cable" Id at 15, 7epriniin
1978 U.S.CCA.N. at 123 (emphasis
added). The reason Congress gave this
pole attachment authority to the FCC
was that the Commission already
regulated all other aspects of the cable
industry and cable companies were the
only entities seeking to attach to poles in
1978.
In 1996, when Congress amended the
1978 Act, it once again expanded the
FCC's jurisdiction; this time to include
attachments by telecommunications
service providers. Nothing in the
legislative history indicates that the
original purpose behind regulating utility
poles--to prevent the telephone and
power companies from charging
monopoly rents to connect to their
bottleneck * * * facilities--changed.
Rather, the legislative history suggests
the same thing the language alteration
suggests: Congress wanted to allow
telecommunications service providers,
like the cable television companies
before them, to attach to the utilities'
bottleneck facilities without having to
pay monopoly rents. *" *
The Petitioners' poles are not bottleneck
facilities for wireless carriers. Wireless
attachments to poles "include an antenna
or antenna clusters, a communications
cabinet at the base of the pole, coaxial
cables connecting antennas to the
cabinet, concrete pads to support the
cabinet, ground wires and trenching, and
wires for telephone and electric service."
Repon and Ole;r, 13 F.CC.R at 6799.
Most of this equipment can be placed on
any tall building, and the whole set-up
requires more physical space then a
wireline system. Further, wireless
systems operate in a completely different
way than do wireline systems. Wireline
networks transmit through linear
networks of cables strung between poles.
Wireless networks, on the other hand,
transmit through a series of concentric
circle emissions that allow the network
to continue working if one antenna
malfunctions. Indeed, it is highly
questionable whether there are any
bottleneck facilities for wireless systems.
What is beyond question is that utility
poles are not bottleneck facilities for
wireless systems. Because they are not,
and because the 1996 Act deals with wire
and cable attachments to bottleneck
facilities, the act does not provide the
FCC with authority to regulate wireless
carners. * *
Although Congress did not give the FOC
authority to regulate the placement of
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wireless carriers' equipment under
section 224 (or any other section) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, that
statute did address, in part, such
regulation by state and local
governments. Section 332 * * * states
that "[t]he regulation of the placement,
construction, and modification of
personal wireless services facilities by any
State or local government or
instrumentality thereof--shall not
unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent
services; and shall not prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless service." * * *The
section goes on to require a state to act
on requests to site wireless equipment
within a reasonable time, to require a
state to put its reasons for denying any
such request in writing, and to limit the
reasons a state can assert for determining
where wireless carriers can locate their
equipment. * * *The specificity with
which Congress addressed the siting of
wireless equipment in section 332
indicates that it did not intend that
section 224 provide the FCC authority to
regulate the placement of wireless
carriers' equipment.
V.
Next, Petitioners challenge the FCCs
statutory authority to regulate
attachments for Internet service under
the 1996 Act. As with wireless carriers,
we agree that the FCC has no authority
under that act to regulate Internet service
providers. The 1996 Act allows the
Commission to regulate the rates for
cable service and telecommunications
service; Internet service is neither.
The FCC argues that Internet service
provided by a cable television system is
either "solely cable services" or is subject
to regulation under section 224(b)(1)'s
mandate to "ensure that the rates, terms,
and conditions [for pole attachments] are
just and reasonable." * * *To accept this
argument requires us to disregard the
unambiguous language of the 1996 Act,
which we cannot do. * * *The 1996 Act
calls for the Commission to establish
two rates for pole attachments. * * *One,
described in section 224(d), applies to
"any pole attachment used by a cable
television system solely to provide cable
service." * * *The second rate applies to
"charges for pole attachments used by
telecommunications carriers to provide
telecommunications services." * * * For
the FOC to be able to regulate the rent
for an attachment that provides Internet
service then, Internet service must
qualify as either a cable service or a
telecommunications service.
Cable service, defined in section 522, is
"the one-way transmission to subscribers
of (i) video programming, or (ii) other
programming service, and subscriber
interaction, if any, which is required for
the selection or use of such video
programming or other programming
service." * * *The only difference
between this definition of "cable service"
and the definition included in the 1978
Act is the addition of the words "or use."
According to the House Report
accompanying the 1996 amendments,
the inclusion of the words "or use" was
meant to "reflect[ ] the evolution of
video programming toward interactive
services." * * *This is the only sentence
in the legislative history that attempts to
explain Congress' change to the
definition of "cable service." Although
what it means to reflect an evolution of
video programming toward interactive
service is not exactly clear, it is clear
from Congress' lack of discussion of this
change that it was minor in both
language and intent. If Congress by the
addition of these two words meant to
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expand the scope of the "cable service"
definition from its traditional video base
to include all interactive services, video
and non-video, it would have said so.
Without any substantive comment, we
will not read this minor change to
effectuate a major statutory shift. * * *
How then did the addition of the words
"or use" alter the definition of "cable
service"? The statute's plain language and
Congress' one sentence explanation
suggest that Congress expanded the
definition to include services that cable
television companies offer to their
customers to allow them to interact with
traditional video programming. * * *
Although the statute includes interaction
with other programming--in addition to
video programming--within the
definition of "cable service," we cannot
read the language "other programming"
broadly to include Internet services.
"Other programming" has been part of
the definition of "cable service" since
1978, when the Internet was only a tool
for researchers and the military, not a
commodity that would require
regulation. When Congress used this
language then, it could not have intended
it to cover Internet services provided by
cable companies. Again, we will not
radically expand the scope of the
definition of "cable service" from a video
base to an all-interactive-services base
without some substantive indication
from Congress that this is indeed its
intent.***
Furthermore, as an aside, we note that
the FCC; itself, has defined the Internet
as an information service, not as a cable
service. See In Re Fal-State Jame Bd on
Uniwesal Seru, 13 F.CQCR 11501 1 66,
1998 WL 166178 ("Internet service
providers themselves provide
information services.... "). Thus, the FCC
lacks statutory authority to regulate the
Internet under the 1996 Act based on
the theory that Internet service is a cable
service.
The only remaining basis for the
Commission's authority to regulate the
Internet under the 1996 Act is to treat
the Internet as a telecommunications
service. * * *The FCC, however, did not
raise that argument before us. Nor could
it have because the FCC has specifically
said that the Internet is not a
telecommunications service. * * *
Accordingly, there is no statutory basis
for the FCC to regulate the Internet as a
telecommunications service under the
1996 Act.
In sum, Congress, in the 1996 Act,
authorized the FCC to develop rent
formulas for attachments providing cable
and telecommunications services.
Internet service does not meet the
definition of either a cable service or a
telecommunications service. Therefore,
the 1996 Act does not authorize the FCC
to regulate pole attachments for Internet
service.
VI.
The Petitioners' final challenge is to the
FCCs statutory authority to regulate the
rents utilities charge for dark fiber
attachments. Dark fiber, which exists
within a fiber optic cable, "consists of ...
bare capacity and does not involve any
of the electronics necessary to transmit
or receive signals over that capacity."
Report ard Cde 13 F.C.CR at 6810.
The advantage of stringing cables with lit
and dark fiber is that dark fiber provides
excess distribution and transmittal
capacity for a cable or
telecommunications company to use as
its service network expands. Dark fiber
also may be leased to a third party.Because dark fiber is bare capacity, it
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technically is neither a
telecommunications service nor a cable
service. In fact, it is not a service at all; it
is simply an inactive fiber.
The 1996 Act authorizes the FCC to
regulate the pole attachments of cable
television and telecommunications
companies that provide cable and
telecommunications services. See 47
U.S.C. S 224; supra part V. The 1996 Act
says nothing about regulating bare
capacity. But, these bare capacity fibers
do not generally exist on their own. They
are usually located within cables that also
contain fibers providing cable or
telecommunications services, i.e., lit
fibers the FCC clearly has the authority
to regulate. Thus, unlike Internet service
or wireless carriers, the statute's silence
does not resolve the issue of whether the
Commission may regulate dark fiber.
Both Internet service and wireless
carriers are similar to items the statute
covers. The statute defines the kinds of
attachers it covers, and wireless carriers
do not fall within that definition.
Similarly, the statute defines the types of
wire services it covers, and Internet
services are not one of those services.
We can, therefore, say, based on the
1996 Act alone, that the FCC lacks the
authority to regulate wireless carriers and
the provision of Internet services. Dark
fiber, however, is not a service (nor, of
course, is it a type of attacher). Thus, the
fact that it falls outside the definitions of
"cable service" and "telecommunications
service" tells us nothing about Congress'
intent to regulate dark fiber. Congress
did say that it did not intend to have an
attacher pay twice for a single
attachment, se H-.Rep. No. 104-204, at
92, pima in 1996 U.S.C.A.N. at 59,
but the legislative history does not
indicate whether dark fiber and its host
were to be considered a single
attachment. Congress' intent is
ambiguous; therefore, we proceed to
step two of the Cheum analytical
framework and consider whether the
FCC reasonably interpreted Congress'
silence on dark fiber. See Oarn, 467
U.S. at 843, 104 S.Cc. at 2781-82. * * *
The FCC decided that dark fiber is not a
separate attaching entity from its host
attachment. Sw Repos and Oder, 13
F.C.C.R at 6811. * * *According to the
FCC, dark fibers place no more burden
on a pole than do their host attachments.
See i This makes sense since dark fiber,
by definition, is merely bare capacity and
is included within its host attachment at
the time that cable is attached to the
pole. Further, we presume that in
determining the rent for the host
attachment, the utility and the FCC will
account for the dark fibers contained
within the attaching host. By accounting
for the dark fibers in the rent
determination for the host cable, the
Commission ensures that the utility
receives just compensation for any
burden the dark fiber may cause the pole
at the time the host attaches. Hence,
once the utility has been compensated,
there is no reason to treat dark fiber as a
separate attaching entity, and the FCC's
decision not to do so is reasonable. * * *
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
the nondiscriminatory access provision
of the 1996 Act authorizes a taking of a
portion of the Petitioners' poles, which
occurs when the FCC issues a rent
determination order as to a particular
pole or set of poles. Whether the rent
formula developed by the FCC,
including its decision not to require
additional compensation for overlashed
wires, provides just compensation is not
ripe for review because it is not
presented in a sufficiently concrete form
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for adjudication. Further, we hold that
the FCC lacks the authority to regulate
wireless carriers and the provision of
Internet service under the 1996 Act.
Finally, we hold that the FCCs decision
not to count leased dark fiber as an
additional attaching entity is reasonable.
SO ORDERED.
CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part: (Deleted)
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00-511 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC
Ruling Below (Iouw Utilitia Balv FCC, 8 Gr., 219 F.3d 744):
Provision of 1996 Telecommunications Act prescribing that rates charged by incumbent
local exchange carriers to new local service competitors for interconnection of facilities and
equipment and for furnishing of network elements on unbundled bases "shall be based on
the cost ... of providing the interconnection or network element," 47 U.S.C §252(d) (1) (A),
is ambiguous, and Federal Communications Commission's use of forward-looking cost
calculation methodology that is based on incremental costs that ILEC actually incurs or will
incur in providing interconnection to its network or unbundled access to its specific network
elements requested by competitor, while denying ILECs recovery of historical costs, is
reasonable and entitled to deference.
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that 47 U.S.C §252(d)(1)
(1996 Telecommunications Act) forecloses cost methodology adopted by FCC, which is
based on efficient replacement cost of existing technology, for determining interconnection
rates that new entrants into local telecommunications markets must pay incumbent local
telephone companies? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding htat neither takings clause nor
1996 Telecommunications Act requires incorporation of incumbent local exchange carrier's
"historical" costs into rates that it may charge new entrants for access to its network
elements? (3) Does 47 U.S.C. §251(c) (3) prohibit regulators from requiring that incumbent
local telephone companies combine certain previously uncombined network elements when
new entrant requests combination and agrees to compensate incumbent for performing that
task?
00-555 WorldCom, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc.
Ruling Below (Iozma Utilitia Baniv FCC, 8t Cir., 219 F.3d 744):
Provision of 1996 Telecommunications Act prescribing that rates charged by incumbent
local exchange carriers to new local service competitors for interconnection of facilities and
equipment and for furnishing of network elements on unbundled bases "shall be based on
the cost.. .of providing the interconnection or network element," 47 U.S.c §252(d)(1)(A),
was reasonably construed by the Federal Communications Commission to allow for
forward-looking cost calculation methodology that is based on incremental costs that ILEC
actually incurs or will incur in providing interconnection or unbundled access, but does not
permit basing allowable charges on what costs would be if ILEC provided most efficient
technology and in most efficient configuration available today utilizing its existing wire
center locations; FCC regulation that requires ILEC to perform functions necessary to
combine unbundled network elements in any technically feasible manner, 47 CF.R.
§51.315(c)-(f), violates plain language of Section 251(c)(3) of statute, which, in providing that
ILEC "shall provide such unbundled network elements in a meaner that allows requesting
carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunication service,"
contemplates that it is requesting carriers, rather than ILECs, who shall "combine such
elements"; Section 252(d)(3) of statute, which provides that state commissions "shall
determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the
telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any
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marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange
carrier," authorizes exclusion from wholesale rates of only those continuing costs of
providing retail telephone service that ILEC actually will avoid by selling to competitor
services that it requests and thus FCC regulation authorizing exclusion of such costs that
"reasonably can be avoided," 47 C.F.R. §51.609(b), is contrary to statute.
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that 47 U.S.C §252(d)(1)
(1996 Telecommunications Act) forecloses cost methodology adopted by F(C, which is
based on efficient replacement cost of existing technology, for determining interconnection
rates that new entrants into local telecommunications markets must pay incumbent local
telephone companies? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding that neither takings clause or
1996 Telecommunications Act requires incorporation of incumbent local exchange carrier's
"historical" costs into rates that it may charge new entrants for access to its network
elements? (3) Does 47 U.S.C 5251(c)(3) prohibit regulators from requiring that incumbent
telephone companies combine certain previously uncombined network elements when new
entrant requests combination and agrees to compensate incumbent for performing that task.
00-587 FCC v. Iowa Utilities Board
Ruling Below (8 Cir., 219 F.3d 744)
Provision of 1996 Telecommunications Act prescribing that rates charged by incumbent
local exchange carriers to new local service competitors for interconnection of facilities and
equipment and for furnishing of network elements on unbundled basis "shall be based on
the cost ... of providing the interconnection or network element," 47 U.S.C $252(d)(1)(A),
was reasonably construed by Federal Communications Commission to allow for forward-
looking cost calculation methodology that is based on incremental costs that ILE C actually
incurs or will incur in providing interconnection or unbundled access, but does not permit
basing allowable charges on what costs would be if ILEC provided most efficient technology
and in most efficient configuration available today utilizing its existing wire center locations;
FCC regulation that requires ILEC to perform functions necessary to combine unbundled
network elements in any technically feasible manner, 47 CF.R. $51.315(c)-(f), violates plain
language of Section 251(c) (3) of statute, which, in providing that ILEC "shall provide such
unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such
elements in order to provide such telecommunication service," contemplates that it is
requesting carriers, rather than ILECs, who shall "combine such elements."
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that 47 U.S.C 5252(d)(1)(1996 Telecommunications Act) forecloses cost methodology adopted by FCC, which is
based on efficient replacement cost of existing technology, for determining interconnection
rates that new entrants into local telecommunications markets must pay incumbent local
telephone companies? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding that neither takings clause nor
1996 Telecommunications Act requires incorporation of incumbent local exchange carrier's
"historical" costs into rates that it may charge new entrants for access to its network
elements? (3) Does 47 U.S.C 251(c) (3) prohibit regulators from requiring that incumbent
local telephone companies combine certain previously uncombined network elements when
new entrant requests combination and agrees to compensate incumbent for performing that
task
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00-590 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board
Ruling Below (Ioua Utilitus Banly FCC, 8' Cir., 219 F.3d 744):
Provision of Telecommunications Act prescribing that rates charged by incumbent local
exchange carriers to new local service competitors interconnection of facilities and
equipment and for furnishing of network elements on unbundled basis "shall be based on
the cost ... of providing the interconnection or network element," 47 U.S.C §252(d) (1) (A),
was reasonably construed by Federal Communications Commission to allow for forward-
looking cost calculation methodology that is based on incremental costs that ILEC actually
incurs or will incur in providing interconnection or unbundled access, but does not permit
basing allowable charges on what costs would be if ILEC provided most efficient technology
and in most efficient configuration available today utilizing its existing wire center locations;
FCC regulation placing burden of proof on rural ILECs claiming right to continued
exemption from their obligation under Section 251(c) of statute to provide new competitors
access to their own networks, 47 CF.R. §51.405(a), (c), (d), conflicts with language of
Section 251 (f)(1)(A), which, in providing that exemption shall continue "until" bona fide
request for access is made, places burden of proof on party making request for access to
show that request "is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is
consistent with Section 245 of this title (other than subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D)
thereof)," and thus regulation is vacated as invalid; FCC regulation construing "unduly
economically burdensome" criterion of Section 251(f) to mean "undue economic burden
beyond the economic burden that is typically associated with efficient competitive entry," 47
CF.R. §51.405(c), (d), impermissibly weakens broad protection Congress granted to small
and rural telephone companies by excluding economic burdens ordinarily associated with
competitive entry, and thus is unreasonable; Section 252(d)(3) of statute, which provides that
state commission "shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to
subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof
attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the
local exchange carrier," authorizes exclusion from wholesale rates of only those continuing
costs of providing retail telephone that ILEC actually will avoid by selling to competitor
services that it requests, and thus FCC regulation authorizing exclusion of such costs that
reasonably can be avoided," 47 CF.R 551.609(b), is contrary to statute; FCC regulation
that requires ILEC to perform functions necessary to combine unbundled network elements
in any technically feasible manner, 47 CF.R. §51.315(c)-(f), violates plain language of Section251 (c)(3) of statute, which, in providing that ILEC "shall provide such unbundled network
elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order toprovide such telecommunication service," contemplates that it is requesting carriers, ratherthan ILECs, who shall "combine such elements."
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that 47 U.S.C(d)(1) (1996Telecommunications Act) forecloses cost methodology adopted by FCQ, which is based onefficient replacement cost of existing technology, for determining interconnection rates thatnew entrants into local telecommunications markets must pay incumbent local telephonecompanies? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding that neither takings clause nor 1996Telecommunications Act requires incorporation of incumbent local exchange carrier'shistorcal" costs into rates that it may charge new entrants for access to its network
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elements? (3) Does 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3) prohibit regulators from requiring that incumbent
local telephone companies combine certain previously uncombined network elements when
new entrant requests combination and agrees to compensate incumbent for performing that
task)
00-602 General Communications, Inc. v. Iowa Utilities Board
Ruling Below (Ioua Utiliti5 Band v FCC 8h Cir., 219 F.3d 744):
Federal Communications Commission regulation placing burden of proof on rural
incumbent local exchange carriers claiming right to continued exemption from their
obligation under Section 25 1(c) of 1996 Telecommunications Act to provide new
competitors access to their own networks, 47 CF.R. §51.405(a), (c), (d), conflicts with
language of Section 251(f) (1) (A), which, in providing that exemption shall continue "until"
bona fide request for access is made, places burden of proof on party making request for
access to show that request "is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible,
and is consistent with Section 254 of this title (other then subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D)
thereof)," and thus regulation is vacated as invalid; FCC regulation construing "unduly
economically burdensome" criterion of Section 251(f) to mean "undue economic burden
beyond the economic burden that is typically associated with efficient competitive entry," 47
CF.R. §51.405(c), (d), impermissibly weakens broad protection Congress granted to small
and rural telephone companies by excluding economic burdens ordinarily associated with
competitive entry, and thus is unreasonable.
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals err in holding that 47 U.S.C 252(d)(1)
(1996 Telecommunications Act) forecloses cost methodology adopted by FCC, which is
based on efficient replacement cost of existing technology, for determining interconnection
rates that new entrants into local telecommunications markets must pay incumbent local
telephone companies? (2) Did court of appeals err in holding that neither takings clause nor
1996 Telecommunications Act requires incorporation of incumbent local exchange carrier's
"historical" costs into rates that it may charge new entrants for access to its network
elements? (3) Does 47 U.S.C S251(c)(3) prohibit regulators from requiring that incumbent
local telephone companies combine certain previously uncombined network elements when
new entrant requests combination and agrees to compensate incumbent for performing that
task)
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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
These cases are before us on remand
from the Supreme Court. Se AT & T
Gap. v Iou Utis. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 119
S.Ct. 721, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). Local
telephone service providers (known as
"incumbent local exchange carriers" or
"ILECs") and their industry associations
petition for review of the First Report
and Order * * * issued by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)
which contains the FCC's findings and
rules * * * pertaining to the local
competition provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 * * *
(the Act). The Act requires an ILEC to
(1) permit requesting new entrants
(competitors) in the ILEC's local market
to interconnect with the ILEC's existing
local network and, thereby, use that
network to compete in providing local
telephone service (interconnection); (2)
provide its competitors with access to
elements of the ILECs own network on
an unbundled basis (unbundled access);
and (3) sell to its competitors, at
wholesale rates, any telecommunications
service that the ILEC provides to its
customers at retail rates in order to allow
the competing carriers to resell those
services (resale). See 47 U.S.C.
251(c)(2)- (4) (1994 ed., Supp. III). ***
Through this Act, Congress sought "to
promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies."
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L.
No. 104-104, purpose statement, 110
Stat. 56, 56 (1996). Challenges to the
First Report and Order were
consolidated in this court.
II. Analysis
The United States Courts of Appeals
have exclusive jurisdiction to review final
orders of the FCC pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
5 2342(1) and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994).
In reviewing an agency's interpretation
of a statute, we must defer to the agency
only if its interpretation is consistent
with the plain meaning of the statute or
is a reasonable construction of an
ambiguous statute. SW Chm"r U.S.A. Inc
V Natural Remus Deme Chwzi, Inc,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We will overturn an
agency interpretation that conflicts with
the plain meaning of the statute, see id, is
an unreasonable construction of an
ambiguous statute, see id at 844-45, 104
S.Cc. 2778, or is arbitrary and capricious.
See 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1994); ObeutW 467
U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In making
our decision regarding reasonableness,
the issue "is not whether the
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Commission made the best choice, or
even the choice that this Court would
have made, but rather 'whether the FCC
made a reasonable selection from among
the available alternatives.' " Sadnestem
Bell Td Ca v F.CC, 153 F.3d 523, 559-
60 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting MCI
Tearm. Cop. v FCC 675 F.2d 408,
413 (D.CCir.1982).
A. Pricing Methodology
Congress established pricing standards
for the rates that may be charged by
ILECs to their new local service
competitors for interconnection and for
the furnishing of network elements on
an unbundled basis. The statute, in
relevant part, states:
(d) Pricing standards
(1) Interconnection and network element
charges
Determinations by a State commission
of the just and reasonable rate for the
interconnection of facilities and
equipment for purposes of subsection
(c)(2) of section 251 of this title, and the
just and reasonable rate for network
elements for purposes of subsection
(c)(3) of such section-
(A) shall be--
(i) based on the cost (determined without
reference to a rate-of-return or other
ratebased proceeding) of providing the
interconnection or network element
(whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.
47 U.S.C § 252(d)(1).
The FCC promulgated various pricing
rules to implement the Act. The FCC's
pricing provisions that pertain to the
pricing of interconnection and network
elements utilize a forward-looking
economic cost methodology that is
based on the total element long-run
incremental cost (TELRIQ of the
element. These costs are to be based on
an ILEC's existing wire center locations
using the most efficient technology
available in the industry regardless of the
technology actually used by the ILEC
and furnished to the competitor. Se First
Report and Order 1 685. State
commissions are to employ TELRIC to
determine the price an ILEC may charge
its competitors for the right to
interconnect with the ILEC and/or to
use the ILECs network elements to
compete with the ILEC in providing
telephone services.
The petitioners contend the TELRIC
method violates the plain language and
purpose of the Act and represents
arbitrary and capricious decision-
making. The petitioners challenge
TELRIC on four grounds.
1. Hypothetical Network Standard
In its First Report and Order, the FCC
explained that forward-looking
methodologies, like TELRIC, consider
the costs that a carrier would incur in the
future for providing the interconnection
or unbundled access to its network
elements. See First Report and Order 1
683. These costs either can be based on
the most efficient network configuration
and technology currently available, or on
the ILEC's existing network
infrastructures. Sw id The FCC chose an
approach which it says combined the
two possibilities. Sw id 685. Pursuant
to § 252(d)(1), the FCC promulgated 47
CF.R § 51.505 entitled "Forward-
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looking economic cost." It states in part
that "[t]he total element long-run
incremental cost of an element should be
measured based on the use of the most
efficient telecommunications technology
currently available and the lowest cost
network configuration, given the existing
location of the incumbent LEC's wire
centers." 47 C.F.R § 51.505(b)(1). The
only nonhypothetical factor in the
calculation is the use of the actual
location of the ILECs existing wire
centers.
The petitioners assert that the
hypothetical network standard upon
which TELRIC's costs are based is
contrary to the Act's plain language.
Section 252(d)(1)(A)(i) requires the just
and reasonable rates for network
elements to be "based on the cost
(determined without reference to a rate-
of-return or other rate-based proceeding)
of providing the interconnection or
network element." Id (emphasis added).
The petitioners contend the language
points inescapably to the actual costs the
ILEC incurs for furnishing its existing
network to the competitor either
through interconnection or on an
unbundled network element basis.
However, the petitioners explain that the
costs under the FCCs pricing
methodology are those costs that would
be incurred by a hypothetical carrier
deploying a hypothetical network that is
optimally efficient in technology and
configuration. The petitioners argue that
the FCC's hypothetical network standard
does not reflect what they are statutorily
required to furnish to their competitors
and is, therefore, flatly contrary to the
statute.
The respondents counter the petitioners'
assertion that TELRIC costs are based
on a hypothetical network The
respondents contend TELRIC does
reflect the ILECs' costs but on a
predictive forward-looking basis that
assumes a reasonable level of efficiency.
According to the respondents, setting
rates based on the use of the most
efficient technology available and on the
lowest cost network configuration using
existing wire center locations is
consistent with the statute, promotes
competition, and is a reasonable
application of forward-looking costs.
The intervenors in support of the FOC
(the intervenors) explain that costs
should be based on what any firm,
including the specific ILEC whose rates
are to be set, would incur in providing
the network elements today. They
suggest these costs should be the
replacement cost of the network using
the technology available today and that
no firm in a competitive market would
charge rates based on the cost of
reproducing obsolete technology. The
intervenors contend that calculating the
cost of old technology with current
prices defeats the purpose of using a
forward-looking methodology.
We agree with the petitioners that basing
the allowable charges for the use of an
ILECs existing facilities and equipment
(either through interconnection or the
leasing of unbundled network elements)
on what the costs would be if the ILEC
provided the most efficient technology
and in the most efficient configuration
available today utilizing its existing wire
center locations violates the plain
meaning of the Act. It is clear from the
language of the statute that Congress
intended the rates to be "based on the
cost ... of pmidm the me ci or
m,=ook dent," id (emphasis added), not
on the cost some imaginary carrier would
incur by providing the newest, most
efficient, and least cost substitute for the
actual item or element which will be
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furnished by the existing ILEC pursuant
to Congress's mandate for sharing.
Congress was dealing with reality, not
fantasizing about what might be. The
reality is that Congress knew it was
requiring the existing ILECs to share
their existing facilities and equipment
with new competitors as one of its
chosen methods to bring competition to
local telephone service, and it expressly
said that the ILECs' costs of providing
thxe facilities and that equipment were to
be recoverable by just and reasonable
rates. Congress did not expect a new
competitor to pay rates for a
"reconstructed local network," First
Report and Order 1 685, but for the
existing local network it would be using
m an attempt to compete.
It is the cost to the ILEC of providing its
existing facilities and equipment either
through interconnection or by providing
the specifically requested existing
network elements that the competitor
will in fact be obtaining for use that must
be the basis for the charges. The new
entrant competitor, in effect, piggybacks
on the ILEC's existing facilities and
equipment. It is the cost to the ILEC of
providing that ride on those facilities that
the statute permits the ILEC to recoup.
This does not defeat the purpose of
using a forward-looking methodology as
the intervenors assert. Costs can be
forward-looking in that they can be
calculated to reflect what it will cost the
ILE C in the future to furnish to the
competitor those portions or capacities
of the ILE Cs facilities and equipment
that the competitor will use including
any system or component upgrading that
the ILEC chooses to put in place for its
own more efficient use. In our view it is
the cost to the ILEC of carrying the
extra burden of the competitor's traffic
that Congress entitled the ILEC to
recover, and to that extent, the FCCs
use of an incremental cost approach
does no violence to the statute. At
bottom, however, Congress has made it
clear that it is the cost of providing the
actual facilities and equipment that will
be used by the competitor (and not some
state of the art presently available
technology ideally configured but neither
deployed by the ILEC nor to be used by
the competitor) which must be
ascertained and determined.
Consequently, we vacate and remand to
the FCC rule 51.505(b)(1).
2. Use of a Forward-looking
Methodology
The petitioners contend that the FCC's
use of its forward-looking TELRIC
methodology, which denies the ILECs
recovery of their historical costs, is
contrary to the express terms of the Act
and is unreasonable. The petitioners state
that the term "cost" plainly refers to
historical cost and that the juxtaposition
of "cost" in 5 252(d)(1)(A)(i) with
"profit" in § 252(d)(1)(B) confirms this.
They refer to the discussion of profit in
paragraph 699 of the First Report and
Order as support for their proposition
that if profit must be read in an
accounting sense, then so too must cost.
In addition, they assert the FCC failed to
provide an adequate explanation for its
rejection of historical costs and that an
agency is not allowed to change
ratemaking methodologies without
cogently explaining why the change is
being made.
The respondents argue the term "cost" is
an elastic term that can be construed to
mean either historical or forward-looking
costs and that the FCCs interpretation
of cost as forward-looking is reasonable.
They clarify the discussion in the First
Report and Order regarding profit. They
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explain that the FCC found that a
normal profit, which TELRIC is
designed to yield, represents a
"reasonable profit" within the meaning
of the statute and that the FCC has not
construed profit to mean accounting
profit. The respondents also argue the
FCC explained in detail its decision to
use forward-looking costs and that the
decision was reasonable based on the
new competitive objectives of the 1996
Act. The intervenors agree with the
respondents that the term "cost"
imposes no clear limits on the FCC's
authority to establish a ratemaking
methodology, and according to their
argument, it is in these circumstances
that an agency is entitled to deference.
We respectfully disagree with the
petitioners' contention that cost, as it is
used in the statute, means historical cost.
The statute simply states that rates "shall
be based on the cost ... of providing the
interconnection or network element." 47
U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A). We conclude the
term "cost," as it is used in the statute, is
ambiguous, and Congress has not
spoken directly on the meaning of the
word in this context. We agree with the
assessment that "the word 'cost' is a
chameleon, capable of taking on
different meanings, and shades of
meaning, depending on the subject
matter and the circumstances of each
particular usage." Strikland v
CMssiorMr, Mair Dept cfHunun Seru.,
48 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1995), at dmna(
516 U.S. 850, 116 S.Ct. 145, 133 L.Ed.2d
91(1995).
The FCC has the authority to make rules
to fill any gap in the Act left by
Congress, provided the agencys
construction of the statute is reasonable.
Se Cheztra 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Cz.
2778. Likewise, "Congress is well aware
that the ambiguities it chooses to
produce in a statute will be resolved by
the implementing agency." A T & T
ap., 525 U.S. at 397, 119 S.Ct. 721
(citation to Gemntr omitted). Forward-
looking costs have been recognized as
promoting a competitive environment
which is one of the stated purposes of
the Act. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, explained, "[It is current and
anticipated cost, rather than historical
cost that is relevant to business decisions
to enter markets ... historical costs
associated with the plant already in place
are essentially irrelevant to this decision
since those costs are 'sunk' and
unavoidable and are unaffected by the
new production decision." MCI
Crncm v Anrrican TW & Td Ca,
708 F.2d 1081, 1116-17 (7th Cir.1983),
cat demac 464 U.S. 891, 104 S.Ct. 234
(1983). Here, the FCC's use of a
forward-looking cost methodology was
reasonable. The FCC sought comment
on the use of forward-looking costs and
concluded that forward-looking costs
would best ensure efficient investment
decisions and competitive entry. See First
Report and Order 1 1705. It is apparent
that the FCC explained in detail its
reason for selecting a forward-looking
cost methodology to implement the new
competitive goals of the Act, and any
past rejection of forward-looking
methodologies was made in a monopoly,
rather than a competitive, environment.
See First Report and Order 1618-711.
Additionally, we are unpersuaded by the
petitioners' discussion of thejuxtaposition of the word "profit" with
cost" in the statute. The FCC did notinterpret profit as accounting * * * profit
as the petitioners contend. The First
Report and Order discusses only two
types of profit: economic * * * and
normal * * * The FCC interpreted the
word "profit" in the statute to mean
normal profit." The FCC found that
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TELRIC provides for a "normal" profit
and that level of profit is reasonable
within the meaning of the statute.
Section 252(d)(1)(B) states only that the
rates paid for either interconnection or
furnishing unbundled access "may
include a reasonable profit." The use of
the word "may" indicates that the
inclusion of a reasonable profit is not
mandatory but permitted. Additionally,
nothing in the phrase "may include a
reasonable profit" suggests "cost" must
mean historical costs. A "profit" can be
made whether a historical cost or
forward-looking cost methodology is
used. We reiterate that a forward-looking
cost calculation methodology that is
based on the incremental costs that an
ILEC actually incurs or will incur in
providing the interconnection to its
network or the unbundled access to its
specific network elements requested by a
competitor will produce rates that
comply with the statutory requirement of
5 252(d)(1) that an ILEC recover its
"cost" of providing the shared items.
4. Takings Argument
The petitioners contend the use of the
TELRIC method to set rates raises a
serious Fifth Amendment takings issue
that the statute should be construed to
avoid. The petitioners challenge the
pricing rules as mandating invalid
confiscatory rates. The petitioners insist
the statute must be read so that an ILEC
receives just and reasonable
compensation in the constitutional sense
for the services it provides to its
competitors.
The respondents argue that the claim
that the use of TELRIC will constitute a
taking is not ripe for judicial
consideration because, at this point, it is
unknown whether the rates established
under TELRIC will constitute just and
reasonable compensation. In addition,
the intervenors point out that TELRIC
compensates the ILECs for the present
market value of the property taken which
is all that is constitutionally required for
just and reasonable compensation.
Because we have vacated 47 CF.R. 5
51.505(b)(1), we have some doubt that
we need to address the argument that
TELRIC also violates the Constitution.
Our remand to the FCC of the TELRIC
rule should result in a new rule for
determining the compensation that the
ILECs will receive for the new
competitor's use of the ILEC's property-
-a rule that should accurately determine
the actual costs to the ILEC of
furnishing its network (either by
interconnection or on an unbundled
element basis) to its competitors
together with a permitted reasonable
profit. Whether the new rule will result
in rates that do not provide just and
reasonable compensation cannot be
foretold. ***
B. Wholesale Rates
Section 252(d)(3) of the Act provides
that state commissions "shall determine
wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates
charged to subscribers for the
telecommunications service requested,
excluding the portion thereof
attributable to any marketing, billing,
collection, and other costs that will be
avoided by the local exchange carrier."
Pursuant to this section, the FCC
promulgated 47 C.F.R. § 51.607 which
excludes "avoided retail costs" from
wholesale rates. "Avoided retail costs"
are defined by the FOC as "those costs
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that reasonably can be avoided when an
incumbent LEC provides a
telecommunications service for resale at
wholesale rates to a requesting carrier."
47 CF.R. 5 51.609(b).
The petitioners challenge the FCC's
interpretation of the term "avoided retail
costs." The petitioners contend 5
252(d) (3) plainly requires wholesale rates
to reflect the ILECs' retail rates less
those costs that an ILEC actually avoids
when it loses its retail customers to a
reselling competitor. However, under the
FCC's definition of "avoided retail
costs," the petitioners argue the FCC
requires them to exclude all retailing
costs rather than only those costs that an
ILEC actually avoids. The petitioners
state that many costs associated with
retailing are fixed and will not begin to
decline initially nor will the costs decline
proportionately to the number of
customers lost to the reseller. The
petitioners explain the phrase "will be
avoided" in § 252(d)(3) means "actually
avoided" because otherwise the
wholesale discount given the reseller
would be inflated.
The respondents counter that the phrase
"will be avoided" is ambiguous and that
the FCC reasonably interpreted the
language of the statute. The intervenors
explain that the ILECs avoid incurring
any retailing costs when engaging in
wholesale transactions, and even if
certain retailing costs are fixed, the
ILECs would still incur only those costs
that arose in connection with the ILE Cs'
retailing activities. The respondents state
that making competitors pay for a
portion of the ILECs' retailing costs,
even though the new entrant is not the
cause of those retail costs, would result
in the new entrants subsidizing theILECs' retail offerings while still having
to pay the new entrants' own retailing
costs.
We agree with the petitioners that the
phrase "will be avoided" refers to those
costs that the ILEC will actually avoid
incurring in the future, because of its
wholesale efforts, not costs that "can be
avoided." The verb "will" is defined, in
part, as "a word of certainty." BLACK'S
LAW DICT1ONARY 1598 (6th
ed.1990). Whereas, the verb "can" is
"[o]ften used interchangeably with 'may,'
" id at 206, and may is a word "of
speculation and uncertainty." Id at 1598.
The language of the statute is clear.
Wholesale rates shall exclude "costs that
will be avoided by the local exchange
carrier." 47 U.S.C § 252(d)(3). The plain
meaning of the statute is that costs that
are actually avoided, not those that could
be or might be avoided, should be
excluded from the wholesale rates.
Consequently, we vacate and remand
rule 51.609.
C Proxy Prices
The FCC established proxy prices to be
used for interconnection and network
element charges, wholesale rates, and the
rates for termination and transport. The
state commissions are to use these proxy
prices if they do not use the provided
ratemaking method to establish rates.
The proxy prices consist of upper limits
higher than which the rates set by the
state commissions shall not go.
We agree with the petitioners that the
respondents are estopped from trying to
now revive the proxy prices. "Thedoctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a
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party from taking inconsistent positions
in the same or related litigation." Hcssabi
v Watem Missuni Mai Cr., 140 F.3d
1140, 1142 (8th Cir.1998). Judicial
estoppel is invoked "to protect the
integrity of the judicial process." Id at
1143. The FCC represented to the
Supreme Court that it was not
establishing rates and depriving the state
commissions of their role in
implementing the Act. See Reply Br. for
Federal Pet'rs at 7, AT & T Cop. v Ioa
Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 119 S.Ct. 721,
142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999) 1998 WL
396961 (Nos. 97-826, 97-829, 97-830,
97-831, 97-1075, 97-1087, 97-1099, and
97-1141). The FCC emphasized that it
was merely providing a methodology for
state commissions to use in completing
the "critical and complex task of
determining the economic costs of an
efficient telephone network." Id The
FCC dismissed the proxy prices as
"designed for a past period in which no
cost studies could have been made
available to the state commissions. They
have no relevance to this case." Id at 7 n.
5.
The Supreme Court held that the FCC
"has jurisdiction to design a pricing
methodology." A T & T Cop., 525 U.S.
at 385, 119 S.Ct. 721. However, the FCC
does not have jurisdiction to set the
actual prices for the state commissions
to use. Setting specific prices goes
beyond the FCC's authority to design a
pricing methodology and intrudes on the
states' right to set the actual rates
pursuant to S 252(c)(2). Following the
Supreme Court's opinion, we now agree
with the FCC that its role is to resolve
"general methodological issues," and it is
the state commission's role to exercise its
discretion in establishing rates. Br. for
Federal Pet'rs at 26-27, A T & T Corp. u
loua Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 119 S.Ct.
721, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999).
The proxy prices are also infirm because
they rely on the hypothetical most
efficient carrier rationale which we have
found to be violative of the Act, ante at
5-8, and because they rely on the
erroneous definition of "avoided retail
costs."
We conclude the proxy prices cannot
stand and, for the foregoing reasons,
vacate rules 51.513, 51.611, and 51.707.
D. Unbundling Rules
The FCC issued numerous rules to
implement the ILE Cs' duties to provide
unbundled access to their network
elements under subsection 251(c)(3).
Many of these rules were previously
challenged. In light of the Supreme
Court's opinion, we revisit three of the
unbundling rules.
1. Identification of Additional
Unbundled Network Elements
The Supreme Court vacated 47 C.F.R. §
51.319 which required the ILECs to
provide requesting carriers with
unbundled access to a minimum of
seven network elements so long as
access was "necessary" and failure to
provide the access would "impair" the
competitors' ability to provide services.
The Supreme Court vacated 47 C.F.R. §
51.319 because the FCCs interpretation
of the "necessary" and "impair" standard
was too broad and unreasonable. See A T
& T Cp., 525 U.S. at 388-92, 119 S.Ct.
721.
The respondents concede that rule
51.317 must be remanded to the FCC as
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a result of the Supreme Court's opinion.
Se Resp'ts' Br. at 87 n. 42. Therefore, we
vacate rule 51.317 without any further
discussion.
2. Superior Quality Rules
In our previous opinion, we vacated 47
C.F.R. % 51.305(a)(4) and 51.311(c),
collectively known as the superior quality
rules. These rules require an ILEC to
provide, upon request, interconnection
and unbundled network elements that
are superior in quality to that which the
ILEC provides to itself. The Supreme
Court did not address these rules.
We again conclude the superior quality
rules violate the plain language of the
Act. We further conclude that nothing in
47 U.S.C 5§ 154(i), 201(b), or 303(r)
gives the FOC the power to issue
regulations contrary to the plain language
of the Act. As we were correctly
reminded at oral argument that this court
is not a "super FC," neither is the FCC
an alter ego Congress free to change the
words of a statute from "at least equal in
quality" to "superior in quality" when it
exercises its rule-making power.
Subsection 251(c)(2)(C) requires the
ILECs to provide interconnection "that
is at least equal in quality to that
provided by the local exchange carrier to
itself...." Nothing in the statute requires
the ILECs to provide superior quality
interconnection to its competitors. The
phrase "at least equal in quality"
establishes a minimum level for the
quality of interconnection; it does not
require anything more. We maintain our
view that the superior quality rules
cannot stand in light of the plain
language of the Act for all the reasons
we previously expressed. See Ioa Ul.
Bd, 120 F.3d at 812-13. We also note
that it is self-evident that the Act
prevents an ILEC from discriminating
between itself and a requesting
competitor with respect to the quality of
the interconnection provided.
3. Additional Combinations Rule
In our previous opinion, we also vacated
47 CF.R. 5 51.315(c)-(f), the additional
combinations rule. This rule requires an
ILEC to perform the functions necessary
to combine unbundled network elements
in any technically feasible manner.
Although the Supreme Court reversed
our decision to vacate 47 CF.R. §
51.315(b), prohibiting the ILECs from
separating requested network elements
that are already combined, the Supreme
Court did not address subsections (c)-(f).
The petitioners request that we reaffirm
our prior decision vacating the additional
combinations rule. The petitioners state
that the Supreme Court's decision to
reinstate 51.315(b) does not call into
question this court's decision to vacate
51.315(c)-(f). The petitioners explain
51.315(b) is different because it
prohibited ILECs from separating
previously combined network elements
over the objection of the requesting
carrier. The additional combinations rule
contained in subsections (c)-(f), on the
other hand, requires the ILECs to
combine their own network elements in
new ways or with elements provided by
the requesting carriers. They argue the
additional combinations rule violates the
Act.
In addition to the respondents' argument
regarding the general rulemaking
authonty of the FCC, they assert this
court's decision to vacate rules 51.315(c)-
(f) was predicated on language rejected
by the Supreme Court when it reinstated
rule 51.315(b). In reinstating subsection
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(b), the Supreme Court emphasized the
ambiguous nature of § 251(c)(3)
regarding the separation of leased
network elements. Se A T & T Cap.,
525 U.S. at 395, 119 S.Ct. 721. Because
of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court
concluded, subsection (b) is rationally
based on the nondiscrimination language
in 5 251(c)(3). See id The respondents
rely on the same nondiscrimination
language to support subsections (c)-(f)
because without these subsections, they
argue, new entrants would incur higher
costs for unbundled network elements
than the ILECs incur. The intervenors
agree that the policy concerns of
ensunng against an anticompetitive
practice not only support 47 C.F.R. 5
51.315(b) but also subsections (c)-(f).
We are not persuaded by the
respondents' contention that the
Supreme Court's reinstatement of rule
51.315(b) affects our decision to vacate
subsections (c)-(f). Nor do we agree with
the Ninth Circuit that the Supreme
Court's opinion undermined our
rationale for invalidating the additional
combinations rule. See U.S. Wst
Ccnmiatiom v MFS Inteenr Ir, 193
F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir.1999), ct
ni --- U.S. ---- , 120 S.Ct. 2741, 147
L.Ed.2d 1005 (2000). The Ninth Circuit
misinterpreted our decision to vacate
subsections (c)-(f). We did not, as the
Ninth Circuit suggests, employ the same
rationale for invalidating subsections (c)-
(f) as we did in invalidating subsection
(b). See MCI Tdawns. v U.S. West, 204
F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.2000) ("The
Eighth Circuit invalidated Rules 315(c)-
(f) using the same rationale it employed
to invalidate Rule 315(b). That is, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that requiring
combination was inconsistent with the
meaning of the Act because the Act calls
for 'unbundled' access.") Rather, the
issue we addressed in subsections (c)-(O
was who shall be required to do the
combining, not whether the Act
prohibited the combination of network
elements. See loun Utis. Bd, 120 F.3d at
813.
Rule 51.315(b) prohibits the ILECs from
separating previously combined network
elements before leasing the elements to
competitors. The Supreme Court held
that 51.315(b) is rational because
"[section] 251(c)(3) of the Act is
ambiguous on whether leased network
elements may or must be separated." A T
& T Cop., 525 U.S. at 395, 119 S.Ct.
721. Therefore, under the second prong
of Chenon, the Supreme Court concluded
51.315(b) was a reasonable interpretation
of an ambiguous statute.
Unlike 51.315(b), subsections (c)-(f)
pertain to the combination of network
elements. Section 251(c)(3) specifically
addresses the combination of network
elements. It states, in part, "An
incumbent local exchange carrier shall
provide such unbundled network
elements in a manner that allows
requesting carriers to combine such
elements in order to provide such
telecommunication service." Here,
Congress has directly spoken on the
issue of who shall combine previously
uncombined network elements. It is the
requesting carriers who shall "combine
such elements." It is not the duty of the
ILECs to "perform the functions
necessary to combine unbundled
network elements in any manner" as
required by the FCCs rule. See 47 CF.R.§ 51.315(c). We reiterate what we said in
our prior opinion: "[Tlhe Act does not
require the incumbent LECs to do al the
work." Iom Utils. Bd, 120 F.3d at 813.
Under the first prong of cberu,
subsections (c)-(f) violate the plain
language of the statute. We are
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convinced that rules 51.315(c)-(f) must
remain vacated.
E. Rural Exemptions
Congress enacted § 251(f) to relieve the
small and rural ILECs from some of the
obligations imposed by other subsections
of § 251. The FCC promulgated 47
C.F.R, § 51.405 to establish standards
that the state commissions must follow
in determining whether the small and
rural ILECs are entitled to the
exemption, suspensions, or
modifications set forth in § 251(f).
The petitioners contend rule 51.405
cannot be reconciled with the language
of the statute. They challenge the rule on
three grounds. First, they argue the rule
eliminates two of the three prerequisites
that must be satisfied before a state
commission may terminate an
exemption. Second, they disagree with
the limitation the rule places on the
statutory phrase "unduly economically
burdensome." Third, they suggest that
the rule impermissibly shifts the burden
of proof in exemption proceedings.
1. Prerequisites for Terminating an
Exemption
Section 251(f)(1)(A) explains that a state
commission may terminate an exemption
for a rural telephone company if a
request for interconnection, services, or
network elements "is not unduly
economically burdensome, is technically
feasible, and is consistent with section
254 of this title (other than subsections
(b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof)." The FCC
promulgated 47 CF.R. § 51.405 pursuant
to S 251(f). The rule requires the ILECs
to offer evidence that the application of
the requirements under § 2 51(c) "would
be likely to cause undue economic
burden beyond the economic burden
that is typically associated with efficient
competitive entry" in order to justify
exemption. 47 CF.R. § 51.405(c).
The petitioners contend the rule is
invalid because it alters the statutorily-
mandated criteria that must be met in
order for a state commission to
terminate a rural ILEC's exemption. The
petitioners point out that rule 51.405
refers only to the "unduly economicaly
burdensome" prerequisite for
termination rather than the above-
mentioned three criteria.
The respondents argue that the rule does
not eliminate any statutory criteria
regarding rural exemptions. The
respondents explain it was not the FCC's
intent, nor was it within the FCCs
power, to eliminate any statutory
requirements. The respondents suggest
that state commissions will look to the
statute itself, in addition to the FCCs
rule, when implementing § 251(f). They
further claim that the FCC has stated in a
later order that rule 51.405(c) "does not
in any way affect a state's responsibility
to consider all three of the factors set
forth in section 251(f)(1)(A)," citing to
an order entered when the Rural
Telephone Coalition sought a stay of rule
51.405(c). See In 7e Inplernatin j the
Lo Carpaitiaz Pvuasir in the
Td rmviratzr Act 1996, 11
FOCRcd 20166 (1996) 115.
We agree with the petitioners that the
rule impermissibly disregards two of the
three statutory requirements that must
be met before a state commission can
terminate an exemption. A state
commission looking at rule 51.405(c)
would conclude that if a rural ILE C had
failed to show an undue economic
burden, the exemption must be
terminated, regardless of the existence of
the ILECs companion defenses of
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technical infeasibility and/or
inconsistency with § 254 of the Act. A
rule that permits such a result represents
an arbitrary and unreasonable
interpretation of the governing statute.
2. Undue Economic Burden
Rule 51.405 also refers to the statutory
requirement that a request for
interconnection, unbundled elements, or
retail services for resale must not cause
an undue economic burden in order to
justify termination of an exemption
under § 251(f)(1) or to justify the denial
of a petition for suspension or
modification under 5 251(f)(2). The rule
interprets the statutory phrase "unduly
economically burdensome" as "undue
economic burden beyond the economic
burden that is typically associated with
efficient competitive entry." 47 CF.R.
51.405(c), (d).
The petitioners argue that the rule's
interpretation of the statutory language is
unreasonable because it does not allow
state commissions to consider the total
actual economic burden that competitive
entry could impose on a small or rural
ILEC. The petitioners explain that the
phrase "unduly economically
burdensome" indicates Congress
intended state commissions to consider
any type of economic burden that might
be imposed by such a request, including
those burdens associated with efficient
entry.
The respondents assert that the FOC
interpreted "unduly economically
burdensome" to refer to something more
than the economic burden that
commonly or ordinarily occurs upon
efficient competitive entry because
otherwise exemption, suspension, or
modification would be virtually
automatic. The respondents submit that
Congress did not intend to preclude
competitive entry into small or rural
markets; rather Congress intended to
protect the small or rural ILECs from
only those § 251(b) or § 251(c)
requirements that might be unfair or
inappropnate.
We agree with the petitioners that the
FCC has unreasonably interpreted the
phrase "unduly economically
burdensome." We owe no deference to
an agency's interpretation that would
"frustrate the congressional policy
underlying a statute." Burau cf A 7TF
Fei Labor Rdatim A uth., 464 US. 89,
97, 104 S.Ct. 439, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983)
(quoting NLRB v Bvten 380 US. 278,
291-92, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839
(1965)). In the Act, Congress sought
both to promote competition and to
protect rural telephone companies as
evidenced by the congressional debates.
Se 142 CONG.REC S687- 01 (Feb. 1,
1996) (statements by Sen. Hollings and
Sen. Burns); 142 CONG.REC H1145-
06 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement by Rep.
Orton). It is clear that Congress intended
that all Americans, including those in
sparsely settled areas served by small
telephone companies, should share the
benefit of the lower cost of competitive
telephone service and the benefits of
new telephone technologies, which the
Act was designed to provide. It is also
clear that Congress exempted the rural
ILECs from the interconnection,
unbundled access to network elements,
and resale obligations imposed by 5
251(c), unless and until a state
commission found that a request by a
new entrant that the ILEC furnish it any
of § 251(c)'s methods to compete in the
rural ILE C's market is (1) not unduly
economically burdensome, (2) technicallyfeasible, and (3) consistent with 5 254.
S& 47 U.S.C § 251(f)(1). Likewise,
Congress provided for the granting of a
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petition for suspension or modification
of the application of the requirements of
5 251(b) or (c) if a state commission
determined that such suspension or
modification is necessary to avoid (1) a
significant adverse economic impact, (2)
imposing a requirement that is unduly
economically burdensome, and' (3)
imposing a requirement that is
technically infeasible; and is consistent
with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. See 47 U.S.C S 251(f)(2).
There can be no doubt that it is an
economic burden on an ILEC to provide
what Congress has directed it to provide
to new competitors in 5 251(b) or S
251(c). Because the small and rural
ILE Cs, while they may be entrenched in
their markets, have less of a financial
capacity than larger and more urban
ILECs to meet such a request, the
Congress declared that their statutorily-
granted exemption from doing so should
continue unless the state commission
found all three prerequisites for
terminating the exemption, or
determined that all prerequisites for
suspension or modification were met in
order to grant an ILEC affirmative relief.
It is the full economic burden on the
ILEC of meeting the request that must
be assessed by the state commission. The
FCC's elimination from that assessment
of the "economic burden that is typically
associated with efficient competitive
entry" substantially alters the
requirement Congress established. By
limiting the phrase "unduly economically
burdensome" to exclude economic
burdens ordinarily associated with
competitive entry, the FCC has
impermissibly weakened the broad
protection Congress granted to small and
rural telephone companies. We have
found no indication that Congress
intended such a cramped reading of the
phrase. If Congress had wanted the state
commissions to consider only that
economic burden which is in excess of
the burden ordinarily imposed on a small
or rural ILEC by a competitor's
requested efficient entry, it could easily
have said so. Instead, its chosen language
looks to the whole of the economic
burden the request imposes, not just a
discrete part.
Nor do we think the consideration of the
whole economic burden occasioned by
the request will result in state
commissions "automatically" continuing
the exemption, or "automatically'
granting a petition for suspension or
modification. In making their
determination of "unduly economically
burdensome," the state commissions will
undoubtedly take into their judgment the
fact that the ILEC will be paid for the
cost of meeting the request and may also
receive a reasonable profit pursuant to S
252(d). Subsections (c) and (d) of rule
51.405 are an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute's
requirement that a 5 251(b) or § 251(c)
request made by a competitor must not
be "unduly economically burdensome"
to the small or rural ILE C
3. Burden of Proof
Rule 51.405 also requires the rural ILEC
to offer evidence to the state
commission to prove that it is entitled to
a continuing exemption. The rule states,
"Upon receipt of a bona fide request for
interconnection, services, or access to
unbundled network elements, a rural
telephone company must prove to the
state commission that the rural
telephone company should be entitled,
pursuant to section 251(f)(1) of the Act,
to continued exemption from the
requirements of section 2 5 1(c) of the
Act." 47 CF.R. 5 51.405(a).
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The petitioners contend the FCC has
improperly placed the burden of
justifying a continued exemption on the
ILE Cs. The petitioners discuss the
language in 47 U.S.C § 251(f)(1)(A),
which states "[s]ubsection (c) of this
section shall not apply to a rural
telephone company until (i) such
company has received a bona fide
request for interconnection, services, or
network elements...." This language, they
explain, indicates that the ILECs are
automatically exempt from subsection (c)
until a request has been made, and once
a request is made, the burden is on the
party making the request to prove that
the request is not unduly economically
burdensome, is technically feasible, and
is consistent with 5 254. They also assert
the burden of proof lies with the
proponent of the order according to the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5
U.S.C S 556(d) (1994).
The respondents argue it was reasonable
to place the burden on the rural ILECs
because the default rule is for the state
commission to deny the exemption
unless the state commission affirmatively
finds a reason to continue the
exemption. The respondents rely on the
Senate conference report on the Act
which explains that a state commission
must rule on the continuation of an
exemption within 120 days, "and, if no
exemption is granted," then the state
commission must establish a schedule
for compliance. * * * The respondents
emphasize the word "granted" implies
that a state commission will only grant
an exemption if there is a specific reason
to do so.
We agree with the petitioners that the
rule impermissibly places the burden of
proof on the ILECs. The statute states
that the requirements of S 251(c) "shall
not apply to a rural telephone company
until " a request has been made. 47
U.S.C § 251(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
The use of the word "until" suggests that
the rural telephone companies have a
continuing exemption that is only
terminated once a bona fide request is
made, provided the request is not unduly
economically burdensome, is technically
feasible, and is consistent with § 254.
Although the conference report refers to
state commissions granting an
exemption, the language of a conference
report does not trump the language of a
statute. See Siera Club v CJak, 755 F.2d
608, 615 (8th Cir.1985). The language of
the statute uses the word "terminate" not
"grant." See 47 U.S.C § 251(f)(1)(B). The
plain meaning of the statute requires the
party making the request to prove that
the request meets the three prerequisites
to justify the termination of the
otherwise continuing rural exemption.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate rule
51.405(a), (c), and (d).
***
III. Conclusion
We grant the pending petitions for
review in part. For the reasons stated, we
vacate, in total, 47 C.R. %
51.505(b)(1), 51.609, 51.513, 51.611,
51.707, 51.317, 51.405(a), (c), and (d),
and 51.303. We remain firm in our
previous decision to vacate 47 CF.R %§
51.305(a)(4) and 51.311(c) (the superior
quality rules) and 47 CF.R § 5 1.3 15(c)-
(f) (the additional combinations rule). In
all other respects, we deny the petitions
for review.
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Supreme Court Takes High-Tech Cases on Consumer Phone and Web
Services
The Wal Stiretfoumal
Tuesday, January 23, 2001
Robert S. Greenberger and Jill Carroll
The Supreme Court waded into several
high-technology legal disputes ranging
from telephone and Internet service to
child pornography.
Residential Phone Service
(Verizon v. FOC; WorldCom v. Verizon;
FCC v. Iowa Utilities Board; AT&T v.
Iowa Utilities Board; General
Communications v. Iowa Utilities Board)
The high court agreed to resolve a
complex regulatory brawl that ultimately
could decide how soon -- and at what cost
-- most residential consumers will be
given a choice among competing
telephone companies. In taking the five
cases, which will be handled together, the
court agreed to determine how to
calculate fees that local phone companies
charge new competitors for using their
phone networks.
Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
local phone companies have to let rivals
use their networks to offer competing
services. But the rivals must pay for use of
the transmission networks.
Without such an arrangement, it would be
too costly for competing local phone
compaies to build brand-new networks.
Last year, the U.S. Appeals Court for the
Eighth Circuit in St. Louis rejected the
way the Federal Communications
Commission determines these fees.
The most important issue the Supreme
Court will examine is how to determine
rental fees. The FCC had required them to
be based on the cost of building the part
of the network that the rival phone
company wanted to use. The existing
phone companies, including the Bells, say
the fees should be based on their original
building costs, but many competitors
argue construction costs have dropped
significantly over the years.
The justices will also weigh arguments
over whether the FCC can require old-
line phone companies to lease portions of
their network in packages, when
competitors request it, rather than as
individual parts. Currently, competitors
can negotiate package deals with the
existing company. If regulators mandate a
competing company's right to ask for such
packages, then they can also keep an eye
on the prices that are agreed upon.
The high court isn't expected to rule in
the case until its next term begins in
October. As a result, several companies
said they couldn't readily determine any
effect on profits. Still, the justices'
decision to review the case is "a good
thing for everybody," said Mary Albert,
vice president for regulatory affairs at
Allegiance Telecom Inc., an upstart
provider of telecommunications services
to businesses based in Dallas.
High-Speed Web Access Fees
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(National Cable v. Gulf Power and FCC
v. Gulf Power)
Separately, the Supreme Court agreed to
review a case that pits the FCC and cable
operators against major utilities.
The utilities, which charge cable-TV
companies for use of their telephone
poles or underground facilities, argue that
the FCC lacks authority to regulate these
charges when the cable companies also
provide high-speed Internet access. Under
a 1977 statute, later expanded in the 1996
Telecommunications Act, the FCC has
authority to make sure the fees are "just
and reasonable." The issue before the high
court is how far that regulatory reach
extends.
The utilities contend the 1996
Telecommunications Act didn't expand
this regulation, and therefore doesn't
apply to "commingled cable and Internet
service." They challenged the FCC's
ruling, and a number of these cases were
consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta.
That court ruled against the FCC last
April, and the FCC and the National
Cable Television Association appealed to
the high court for review. The case isn't
likely to be resolved until the court's next
term.
Child Pornography
(Reno v. Free Speech Coalition, et. al.)
Meanwhile, the high court agreed to
review whether two provisions of the
1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act
violate the constitutional right to free
expression by barring what "appears to
be" a minor engaging in sexually explicit
activity.
The law was challenged by the Free
Speech Coalition, which represents adult-
oriented businesses, as well as by an artist
and a photographer.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California in San Francisco
upheld the law, saying that protecting
children from child pomography was an
important government interest. But the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in San Francisco reversed the
ruling, saying the law was too broad and
too vague.
Defending the statute, former Attorney
General Janet Reno argued in a filing to
the high court that "Congress was
concerned that advancing technology
could render unenforceable the
prohibitions against the distribution and
possession of child pornography involving
real children."
Employee Medical Expenses
(Great-West Life v. Knudson)
The high court also said it will decide
whether an employee-benefit plan can sue
to collect medical expenses paid to a
worker who later recovers those same
expenses from a third party.
Maternity and Retirement Benefits
(Communications Workers v. Ameritech
Benefit Plan)
The justices also said they wouldn't review
an appeal involving how companies
treated maternity leaves in the 19 6 0s and
1970s when calculating retirement benefits
based on a worker's seniority.
Copyright Q 2001, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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ILEC-to-CLEC Fees: No Cold Calculation
Computer Telephony
Tuesday, May 1, 2001
Martha Buyer
In late January, the Supreme Court
agreed to grapple with an issue in its next
term that arises directly from the
Telecommunications Act of 1996:
namely, the method of calculating fees
that CLECs must pay ILECs for access
to their networks. The dispute that the
court will hear in October consolidates
the issues raised in five cases: Venzon v.
FCC,
WorldCom v. Verizon, FCC v. Iowa
Utilities Board, AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board, and General Communications v.
Iowa Utilities Board.
In the first round of AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board decided in January 1999,
the Supreme Court held that the FCC has
the jurisdiction to establish pricing
methodologies. That ruling resolved the
authority question but didn't address the
ILEC's challenge to that methodology. In
addition, the Supreme Court upheld the
"pick and choose" rule, which allows
competitors to select provisions of other
negotiated agreements to establish their
own services. The Supreme Court also
held that competitors must be allowed to
purchase UNEs in any and all
combinations, whether or not the
competitor has facilities of its own.
There are probably as many pricing
methodologies in the world as there are
economists to devise them. Each has its
inherent strengths and weaknesses. The
FCC's original methodology of 1996,
known as TELRIC Plus, (Total Element
Long Run Incremental Cost plus a
reasonable share of joint and common
costs) based the pricing of wholesale
elements andservices on the ILECs' rate
to deliver service plus a portion of
operations costs. The FCC calls TELRIC
a forward-looking, economically efficient
methodology that encourages competition
- the fundamental goal of the Act. It
meant to fix rates at the current costs of
adding service to supply CLECs, not the
historical costs of building networks with
(historically) pricier and older
technologies.
The ILECs, in concert and in protest,
have claimed that a pricing model that
makes no allowance for either the
historical costs of creating the strategic
infrastructure (including both bricks and
mortar and technology), nor the cost of
developing the manpower base, is
inherently unfair. They claim that this
denies them the ability to recoup historical
and embedded costs (and profits) owed
their investors.
In other ratemaking cases, the Supremes
have been hesitant to adopt one method
of ratemaking over any other. They have
opted to focus on the effects of that
methodology. Come October, however,
they will be forced to tackle this delicate
issue head-on, thus making the stakes
very high, not only within the LEC
industry, but within the utilities markets as
well.
CLECs and ILECs have no choice but to
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wait patiently while the high court
determines how pricing methodologies
will be determined. While they do, they
can imagine another set of Supremes:
"You can't hurry law, you just have to
wait, no law don't come easy, it's a game
of give and take..."
INSPIRED INE ITEM
The deadline for de-tariffing interstate
traffic has been extended until July 31,
2001. Come August 1, telecom consumers
have the right to hold carriers to the terms
of the written contract, and, by extension,
that carriers have no "sanctuary" in posted
tariffs that conflict with these contracts.
But it also means that till then, spurious
charges can sneak incognito into bills via
"referenced" tariffs. That's why it
remains vitally important that consumers -
particularly large corporate consumers -
remain vigilant about familiarizing
themselves with the terms of their long-
distance contracts and the tariffs that
underlie them.
An egregious case in point is the latest
amendment to filed tariffs added by the
big three - Sprint, WorldCom, and AT&T
- and possibly others. In a moment of line
item inspiration, the interexchange carriers
are now assessing customers for an
allocated portion of their - brace yourself -
property taxes.
That's right. In addition to the monthly
bill for usage and other miscellaneous
fees, now you're being asked to pay a
chunk of Sprint, WorldCom, or AT&T's
property taxes, and chances are, you don't
even know it. The kicker This special
surcharge is subject to sales tax.
Imagine a supermarket adding such a line
item on your sales receipt. Where I come
from, property taxes are part of overhead.
If the big carriers couldn't do the math
before they sent their sales teams out to
sell, I cannot fathom why their
shortcomings should become my
problem.
This fee not only offends on its face, but
it undercuts the credibility of the account
team that sold service at an agreed-upon
per-minute rate. The new assessment
makes the account team's commitments
inaccurate. The vendors' argument that
competitors are assessing this fee is of no
consequence.
Copyright 0 2001 CMP Media LLC
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00-1167 Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
Ruling Below (9' Gr., 216 F.3d 764, 68 U.S.L.W. 1779, 50 Envt. Rep. Cas. 1751):
Temporary moratorium imposed to stop development in environmentally sensitive
lake area pending formulation of new regional land use plan does not effect compensable
taking under Fifth Amendment; 1981 planning moratorium that was in effect for 32-month
period did not take all economically viable use of properties; development delay associated
with 1984 court-imposed injunction was not attributable to any action by planning agency,
and thus agency may not be held liable for any taking that may have occurred during such
delay.
Question Presented: Did court of appeals properly determine that temporary moratorium
on land development does not constitute taking of property requiring compensation under
Fifth Amendment's takings clause?
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, et al, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-
Appellant
v.
TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, et al, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-
Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided March 16, 2000
REINHARDT Circuit Judge:
This case involves approximately 450
plaintiffs who own property in the Lake
Tahoe Basin. The lead plaintiff, Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. (TSPQ,
is an association of Tahoe-area property
owners. Each individual property owner
has alleged, inter alia, that each of several
land-use regulations enacted in the1980's by the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA) constituted a "taking" of
his property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The principal
question on this appeal is whether atemporary planning moratorium, enacted
by TRPA to halt development while a
new regional land-use plan was beingdevised, effected a taking of each
plaintiff's property under the standani
set forth in L ucas v Saoh Czdin Castd
Cooi4 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886,120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). In addition, we
must determine whether any taking that
may have occurred following TRPA's
adoption of a regional land-use plan in
1984 was attributable to the
promulgation of that plan, in light of the
fact that the plan was enjoined
immediately after it was enacted and was
never implemented. Finally, we mustdecide whether the plaintiffs' claims
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regarding the successor regional land-use
plan enacted by TRPA in 1987--which
did become effective--are time-barred.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Lake Tahoe is a large alpine lake located
in the northern Sierra Nevada
mountains. The lake is unique, both
aesthetically and ecologically, because of
its size, depth, and the astounding clarity
of its water. Indeed, it is one of the
clearest large lakes in the world. The
unusual clarity of Lake Tahoe results
from the fact that it historically was
"oligotrophic"--that is, very low in
nutrients and lacking a steep temperature
gradient that would prevent deep
circulation and mixing. Since mid-
century, however, the lake has been
undergoing "eutrophication," a process
by which the nutrient loading in the lake
increases dramatically, due to nitrogen
and phosphorus (contained in soil) being
washed into the lake. The excessive
enrichment of the lake by these nutrients
encourages the growth of algae. As algal
growth in the lake increases, the lake
loses its clarity and color, becoming
green and opaque. In addition to
destroying the water's visual perfection,
the algae also depletes its oxygen
content, thereby jeopardizing the
survival of fish and other lake-dwelling
animal life. In short, the eutrophication
of the lake is causing serious, and
effectively permanent, environmental
damage.
The dramatic increase in Lake Tahoe's
nutrient levels has been caused by the
rapid development of environmentally
sensitive land in the Lake Tahoe Basin.
The land in the basin drains into the
lake, and artificial disturbances of the
land--the destruction of vegetation, the
creation of impervious objects such as
roads and houses, etc.--greatly increase
the flow of nutrients into the lake. * * *
Of course, the degree to which the
development of a particular parcel of
land in the basin increases the nutrient
flow into the lake depends on the
particular characteristics of that property.
In general, the development of steeper
land leads to more environmental
damage, because steeper land is
susceptible to more rapid soil erosion.
Along with steepness, other land
characteristics also affect the amount of
damage caused to the lake by
development. For example, certain areas
near streams and other wetlands, known
as Stream Environment Zones (SEZs),
act as filters for much of the nutrient
loading that runoff carries. Disturbance
of SEZ lands can lead to the rapid
release of these stored nutrients into the
lake. In addition, disturbance of SEZ
lands may prevent them from
performing their natural filtering
function, thereby permitting more of the
nutrients contained in runoff from
higher elevations to reach the lake.
Accordingly, SEZ lands are considered
especially sensitive to the impact of
development.
In an effort to halt the increasing rate of
environmental damage to Lake Tahoe,
the bi-state Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact was approved in 1969 by the
United States Congress after being
passed by the legislatures of both
Nevada and California. The Compact
created the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency and set goals for the
preservation of the lake and the
surrounding basin. Pursuant to the
Compact, TRPA adopted land-use
Ordinance No. 4, which, among other
things, classified the land in the basin
according to its susceptibility to
environmental damage. Land in the Lake
Tahoe Basin was divided into seven
"land capability districts," numbered 1
through 7, with 1 being the most
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environmentally sensitive and 7 the least.
Land capability districts 1 through 3--
consisting of the steepest land in the
basin--were denominated "high hazard"
or "sensitive" lands. SEZ lands were
classified as a special subcategory of high
hazard lands and were labeled "lb"
lands. Land capability districts 4 through
7 were referred to as "low hazard" or
"non-sensitive" lands.
For each land classification, Ordinance
No. 4 adopted recommendations as to
what degree of artificial disturbance the
land could safely sustain. There were
numerous exceptions to the
recommendations, however, and these
exceptions caused significant
dissatisfaction with TRPA's regulatory
scheme. This dissatisfaction, combined
with evidence that the 1969 Compact
was not strong enough to remedy the
problems causing the decline in the basin
environment, led to the amendment of
the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in
1980. * * * In addition to restructuring
TRPA and its voting procedures, the
1980 Compact directed TRPA (1) to
adopt "environmental threshold carrying
capacities " within eighteen months of
the date on which the Compact became
effective; * * * (2) to adopt a new
regional plan within twelve months of
the adoption of the carrying capacities;
and (3) to review all projects and
establish temporary restrictions on
development in the basin pending the
enactment of a new regional plan.
On August 26, 1982, TRPA adopted
environmental threshold carrying
capacities. The agency then proceeded
with the development of a new regional
plan. Due to the tremendous complexity
of the task, however, it soon became
clear that TRPA would be unable to
adopt a new regional plan within twelve
months of the adoption of the carrying
capacities, as required by the Compact.
Concerned that it lacked the authority to
issue any building permits after this date
without a new regional plan in place,
TRPA adopted Resolution 83-21. The
Resolution suspended all permitting
activities "pending adoption of the new
regional plan." This suspension
temporarily prohibited the development
of all of the covered land. Although the
Resolution was drafted to expire after a
ninety-day period that ended on
November 26, 1983, it was extended, in
accordance with its design, until the new
regional plan was adopted.
On April 26, 1984, thirtytwo months
after it had initially suspended
development, TRPA adopted a new
land-use plan, the 1984 Regional Plan.
Se Ordinance 84-1. On the day of its
adoption, the State of California sued
TRPA to block the implementation of
the plan on the ground that it failed to
establish land-use controls sufficiently
stringent to protect the Lake Tahoe
Basin. The next day, the League to Save
Lake Tahoe followed suit and sought an
injunction against the plan on the same
grounds. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
California, Judge Edward J. Garcia
presiding, immediately issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting
TRPA from taking any action to approve
building projects, and ordered TRPA to
show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not issue. On June 15, 1984,
Judge Garcia granted a preliminary
injunction. We upheld the preliminary
injunction on appeal, see Qdnia ex '
Van de Kanp v Tahae Reg'1 Plaring
Agery 766 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.1985), and
the injunction remained in force until a
completely revised land-use plan--the
1987 Regional Plan--was adopted.
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AThe Takings Cause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the government
from taking "private property ... for
public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V. Courts have had
little success in devising any set formula
for determining when government
regulation of private property amounts
to a regulatory taking. * * * Thus, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that "whether a particular
restriction [amounts to a taking] depends
largely 'upon the particular circumstances
[of each] case' "--that is, on "essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries." Pem nral
Tramportaia Ch v City oNew Yok, 438
U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d
631 (1978); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886. In this regard, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have
indicated that most regulatory takings
cases should be resolved by balancing
the public and private interests at stake,
with three primary factors weighing in
the balance: (1) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant, (2) the
extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations, and (3) the
character of the governmental action.
So- eg, Pm Crra 438 U.S. at 124, 98
S.Ct. 2646; Dd v HaodRi'er Caar 136
F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir.1998); District
Intoun Papenus L td v Distit q Cdunbia,
198 F.3d 874, 879 (D.C.Cir.1999). ***
The Supreme Court has identified two
specific circumstances in which it will
find a government regulation to
constitute a "categorical" taking without
performing an ad hoc balancing under
Penn CntraL The first situation involves
regulations that compel a property owner
to suffer a permanent physical "invasion"
or "occupation" of his property. Sa e.g,
Lonsto v Tdep rver Manattan CA TV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 102 S.Ct. 3164,
73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). In that
circumstance, the "character of the
governmental action"--ordinarily one of
the factors balanced under Pem Czral--
itself becomes sufficient to effect a
taking. As the Court held in Lowtxr
[A] "taking" may more readily be found
when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by
government .... [w]hen the physical
intrusion reaches the extreme form of a
permanent physical occupation, a taking
has occurred. In such a case, "the
character of the government action" not
only is an important factor in resolving
whether the action works a taking but
also is determinative.
Lonrto 458 U.S. at 426, 102 S.Ct. 3164.
The categorical rule applicable to
physical invasion cases is clearly not
applicable to the present case.
"The second situation in which [the
Court] hafs] found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive
use of land." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112
S.Ct. 2886; see also A gm, 447 U.S. at 260,
100 S.Ct. 2138. Here, too, ad hoc
balancing is not required because one
factor of the Pem Cntral test becomes
dispositive. In this instance, it is the
"economic impact of the regulation" that
becomes determinative: the regulation
constitutes a "categorical" taking when it
depnves the claimant of "all
economically beneficial and productive
use of [his] land." Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886. Cf Dod4 136 F.3d
at 1228. * * *
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With respect to Periods I and II, the only
question before us is whether the rule set
forth in Lucas applies--that is, whether a
categorical taking occurred because
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21
denied the plaintiffs "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land."
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
Below, the district court mled that the
regulations did not constitute a taking
under Pam Cral 's ad hoc approach,
but that they did constitute a categorical
taking under Lucas. S& Talxe-Siera
Pnserutan Coril4 34 F.Supp.2d at 1238-
45. The defendants appealed the district
court's latter holding, but the plaintiffs
did not appeal the former. And even if
arguments regarding the Penm Central test
were fairly encompassed by the
defendants' appeal, the plaintiffs have
stated explicitly on this appeal that they
do not argue that the regulations
constitute a taking under the ad hoc
balancing approach described in Pem
CetraL More generally, the plaintiffs do
not contest that Califoria's and
Nevada's objective of preserving the
environmental health and aesthetic
beauty of Lake Tahoe is an entirely
permissible governmental goal. Nor do
they dispute that the restrictions imposed
on their properties are appropriate
means of securing the purpose set forth
in the Compact. In view of the limited
nature of the plaintiffs' arguments on
appeal, we address our specific inquiry to
whether the facts of this case present
one of the "relatively rare situations"
where "regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land."
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
Our focus is also narrowed by the fact
that the plaintiffs bring only a facial
challenge to Ordinance 81-5 and
Resolution 83-21. In facial takings
claims, our inquiry is limited to "whether
the mere enactment of the [regulation]
constitutes a taking." Agim, 447 U.S. at
260, 100 S.Ct. 2138; see also Ke)tr
Biurirs Cul Assn, 480 U.S. at 493,
107 S.Ct. 1232; Hodd v Virgina Stwe
Mirng & Rdarmti zAssln, 452 U.S. 264,
295, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981);
Gartmu v City Gf Seat 147 F.3d 802,
807 (9th Cir.1998). For that reason, we
look only to the regulation's " 'general
scope and dominant features,' " rather
than to the effect of the application of
the regulation in specific circumstances.
Garnas4 147 F.3d at 807 (quoting Village
of E udid vA mnber Realty Ca, 272 U.S.
365, 397, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303
(1926)); se also A&gim, 447 U.S. at 260,
100 S.Ct. 2138; Kepar Bitaim i Gal
Assh 480 U.S. at 493, 494, 107 S.Ct.
1232; Vhginza Sufa Mimng &
Redamtimz Ass?; 452 U.S. at 297, 101
S.Ct. 2352. In this connection, "since it is
difficult to demonstrate that [the] 'mere
enactment' of a piece of legislation"
amounts to a taking, the Court has
recognized that facial takings challenges
"face an uphill battle." Stan v Tahe
Rg'1ParmingA gerrfy 520 U.S. 725,736 n.
10, 117 S.C. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980
(1997); se aso Kewtar Biuortas Gl
Ass'? 480 U.S. at 495, 107 S.Ct. 1232;
Garwru, 147 F.3d at 807.
B.
"Because our test for regulatory taking
requires us to compare the value that has
been taken from the property with the
value that remains in the property, one
of the critical questions is determining
how to define the unit of property
'whose value is to furnish the
denominator of the fraction.' " * * *
Kestar Bitua Cd Assn, 480 U.S. at
497, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (quoting Frank I.
Michelman, Pnyxry Uiliy and Fairras:
Carents on de Ethical Faraai <f "Just
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Ovrpematurz" Laq 80 Harv. L.Rev. 1165,
1192 (1967)). In other words, for
purposes of determining whether a
"taking" of the plaintiffs' "property" has
occurred, the proper inquiry is what
constitutes the relevant "property"? Is it
the fee interest that must be "taken," or
is it some lesser unit of property?
Property interests may have many
different dimensions. For example, the
dimensions of a property interest may
include a physical dimension (which
describes the size and shape of the
property in question), a functional
dimension (which describes the extent to
which an owner may use or dispose of
the property in question), and a temporal
dimension (which describes the duration
of the property interest). At base, the
plaintiffs' argument is that we should
conceptually sever each plaintiff's fee
interest into discrete segments in at least
one of these dimensions--the temporal
one--and treat each of those segments as
separate and distinct property interests
for purposes of takings analysis. Under
this theory, they argue that there was a
categorical taking of one of those
temporal segments.
To not reject the concept of temporal
severance, we would risk converting
every temporary planning moratorium
into a categorical taking. Se Pemw Cera
438 U.S. at 130, 98 S.Ct. 2646; Stem v
Haligrn 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3rd
Cir.1998); Michelman, supra, at 1193.
Such a result would run contrary to the
Court's explanation that it is "relatively
rare" that government "regulation denies
all economically beneficial or productive
use of land." Luas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 112
S.C. 2886.
More important, the widespread
invalidation of temporary planning
moratoria would deprive state and local
governments of an important land-use
planning tool with a well-established
tradition. Land-use planning is
necessarily a complex, time-consuming
undertaking for a community, especially
in a situation as unique as this. In several
ways, temporary development moratoria
promote effective planning. First, by
preserving the status quo during the
planning process, temporary moratoria
ensure that a community's problems are
not exacerbated during the time it takes
to formulate a regulatory scheme. Sw
Elizabeth A. Garvin & Martin L. Leitner,
Drafing Interim Deupqrnc Odiaxs:
Cast Tine to Plan Land Use Law and
Zoning Digest, June 1996, at 3, 3; Sdayfr
v City of New Odwea, 743 F.2d 1086,
1090 (5th Cir.1984). Relatedly, temporary
development moratoria prevent
developers and landowners from racing
to carry out development that is
destructive of the community's interests
before a new plan goes into effect. Such
a race-to- development would permit
property owners to evade the land-use
plan and undermine its goals. See id;
Miller v Band cf Public Woks, 195 Cal.
477, 234 P. 381, 388 (1925). * ** Finally,
the breathing room provided by
temporary moratoria helps ensure that
the planning process is responsive to the
property owners and citizens who will be
affected by the resulting land-use
regulations. See Robert H Freilich,
Intem Dezdonrnt Ontd -Essential Toos
for Inplerantin Flexible Plannig ani
Zoning 49 J. Urb. Law 65, 79 (1971).
Absent the pressure of trying to out-
speed developers who are attempting to
circumvent the planning goals, the
"planning and implementation process
may be permitted to run its full and
natural course with widespread citizen
input and involvement, public debate,
and full consideration of all issues and
points of view." Garvin and Leitner,
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supa , at 3. Given the importance and
long-standing use temporary moratona,
courts should be exceedingly reluctant to
adopt rulings that would threaten the
survival of this crucial planning
mechanism.
In short, we reject the plaintiffs'
suggestion that we engage in conceptual
severance. The relevant property
interests in the present case are the
whole parcels of property that the
plaintiffs own.
C.
Having determined that the property
interest at stake is just what one would
expect it to be--the plaintiffs' fee
interests--we must evaluate whether
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21
effected a categorical taking of each
plaintiff's property. * * * For purposes of
this analysis, two features of these
provisions are relevant. First, the
provisions effectively placed a
moratorium on the development of the
plaintiffs' property. * * * The second
relevant feature of the provisions is that
the moratorium they effected was
intended to be temporary--the
regulations were designed to institute a
temporary moratorium that would
remain in effect oniy until a new regional
land-use plan could be adopted. * * * See
Uim Oi C a uMonen, 512 F.2d 743, 751
(9th Cir.1975) (describing a regulation as
temporary if its "termination is
conditioned [on] the occurrence of
certain future events").
To determine whether the temporary
moratorium instituted by TRPA's
regulations denies "all economically
beneficial or productive use" of the
plaintiffs' land, we must first consider the
meaning of the phrase "economically
beneficial or productive use." The
phrase's precise meaning is elusive, and
has not been clarified by the Supreme
Court. SW, eg, Lake NaarivelDRano h Ca
v Caory cfSan Luis Cbisps 841 F.2d 872,
877 (9th Cir.1988). The central
confusion over its meaning centers on
the relationship between the "use" of
property and its "value." * * * Clearly,
the economic value of property provides
strong evidence of the availability of
"economically beneficial or productive
uses" of that property. * * *
Nevertheless, there are instances in
which certain kinds of "value" may be
poor measures of the existence of such
uses. In any event, we need not resolve
the sticky issues surrounding the
meaning and proof of the existence of
"economically beneficial or productive
uses," because it is clear from the
"general scope and dominant features"
of Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21
that the temporary moratorium imposed
by these regulations did not deprive the
plaintiffs' land in the Lake Tahoe Basin
of either all of its "value" or all of its
"use." * * * Garu, 147 F.3d at 807.
First, as amici Cities and Counties of
California note, basic principles of
economics show that the moratorium
did not render the plaintiffs' property
valueless. * * * Sw gerrally Luce, 505
U.S. at 1020, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (assuming,
as the basis for its decision, that the
regulation at issue rendered Lucas's two
beachfront lots "valueless"). The
moratorium was temporary--it was
designed to and did dissolve upon the
adoption of a new regional plan. Given
that the ordinance and resolution banned
development for only a limited period,
these regulations preserved the bulk of
the future developmental use of the
property. This future use had a
substantial present value. * * *
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Of course, were a temporary moratorium
designed to be in force so long as to
eliminate all present value of a property's
future use, we might be compelled to
conclude that a categorical taking had
occurred. We doubt, however, that a true
temporary moratorium would ever be
designed to last for so long a period.
Certainly, the moratorium at issue here
was not. The temporary moratorium was
designed to suspend development only
until a new regional land-use plan could
be formulated--a process that the 1980
Compact intended would take thirty
months. While the completion of the
regional plan actually took forty months
(which led to the temporary moratorium
remaining in effect for eight months
longer than expected), the moratorium
still was in effect for only thirty-two
months. * * *
Moreover, there is no evidence that
owners or purchasers of property in the
basin anticipated that the temporary
moratorium would continue indefinitely.
Nor would they have had reason to: the
district court found that TRPA worked
diligently to complete the regional plan
as quickly as possible. Se Tabe-Sierra
Pnserwrin CavZ 34 F.Supp.2d at 1250-
51. Thus, while the temporary
moratorium surely had a negative impact
on property values in the basin, we
cannot conclude that the interim
suspension of development wiped out
the value of the plaintiffs' properties.
Furthermore, the temporary moratorium
did not deprive the plaintiffs of all "use"
of their property. The "use" of the
plaintiffs' property runs from the present
to the future. (This is a simple corollary
of our earlier conclusion that the
plaintiffs' property interests may not be
temporally severed.) * * * By instituting a
temporary development moratorium,
TRPA denied the plaintiffs only a small
portion of this future stream; the thirty-
two months during which the
moratorium was in effect represents a
small fraction of the useful life of the
Tahoe properties. * * *
Because the temporary development
moratorium enacted by TRPA did not
deprive the plaintiffs of all of the value
or use of their property, we hold that it
did not effect a categorical taking. * * *
Indeed, given the above analysis, it is
equally clear that the district court was
correct to conclude that the moratorium
did not constitute a taking under the
Perm Central test. Se TahcSiena
Pnecrtion Cacw 34 F.Supp.2d at 1240-
42. Thus, while the district court was
correct as to this latter point, we reverse
its holding that a categorical taking
occurred. In reaching this conclusion, we
preserve the ability of local governments
to do what they have done for many
years--to engage in orderly, reasonable
land-use planning through a considered
and deliberative process. To do
otherwise would turn the Takings Clause
into a weapon to be used
indiscriminately to penalize local
communities for attempting to protect
the public interest.
II. TIME PERIOD III
The plaintiffs raise two issues on cross-
appeal, the first of which concerns the
district court's holding regarding Period
III--the period after the passage of the
1984 Plan and before the passage of the
1987 Plan. * ** The district court held
that TRPA's adoption of the 1984 Plan
was not the actionable cause of any
deprivation of the plaintiffs' Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights that
occurred during this period. According
to the court, the injunction issued by
Judge Garcia against TRPA, in a separate
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suit brought by the state of California
and the League to Save Lake Tahoe,
prevented the adoption of the 1984 Plan
from being either the "but for" or the
proximate cause of any taking that may
have occurred during Period III. For this
reason, the court held that, as to that
period, TRPA could not be held liable
under § 1983. * * * On cross-appeal, the
plaintiffs argue that the district court
erred in concluding that TRPA's actions
were not the legal cause of any taking
during the period in question.
In a section 1983 action, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was the actionable cause of the
claimed injury. Sa, eg, A rrdd v IBM
COp., 637 Fld 1350, 1355 (9th
Cir.1981). To meet this causation
requirement, the plaintiff must establish
both causation-in-fact and proximate
causation. Se& Van Ot v Estate <f
StawrzdSa, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th
Cir.1996); Anrr4 637 F.2d at 1355;
H#un v Haden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th
Cir.1959), ozemai in part on oter gtwork
by Cxn V Noris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th
Cir.1962). The parties agree that this
requirement applies to the plaintiffs' S
1983 claims, which allege a violation of
the Takings Clause, as much as it would
to any other § 1983 claim. * * * Like
other factual determinations, causation-
in-fact is reviewed for clear error. In
addition, we review findings of
proximate cause for clear error, even
though they present mixed questions of
law and fact. Se Exxon Co v Sqra; In,54 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir.1995) (holding
that, although it "is an exception to the
general rule that mixed questions of law
and fact are reviewed de novo," issues of
proximate cause are reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard); GMe v Cityof Long Bead, 973 F.2d 706, 709 (9thCir.1992); Brzw-ui v Pi 950 F.2d 602
604 (9th Cir.1991). * * * 9
The plaintiffs argue on two grounds that
the district court clearly erred when it
concluded that TRPA's conduct was not
the actionable cause of the claimed
taking of the plaintiffs' property from
1984 to 1987. First, they argue that the
injunction is irrelevant to any
consideration of "cause," because the
1984 Plan was actually implemented and
itself constituted a regulatory taking. * *
* We disagree. Contrary to the plaintiffs'
contention, the injunction issued by
Judge Garcia effectively prohibited the
implementation of the 1984 Plan. ***
As the district court's order makes clear,
the injunction prohibited TRPA from
taking "any action" to approve any
project, and even prohibited it from
accepting permit applications. Without
the ability to accept, process, or grant
applications, it is impossible to see how
TRPA could have implemented the 1984
Plan, the purpose of which was to
regulate the granting of new permits. * *
* Consequently, as this court pointed out
in TSPC II, "th[e] plan never went into
effect." * * * 938 F.2d at 155. Thus, the1984 Plan itself could not have
constituted a taking.
In the alternative, the plaintiffs argue
that, even if the 1984 Plan was not itself
implemented, TRPA's adoption of the
plan effectuated a taking by causing the
injunction to issue. Specifically, they
contend that (1) the adoption of the1984 Plan was both a "but for" and the
proximate cause of the issuance of the
injunction, and (2) the injunction
constituted a taking of the plaintiffs'
property. * * * For at least two reasons,
we reject the plaintiffs' alternative
argument.
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First, the district court did not clearly err
in holding that TRPA reasonably did not
foresee that the 1984 Plan would be
enjoined. It is well-established that
foreseeability analysis is an appropriate
part of proximate cause determinations
in § 1983 actions. So, eg., A rnd4 637
F.2d at 1355; Jobrsacr 588 F.2d at 743-44.
Cf Van Of 92 F.3d at 837 (noting that
unforeseen, intervening causes break the
chain of proximate causation in § 1983
actions). See grerally Palsgraf v LaongIslard
R. Ca, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928). Employing such an analysis, the
plaintiffs argue that TRPA is legally
responsible for the effects of the
injunction because TRPA should have
reasonably foreseen that it would be
sued as a result of its adopting the 1984
Plan. Even if a lawsuit was foreseeable,
however, it is the foreseeability of the
injunction, not the foreseeability of a
lawsuit, that is relevant to proximate
causation here. The district court
concluded that TRPA reasonably did not
foresee that an injunction would issue.
Se Tahoe-Sierra Pnerratian CPni 34
F.Supp.2d at 1248. The record supports
this determination: TRPA sought to
adopt a plan that would comply with the
Compact, and it had been advised by
counsel that its legislative discretion to
adopt a plan would be given great
deference by the courts; accordingly, it
had no reason to believe that it would
lose a lawsuit or that the 1984 Plan
would be enjoined. Rather than contest
this fact, the plaintiffs make the bald
assertion that TRPA secretly wanted an
injunction against all construction in the
basin. However, they point to no
evidence in the record to support this
contention.
Although TRPA could not have
foreseen, prior to adopting the 1984
Plan, that an injunction would issue, the
fact that the district court did issue an
injunction reveals a second reason why
TRPA may not be held legally
responsible for any injury that occurred
during Period III: in retrospect, there
was little TRPA could have done to
prevent the injunction. The reason is that
"the 'wrongdoing' plaintiffs claim [that
TRPA committed] was not the
'wrongdoing' that triggered the
injunction." TSPCI, 911 F.2d at 1434 (B.
Fletcher, J., concurring). The
wrongdoing about which the plaintiffs
complain was TRPA's adoption, in 1984,
of a regional plan that was ozelly znsnite
of development. As Judge Fletcher noted
in 7SPC I, however, "the court granted
the injunction based on California's and
the League's claim that the Plan wus r
stnct enag: it would permit construction
of single-family residence in excess of
compact limits and inflict environmental
damage, and the Plan also did not abide
by the Compact's stricter procedural
requirements for project approval." Id
(emphasis added). Thus, had TRPA
avoided its alleged wrongdoing--by
adopting a more lenient plan that met
with the plaintiffs' approval--it is even
more certain that an injunction would
have issued. In short, the lack of a causal
connection between the alleged
wrongdoing and the purported harm
compels the conclusion that TRPA may
not be held liable for the effects of the
injunction.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court's holding that TRPA's
actions were not the actionable cause of
any taking that may have occurred
during Period III, and that the
defendants therefore may not be held
liable as to that period under 5 1983.
III. TTME PERIOD IV
The second issue that the plaintiffs raise
on cross-appeal concerns the district
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court's resolution of the claims regarding
the 1987 Plan (the Period IV claims).
The plaintiffs first added these claims
when they amended their complaints in
1991. At that time, the defendants
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims
for all four time periods on the ground
that the claims were barred by the sixty
day statute of limitations included in the
1980 Compact. * * * The district court
agreed as to the claims regarding Periods
I, II, and IV, and dismissed those claims.
* * * On appeal, we reversed as to the $
1983 claims. We held:
TSPC ... brought one claim under 42
U.S.C 5 1983 for the violation of its civil
rights by the actions of TRPA in
adopting the 1981 Ordinance, the 1983
Resolution, the 1984 Plan and the 1987
Plan.... As to § 1983 it is established law
that there is a single statute of limitation
to be applied.... Obviously, the single
state statute of limitations to be applied
in all § 1983 actions cannot be the special
60-day period provided by the Compact.
The defendants did not plead any other
statute of limitations except the 60-day
one. Failing to plead affirmatively any
other statute of limitations, they cannot
now rely on any other. No part of
TSPC's 5 1983 claim is time- barred.
7SPCIII, 34 F.3d at 756, asarrrdai by42
F.3d 1306 (citations omitted).
While our case law appears to support
the authority of a district court to deviate
from the law of the case in appropriate
circumstances, we do not decide whether
such circumstances existed in this case.
Instead, we reach the same decision as
the district court on the alternate ground
that, regardless of the district court's
authority to decline to follow the law of
the case established by this court in
7SPC III, we have the discretion to do
so and we exercise that discretion here.
The law of the case doctrine provides
that a panel of this court has discretion
to depart from the law of the case
established by the same panel, or
another, where: "(1) the decision is
clearly erroneous and its enforcement
would work a manifest injustice, (2)
intervening controlling authority makes
reconsideration appropriate, or (3)
substantially different evidence was
adduced at a subsequent trial." Jqyi5 v
Woxx 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (footnote and internal quotes
omitted). * * * The holding in TSPC III
falls squarely into the first category the
decision was "clearly erroneous and its
enforcement would work a manifest
injustice." Id
In order to understand why the holding
in 7SPC III is clearly erroneous, one
must first understand what it is that
7SPC III held. In concluding that the
defendants had forfeited their right to
argue at any point in the litigation that
the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims were time-
barred, the 7SPC III court stated: "The
defendants did not plead any other statute
of limitations except the 60-day one.
Failing to plerd afirmzty any other
statute of limitations, they cannot now
rely on any other." 7SPC II, 34 F.3d at
756 (emphasis added). On appeal, the
plaintiffs argue that the court used the
term "plead" in its non-technical sense,
to mean simply "argue" or "contend."
We think it evident, however, that the
court used the term in its conventional
legal sense, to mean "assert in a *788
pleading." Both courts and lawyers know
that the term "plead," when used in a
legal context, has that meaning. When a
court uses the term in an opinion,
therefore, we presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the court
meant to employ the standard legal
meaning. Here, there is no indication to
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the contrary. Quite the opposite: the
adverb that the 75PC III court used in
conjunction with the term "plead"
bolsters our reading. In rejecting the
affirmative defense, the court did not
merely state that the defendants had
failed to "plead" the proper limitation
period; instead, it stated that the
defendants had failed to "plead
affirmatively" the proper period. This
more specific term--"plead
affirmatively"--makes it even clearer to
us that the TSPC III court used the term
"plead" in its legal rather than popular
sense. After all, the statute of limitations
defense at issue in TSPC III is an
affirmative defense--a type of defense
that, in legal parlance, must be "plead
affirmatively." For these reasons, we
conclude that TSPC III held that the
defendants forfeited their right to argue
another limitations period by failing to
assert that period Ma nspoitepeading.
Given our conclusion about what TSPC
III held, it follows that TSPC III 's
holding was clearly erroneous. At the
time that we heard the appeal in 7SPC
III, none of the defendants had ever filed
an answer, or any other type of
responsive pleading. See 7SPQ 992
F.Supp. 1218, 1223 (D.Nev.1998).
Instead, in response to both the original
complaints and the amended complaints,
the defendants had filed motions to
dismiss. A motion to dismiss is not a
pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a)
(designating "pleadings"); Miks v
Depautrrr cfAmy 881 F.2d 777, 781
(9th Cir.1989) ("[A] motion to dismiss
the complaint is not a responsive
pleading."). Thus, it was not until the
remand following 7SPC III, when the
defendants filed answers to the plaintiffs'
complaints, that the defendants finally
"pled." * * * And in those first
responsive pleadings, the defendants
pled the pertinent statutes of limitations
for the S 1983 claims. Accordingly, TSPC
III clearly erred in holding that the
defendants failed to "plead affirmatively"
those statutes.
In addition to the clear factual error,
7SPC III 's bare legal holding--that the
defendants forfeited the correct statute
of limitations defense--is clearly wrong.
The defendants raised the correct
limitations periods in their answers. The
inclusion of the defense in an answer is
sufficient to preserve the defense. Se
Magma v Naxm Mariana Islard, 107
F.3d 1436, 1446 (9th Cir.1997); Fed. R
Civ. Pro. 8(c). In fact, we have permitted
defendants to raise affirmative defenses
for the first time well after filing an
answer, see Magan2, 107 F.3d at 1446, and
have also permitted district courts to
raise an affirmative defense sua sponw so
long as the defense has not been
affirmatively waived, see L enda Inc v City
qfPalm Dfert, 998 F.2d 680, 686-87 (9th
Cir.1993).
Although it is true that, prior to filing
their answers, the defendants had
asserted, by way of a motion to dismiss,
a statute of limitations defense premised
on a mistaken choice of law, the
defendants' mistake does not in any way
constitute a waiver of all other
limitations periods. See Zcra v Lirdegh
S&b Dist, 121 F.3d 356, 361 (8th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that
defendant waived application of 90-day
limitation period by relying only on a
two-year limitation period in its summaryjudgment motion); Yaxer v Hanydl Inc,104 F.3d 1215, 1224 n. 3 (10th Cir.1997)
("We hold that [the defendant] did not
waive the statute of limitations defense
simply by pleading the defense based on
the wrong choice of law.") C Daif
Islard Pr"raie SOcy v Babbi 40 F.3d
442, 444-45 (D.C.Cir.1994). * * *
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In addition to being clearly erroneous,
TSPC III 's holding would result in a
manifest injustice were we to follow it.
Jefeiis held that a court may find that an
erroneous decision works a manifest
injustice if "the challenged decision ...
involve[s] a significant inequity or the
extinguishment of a right...." Jefner, 114
F.3d at 1492. In the present case, the
clear error in 7SPC III would lead to a
significant inequity. Were we to follow
7SPC III 's erroneous holding, the
defendants would lose their opportunity
to present this dispositive defense--a
defense that fully vindicates their right to
be free from a trial and an adverse
damage award. Of course, depriving a
defendant of a statute of limitations
defense might not always be significantly
inequitable. Here, however, the
defendants did nothing that would have
misled the plaintiffs or constituted a
forfeiture of that defense. In marked
contrast, the plaintiffs failed to bring
their claims regarding the 1987 Plan until
more than four years after the plan
became effective, which is more than
two years after Nevada's statute of
limitations had run, and more than three
years after California's. These
circumstances, combined with the fact
that the defense is both timely and
dispositive, convince us that the requisite
inequity exists in the present case.
Because the time bar holding in 7SPCIII
is clearly erroneous and would be
manifestly unjust if enforced, we decline
to follow it. On the merits, the district
court held the plaintiffs' claims time-
barred, and the plaintiffs affirmatively
decline to argue on appeal that thedistrict court's resolution of that
question is incorrect. Even when askedby this court at oral argument, the
plaintiffs stressed that they disputed only
the district court's authority to deviatefrom the law of the case set forth in a
disposition of this court. Their decision
not to argue the merits of the time-bar
issue is not surprising, given that they
filed the Period IV claims years after the
relevant statutes of limitations had run.
Because the plaintiffs offer no argument
on the merits of the timeliness of their
Period IV claims, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of those claims.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in
part. REMANDED for entry of
judgment in favor of defendants in
accordance with this disposition.
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High Court to Consider Lake Tahoe
The Associated Pirss
Friday, June 29, 2001
The Supreme Court agreed Friday to
consider whether 450 Lake Tahoe
landowners deserve compensation for a
temporary moratorium on land
development.
Acting in a 17-year-old lawsuit, the court
said the case would be limited to that
single issue.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in June 2000 that because the local
ordinances banned development for less
than three years, they were not severe
enough to be unconstitutional.
The appeals judges said that because
property owners' future development
rights had a value on the open market
even during the moratorium, they could
have sold their land and thereby "used" it.
To win their case, the landowners would
have had to show that they were deprived
of use of the land, said the judges.
Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and
Montana, as well as associations of
California cities and counties, submitted
briefs in favor of the local regulatory
agency, the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. The lake is between California
and Nevada.
The Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council
appealed the ruling by the circuit court.
Landowners seek about $27 million in
damages.
On Thursday, the court ruled that a
Rhode Island man has the right to
challenge the state's prohibition on
development of his coastal marshland
property, but stopped short of ruling he
was owed compensation for claimed
economic losses.
The case accepted by the
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Regional Planning, 00-1167.
justices is
v. Tahoe
Copyright @ 2001 The Associated Press
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00-1021 Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran
Ruling Below (7th Cir., 230 F.3d 959, 69 U.S.L.W. 1251):
State statute that requires health maintenance organizations to submit disputes with
patient's primary care physician over medical necessity of proposed treatment to
independent physician review and to cover treatment if outside reviewer finds it necessary
addresses HMOs as insurers and therefore is saved from Employee Retirement Income
Security Act preemption.
Question Presented: Is independent review provision of Illinois HMO Act, which is
similar to laws adopted in 37 states and District of Columbia, preempted by ERISA?
Debra C. MORAN, Plaintiff-Appellant
and
State of Illinois, Intervenor-Appellant
V.
RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided October 19, 2000
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.
Section 4-10 of Illinois' Hlealth
Maintenance Organization Act ("the
HMO Act"), 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 125/1-1 et seq., requires HMOs
to submit to an independent physician
review when there is a disagreement over
whether a course of treatment is
medically necessary between a patient's
primary care physician and the HMO. In
the event that the independent reviewer
determines that the treatment is
necessary, the HMO is required under 5
4-10 of the HMO Act to cover the
treatment.
Debra Moran's primary care physician
recommended a specific surgery for her,but Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.("Rush"), the service provider for Ms.
Moran's ERISA-governed medical
benefits plan, denied coverage for that
surgery. Rush offered instead to cover a
less expensive surgery to be performed
by a Rush- affiliated doctor. At her own
expense, Ms. Moran underwent the
surgery proposed by her physician. She
later sought to enforce her rights under §4- 10 of the HMO Act by bringing an
action in state court. Rush removed the
action to federal district court on ERISA
preemption grounds. After additional
proceedings, including a remand to state
court and another removal by Rush, the
district court granted summary judgment
to Rush. The district court determined
that S 4-10 of the HMO Act, and Ms.
Moran's claims based on that act, were
preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29
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U.S.C S 1001 et seq. The district court
also concluded, upon reviewing Rush's
decision to deny coverage, that Rush's
denial of coverage was not improper.
Ms. Moran now appeals. * * * For the
reasons set forth in the following
opinion, we reverse the judgment of the
district court.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
Ms. Moran is covered by a medical
benefits plan sponsored by her
husband's employer. The plan is
governed by ERISA, and it is fully
insured. Rush is the HMO provider for
the plan. Two aspects of the plan are
worth noting. First, the plan's member
certificate delegates to Rush "the
broadest possible discretion" to
interpret the terms of the plan and to
determine which benefits the
participants are entitled to receive. R.1-
1, Ex.A. at 7. Second, the certificate
provides that services that are not
"medically necessary" will not be
covered by the plan. Id at 21. * * *
B.
Starting in 1996, Ms. Moran began
experiencing pain, numbness, loss of
function, and decreased mobility in her
right shoulder. Ms. Moran sought
treatment for these symptoms from Dr.
Arthur LaMarre, her primary care
physician and a Rush-affiliated physician.
At first Dr. LaMarre treated Ms. Moran
through physiotherapy and other
conservative therapies, but these efforts
did not relieve her symptoms. While she
was undergoing these conservative
therapies, Ms. Moran obtained the name
of Dr. Julia Terzis, an out-of-network
surgeon in Virginia who specializes in
micro-reconstructive surgery. After Rush
denied Ms. Moran's request for a out-of-
network referral to consult with Dr.
Terzis, Ms. Moran traveled on her own
accord to Virginia to be examined by Dr.
Terzis. Dr. Terzis diagnosed Ms. Moran
with brachial plexopathy and thoracic
outlet syndrome ("TOS"), a nerve
compression syndrome caused by the
compression of nerves in Ms. Moran's
brachial plexus.
Most nerve compression syndromes are
mild and effectively treated with
conservative physiotherapy, and surgery
is not indicated unless more conservative
measures fail to manage the symptoms.
If surgery becomes necessary, the
standard procedure for TOS involves
decompression by way of first rib
resection (the complete removal of the
uppermost rib) or first rib resection with
scale-nectomy (the removal of the rib
and the attached muscle). If necessary, a
surgeon may use loupe magnification, in
which the surgeon wears a goggle-like
apparatus to magnify the immediate
view, to conduct a neurolysis, which is
removal of scar tissue surrounding the
injured nerve. Dr. Terzis, however,
performs a more complicated surgery for
patients with Ms. Moran's condition. Dr.
Terzis' surgery consists of rib resection,
extensive scale- nectomy, and, if
indicated, nicroneurolysis of the lower
roots of the brachial plexus under
intraoperative microscopic
magnification. Dr. Terzis concluded that
Ms. Moran was a candidate for the more
complicated microneurolysis surgery. She
also indicated to Ms. Moran that she had
successfully treated other patients with
Ms. Moran's condition.
After meeting with Dr. Terzis, Ms.
Moran asked Dr. LaMarre to obtain
approval from Rush for Dr. Terzis'
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proposed surgery. Dr. LaMarre first had
Ms. Moran see two Rush-affiliated
thoracic surgeons, Dr. Raymond A.
Dieter and Dr. William H. Warren. After
examining Ms. Moran, both doctors
confirmed Dr. Terzis' diagnosis of TOS
and recommended that Ms. Moran
undergo the standard TOS surgery. Ms.
Moran, however, was not impressed by
the prognosis offered by these doctors,
and she decided that she wanted to have
Dr. Terzis perform her proposed
surgery.
On October 14, 1997, Dr. LaMarre
asked Rush to approve Dr. Terzis'
microneurolysis surgery for Ms. Moran.
In his recommendation letter, Dr.
LaMarre stated that, in his opinion, Ms.
Moran would be "best served" by having
Dr. Terzis' procedure performed. R.45,
Ex.5. Rush denied approval on the
grounds that Dr. Terzis' surgery was out
of network. Ms. Moran appealed the
administrator's decision. In response to
her appeal, Rush requested additional
information from Dr. Dieter and Dr.
Warren about Dr. Terzis' proposed
surgery and the need for
nicroneurolysis. Both doctors reported
that microneurolysis was unnecessary for
Ms. Moran. After reviewing the reports
of Dr. Dieter and Dr. Warren, and after
conducting its own analysis of relevant
medical literature, Rush affirmed its
denial of coverage for Dr. Terzis'
nucroneurolysis surgery on the ground
that the procedure was not "medically
necessary" as defined by the plan. In aletter to Ms. Moran, Rush provided adetailed discussion of its reasons fordenying coverage for Dr. Terzis'
proposed surgery and informed Ms.Moran that it would cover the standard
TOS surgery, by a network surgeon, of
first rib resection with scale- nectomy.
Ms. Moran then made a final appeal toRush's Membership Advisory
Committee, but the committee voted to
uphold Rush's denial.
The next month, in February 1998, Ms.
Moran underwent Dr. Terzis'
microneurolysis surgery. The surgery
took nearly 14 hours and, with
postoperative care, cost $94,841.27. Ms.
Moran paid for the surgery herself. Ms.
Moran submitted a copy of the bill for
her surgery to Rush, and she and Dr.
Terzis also submitted other materials
related to the surgery. Rush treated these
submissions as a.renewed benefits claim,
and it opened another investigation into
whether Ms. Moran's now-completed
surgery should be covered.
As part of its investigation, Rush sought
the opinions of additional experts, and it
provided these experts with Ms. Moran's
medical records as well as information
concerning Dr. Terzis' microneurolysis
surgery. The first two opinions obtained
by Rush were from Dr. Gerald Harris
and Dr. John C Alexander. These
doctors were skeptical of the need for
ncroneurolysis in Ms. Moran's case, but
they admitted that they lacked expertise
in the area. Rush next consulted with Dr.
Susan E. MacKinnon, the Chief of
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery atWashington University School of
Medicine in St. Louis. Dr. MacKinnon
opined that Dr. Terzis' microneurolysis
was unnecessary.
C.
In January 1998, the month before she
underwent surgery, Ms. Moran made a
written demand to Rush for it to comply
with § 4-10 of the HMO Act. Under the
Act, HMOs are equired to provide a
mechanism for a review by an
independent physician when the patient's
primary care physician and HMO
disagree about the medical necessity of atreatment proposed by the primary care
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physician. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 125/4-10. Section 4-10 further
provides that the H MO must provide
the proposed treatment in the event that
the reviewing physician determines that
it is medically necessary. Se id Rush did
not act on Ms. Moran's request, and Ms.
Moran then filed a complaint in Illinois
circuit court seeking a court order
requiring Rush to appoint an
independent physician to review her
claim. Rush removed the action to
federal district court on the ground that
ERISA completely preempts Ms.
Moran's claim.
The district court remanded the case to
the state court. The court noted that
preemption is generally a defense and
that, under the well-pleaded complaint
rule, an anticipated federal defense could
not be the basis for removal.
Nonetheless, the district court also noted
that a "completely preempted" state law
claim could be removed, but the court
explained, in the ERISA context, only
state law claims that conflicted with
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
were completely preempted by ERISA.
In this case, the district court concluded,
Ms. Moran's request for specific
performance was not a claim under
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
and therefore was not completely
preempted. The district court left open
the possibility that a claim for
reimbursement under § 4-10 of the
HMO Act, in contrast to a request to
have the independent review performed,
might be a claim for benefits that would
be completely preempted by ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions.
D.
Upon remand, the state court ordered
Rush to submit to the independent
physician review mandated by the HMO
Act. The state court reserved ruling on
whether ERISA preempted the portion
of § 4-10 that requires the HMO to
cover the procedure in the event that the
independent physician determines the
procedure is *'965 medically necessary.
Rush and Ms. Moran agreed to have Dr.
A. Lee Dellon, an expert in plastic and
reconstructive surgery at Johns Hopkins
Medical Center, perform the
independent review. After reviewing Ms.
Moran's case and the details of the
surgery performed by Dr. Terzis, Dr.
Dellon concluded that the surgery was
medically necessary, including the
microneurolysis. Dr. Dellon, however,
reported that he would have used loupe
magnification, instead of Dr. Terzis'
technique, to perform the neurolysis.
The procedure proposed by Dr. Dellon
would have been less intrusive and less
time consuming than the one performed
by Dr. Terzis. After Dr. Dellon had
completed his independent review, Rush
concluded its renewed investigation into
whether Ms. Moran's surgery should be
covered. Rush's medical director, after
reviewing the reports of Dr. MacKinnon
and Dr. Dellon along with the reports of
the other doctors, concluded that Dr.
Terzis' surgery had not been medically
necessary. In January 1999, Rush again
denied Ms. Moran's benefits claim.
E.
Following the independent review by Dr.
Dellon, Ms. Moran asked the state court
to require Rush to reimburse her for the
surgery. The state court requested that
Ms. Moran amend her complaint to
clarify the relief she was seeking. Ms.
Moran then filed an amended complaint,
the First Amended Complaint, seeking
enforcement of S 4-10 of the HMO Act
and reimbursement for the surgery in the
amount of $94,841.27.
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After Ms. Moran filed her First
Amended Complaint, Rush removed the
suit to federal court once again. This
time, Rush argued that Ms. Moran's suit
was a claim for benefits that was
completely preempted and that her
claim, therefore, had to be made under
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, S
502(a), 29 U.S.C § 1132(a). Ms. Moran
argued that removal was improper
because her claim for reimbursement
was a state law claim. The district court,
relying on our decision in jass u Prudtrial
Halth Cam Pla4 Irc, 88 F.3d 1482, 1487(7th Cir.1996), held that Ms. Moran's
claim for reimbursement properly was
recharacterized as a claim for benefits,
which meant that her claim was
completely preempted because it fell
within § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA's civil
enforcement provision.
Turning to the merits, the district court
then addressed Rush's contention that
ERISA preempted § 4-10 of the HMO
Act and that, therefore, its provisions did
not cabin the discretion of the
administrator. The court held that
ERISA's "saving clause" did not apply
because § 4-10 did not meet one of the
McCarran-Ferguson factors used todetermine whether a law regulates
insurance for purposes of that clause.
According to the district court, § 4-10 of
the HMO Act did not transfer or spread
policyholders' risk
Ms. Moran subsequently moved for
reconsideration of the district court's
ruling. Ms. Moran argued that the district
court should reconsider its previous
decision in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in UNUM Lr Imuraze Ca VWa4 526 U.S. 358, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143L.Ed.2d 462 (1999). In Wanl theSupreme Court held that a state law neednot satisfy all three McCarran-Ferguson
factors in order for the law to fall within
ERISA's saving clause. See id at 374, 119
S.Ct. 1380. The district court denied Ms.
Moran's motion for reconsideration on
the ground that, even if the saving clause
saved § 4-10 from preemption, S 4-10
was preempted nonetheless because it
fell within the "deemer clause" exception
to the saving clause. Under the deemer
clause, the district court held, ERISA
preempted S 4-10 of the HMO Act
"[bjecause the Illinois HMO Act has the
effect of directly regulating employee
benefit plans rather than an insurance
company." R.53.
F.
Ms. Moran amended her complaint a
second time in April 1999, ostensibly to
state a claim for reimbursement under §
4-10 of the HMO Act and to avoid
stating a claim for benefits under ERISA.
In the alternative, the Second Amended
Complaint also alleged ERISA claims
under 5 502(a)(1)(B) for breach of
contract and for breach of fiduciary duty.
The parties then filed cross motions for
summary judgment, and the district
court granted summary judgment to
Rush. The district court explained that,
regardless of Ms. Moran's efforts to
plead only state law claims, she still was
making a claim for benefits under S
502(a)(1)(B) because she was seeking
reimbursement for her surgery.Proceeding to its analysis of Ms. Moran's
claim for benefits, the district court
noted that the certificate governing Ms.
Moran's benefits gave Rush the
"broadest possible discretion" to
interpret the plan's terms and to makebenefits determinations. R79 at 10(citation onitted). Given the standard of
review for plans bestowing this kind ofdiscretion, the district court held thatRush was entitled to summary judgmentbecause it had not abused its discretion
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or acted arbitrarily in denying Ms.
Moran's claim for benefits.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
A district court's preemption ruling is a
question of law that we review de novo.
S&Czrpents Loal Umn Na 26 v Unital
State Fiddity & Guar. C, 215 F.3d 136,
139 (1st Cir.2000); Burington N. & Santa
Fe Ry v Doa* 186 F.3d 790, 794 (7th
Cir.1999). We also review de novo the
propriety of the removal of a state action
to federal court. Sw Tlka v Gedar Pari.
Ca, 211 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir.2000).
Likewise, we review de novo a district
court's grant of summary judgment. Se
Astet v Eagl-Pidxrbius., Inc, 203 F.3d
501, 503 (7th Cir.2000). It is appropriate
to grant summary judgment only when
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); se Cta Corp.
v Cat, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
B.
A defendant may remove to federal
court actions originally brought in a state
court only when those actions fall within
the federal court's original jurisdiction, sw
28 U.S.C. S 1441(a), which would include
"federal question" jurisdiction over cases
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. S
1331. Ms. Moran maintained throughout
the proceedings in the district court that
removal was improper because her
claims based on § 4-10 of the HMO Act
do not arise "under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
Ms. Moran also makes this argument on
appeal.
As we explained in Spiale v Sejxdd, 147
F.3d 612 (7th Cir.), et dania4 525 U.S.
1017, 119 S.Ct. 542, 142 L.Ed.2d 450
(1998) "[t]he determination of
jurisdiction on removal involving an
ERISA issue is based upon the well-
pleaded complaint rule, the ERISA
'complete preemption' exception to that
rule and the defense of 'conflict
preemption' under ERISA." Id at 614.
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule,
we look to the state court complaint and
not to the defendant's response to
determine whether the plaintiff's claim
falls under federal question jurisdiction.
Sa; eg, Jass v Prudtial Hadth Ce Plan,
Inc, 88 F.3d 1482, 1486 (7th Cir.1996).
"It is long settled law that a cause of
action arises under federal law only when
the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint
raises issues of federal law." Mempditan
Lije1m. Ca v Taxlor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107
S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). A
defendant's federal defense to a claim
arising under state law, therefore, "does
not create federal jurisdiction and *967
therefore does not authorize removal."
Blackburn ' Swudtrard Cop., 115 F.3d
493, 495 (7th Cir.), art davnia, 522 U.S.
997, 118 S.Ct. 562, 139 L.Ed.2d 403
(1997).
There exists, however, an exception to
the well-pleaded complaint rule for state
law claims that have been "completely
preempted" by Congress. Se Speae, 147
F.3d at 615. This so-called "complete
preemption" doctrine really "is not a
preemption doctrine but rather a federaljurisdiction doctrine." Lister v Stak, 890
F2d 941, 943 n. 1 (7th Cir.1989). Even
though a complaint may not mention a
federal basis of jurisdiction, the complete
preemption doctrine "permits
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'recharacterization' of a plaintiff's state
law claim as a federal claim so that
removal is proper." Spenale, 147 F.3d at
615 (quoting Lister, 890 F.2d at 943).
In Merpditan Lfe, the Supreme Court
held that the civil enforcement provision
of ERISA, § 502(a), completely preempts
state law causes of action that fall within
the scope of that provision. See 481 U.S.
at 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542; Spmale 147 F.3d at
615. One of ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions, § 502(a)(1)(B), allows a plan
participant or beneficiary to bring a civil
action "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C 
1132 (a) (1) (B).
In Jass, we identified three factors to be
used to determine whether a state law
claim should be recharacterized as an
ERISA claim under § 502(a): (1)
"whether the plaintiff is eligible to bring
a claim under that section"; (2) "whether
the plaintiff's cause of action falls within
the scope of an ERISA provision that
the plaintiff can enforce via 5 502(a)";
and (3) "whether the plaintiff's state law
claim cannot be resolved without an
interpretation of the contract governed
by federal law." 88 F.3d at 1487(quotation marks and citations omitted).
When all three factors are present, the
state law claim is properly
recharacterized as an ERISA claim under§ 502(a). Sw Id at 1489-90.
We agree with the district court that Ms.
Moran's state law claims are properly
recharacterizd as claims for benefits
under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA and,
therefore, are completely preempted. Ms.
Moran's claims certainly satisfy the first
two jass factors. First, she is a planparticipant and is, therefore, eligible to
bring an action under S 502(a)(1)(B).
Second, she is seeking to enforce her
right to a benefit under her plan. Ms.
Moran seeks payment for the surgery.
Finally, Ms. Moran's claims meet the
third jass factor because they require an
interpretation of the insurance contract
governing Ms. Moran's right to the
independent review. As we explained in
Plurb v Fluid Pwp Seru, Inc., 124 F.3d
849 (7th Cir.1997), Illinois laws
automatically are incorporated into all
contracts of insurance in that state. Se id
at 861. Thus, the provisions of § 4-10 of
the HMO Act have been incorporated
into Ms. Moran's insurance contract.
Therefore, the extent and the
enforceability of Ms. Moran's right to an
independent review necessarily requires
an examination of the contract. Thus,
Ms. Moran's claims properly are
recharacterized as claims for benefits
under ERISA's civil enforcement
provision, 5 502(a)(1)(B), and removal
was proper.
C.
Now that we have determined that
removal of Ms. Moran's state court
claims based on S 4-10 of the HMO Act
was proper, we turn to Rush's
preemption defense.
The comprehensive scope of ERISA
extends to the regulation of employee
welfare benefit plans providing "medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits" for
plan participants "through the purchase
of insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C 5
1002(1); se New Yodk State CWfeBlue Cnrs & Blue Shidd PlarE v Trazders
Ihs. Ca, 514 U.S. 645, 650-51, 115 S.C.
1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). As the
Supreme Court explained in Trarden,
ERISA "does not go about protecting
plan participants and their beneficiaries
by requiring employers to provide any
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given set of minimum benefits." Trauiers,
514 U.S. at 651, 115 S.G. 1671. Rather,
the statute "controls the administration
of benefit plans." Id "It envisions
administrative oversight, imposes
criminal sanctions, and establishes a
comprehensive civil enforcement
scheme." Id
As provided by § 514 of the statute,
ERISA also preempts some state laws.
Specifically, ERISA's preemption clause,
5 514(a), "broadly" states that state laws
are preempted "to the extent that those
laws 'relate to any employee benefit
plan.' " UNUM Le Im. Ca f Amu
Wan4 526 U.S. 358, 363, 119 S.Ct. 1380,
143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999) (quoting §
514(a), 29 U.S.C § 1144(a)). Section 514,
however, contains a saving clause, §
514(b)(2)(A), which qualifies S 514(a) by
excepting state laws from preemption
when those laws "regulate [ ] insurance."
29 U.S.C 5 1144(b)(2)(A); see Wa, 526
U.S. at 367, 119 S.Ct. 1380. Still another
clause in § 514 serves as an exception to
the saving clause exception: the deemer
clause, 5 514(b)(2)(B), "makes clear that a
state law that 'purports to regulate
insurance' cannot deem an employee
benefit plan to be an insurance
company." Pike L Im. Ca v Daeaw,
481 U.S. 41, 45, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95
L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting $
514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C S 1144(b)(2)(B)).
We address each clause in turn.
1.
For purposes of § 514(a), a state law
"relates to" a covered employment
benefit plan if it either has (1) "a
connection with" or (2) "reference to"
such a plan. E.g., zfomia Diu of Labor
Stardark Ermennt v Ddliazm Castr.,
N.A., Im, 519 U.S. 316, 324, 117 S.Ct.
832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997); Traekers,
514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. 1671; Shzw v
Ddta Air Li', Inc, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97,
103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983).
We agree with the parties that S 4-10 of
the HMO Act "relates to" ERISA plans
because its provisions have a connection
with such plans.
To determine whether § 4-10 of the
HMO Act "relates to" ERISA plans, we
begin by looking at the state statute.
Section 4-10 provides, in relevant part:
Each Health Maintenance Organization
shall provide a mechanism for the timely
review by a physician holding the same
class of license as the primary care
physician, who is unaffiliated with the
Health Maintenance Organization,
jointly selected by the patient (or the
patient's next of kin or legal
representative if the patient is unable to
act for himself), primary care physician
and the Health Maintenance
Organization in the event of a dispute
between the primary care physician and
the Health Maintenance Organization
regarding the medical necessity of a
covered service proposed by a primary
care physician. In the event that the
reviewing physician determines the
covered service to be medically
necessary, the Health Maintenance
Organization shall provide the covered
service.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-
10. From the text of the HMO Act it is
apparent that the law does not make
"reference to" an ERISA-governed
employee benefit plan; no mention is
made of ERISA plans, and the law
applies to HMOs regardless of whether a
patient's coverage is through an ERISA
plan. Cf Trauees, 514 U.S. at 656, 115
S.Ct. 1671 (noting that the law in
question in that case did not make
"reference to" ERISA plans because the
law's provisions applied regardless of
whether the coverage was "secured by an
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ERISA plan, private purchase, or
otherwise").
State laws that "risk subjecting [ERISA]
plan administrators to conflicting state
regulations" undoubtedly have a
"connection with" ERISA plans within
the meaning of § 514(a). FMC Orp. v
Hdliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59, 111 S.Ct. 403,
112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990). Here, § 4-10 of
the HMO Act requires HMOs, including
those that are service providers for
ERISA plans, to provide an independent
review mechanism and, should the
independent reviewer agree with the
primary care physician, to pay claims that
otherwise might not be paid under the
plan. As the Court explained in Trarder,
state laws that "mandate[ ] employee
benefit structures or their
administration" fall within the ambit of
ERISA's preemption clause. Trazders,
514 US. at 658, 115 S.Ct. 1671. Section
4-10 of the HMO Act has an effect on
how benefit determinations are made
and, thus, squarely falls within ERISA's
preemption clause.
2.
As we already have noted, however, a
state law that "relates to" ERISA plans
may nonetheless avoid preemption if
that law "regulates insurance" within the
meaning of ERISA's saving clause, 5
514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C 5 1144(b)(2)(A).
Se Wan 526 U.S. at 363, 119 S.Ct. 1380.
To determine whether a state law
"regulates insurance" within the meaning
of the saving clause, we first ask
"whether, from a 'cornmon-sense view
of the matter,' the contested prescription
regulates insurance." Id at 367, 119 S.Ct.1380 (quoting Metpditan Ltfe b. Co v
Massahuse, 471 U.S. 724, 740, 105 S.Ct.2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)). Next, we
consider "three factors employed to
determine whether the regulation fits
within the 'business of insurance' as that
phrase is used in the McCaran-Ferguson
Act." Id (citing 15 U.S.C 5 1011 et seq.).
Of -these three factors, the first is
"whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder's
risk." Id (quotation marks and citation
omitted). The second factor is "whether
the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured." Id (quotation marks
and citation omitted). And the third is
"whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry."
Id (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A state law may fall within the
saving clause even if it cannot satisfy all
three of the McCarran-Ferguson factors.
S& id at 373-74, 119 S.Ct. 1380 (stating
that the McCarran-Ferguson factors are
"guideposts" and rejecting the argument
that all three are required).
We conclude that 5 4-10 of the HMO
Act falls within the saving clause because
it "regulates insurance" under a common
sense understanding and because it
meets at least two of the McCarran-
Ferguson factors. As a matter of
common sense, 5 4-10 of the HMO Act
regulates insurance because the law is
directed at the HMO industry as
insurers. We previously have explained
that HMOs "are insurance vehicles
under Illinois law," A ndson v HuMna,
In, 24 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir.1994), and§ 4-10 of the HJM1O Act is aimed
exclusively at members of the insuranceindustry, even if the law does not affect
the entire insurance industry in Illinois.
Section 4-10 of the HMO Act further
regulates insurance under a common
sense understanding because the Act's
provisions go to the core of the
relationship between the insurer and theinsured. "It is fundamental insurance law
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that 'existing and valid statutory
provisions enter into and form a part of
all contracts of insurance to which they
are applicable, and, together with settled
judicial constructions thereof, become a
part of the contract as much as if they
were actually incorporated therein.' "
Plrb, 124 F.3d at 861 (quoting 2 Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on
Insurance 3d § 19:1, at 19-2 to 19- 4
(1996)). The provisions of 5 4-10 of the
HMO Act, therefore, are substantive
terms of all insurance policies in Illinois
by operation of law. When a law
mandates a contract term between
parties, whether that term is
characterized as creating a "procedural"
or "substantive" right, that law is
"integral" to the insurer/insured
relationship. Wad, 526 U.S. at 374-75 &
n. 5, 119 S.Ct. 1380.
Having determined that 5 4-10 of the
HMO Act regulates insurance under a
common sense understanding, we look
next to the McCarran-Ferguson factors.
Section 4-10 clearly satisfies the second
and third McCarran-Ferguson factors. *
* * The second McCarran-Ferguson
factor is satisfied because S 4-10 creates a
mandatory term in the insurance
contract and, thus, "changes the bargain
between insurer and insured," id at 374,
119 S.Ct. 1380. Moreover, § 4-10
satisfies the third McCarran-Ferguson
factor because, as we already have
explained, the section applies only to
HMOs acting as insurers. Thus, the law
is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.
3.
The "deemer clause," § 514(b)(2)(B), is
an exception to the saving clause
exception. A law saved from preemption
by the saving clause may still be
preempted if it falls within the deemer
clause. See FMC orp., 498 U.S. at 61,
111 S.Ct. 403. Under this clause, state
laws that purport to regulate insurance
by "deeming" a plan to be an insurance
company are outside of the saving clause
and are subject to preemption. S&- id
The "deemer clause" is inapplicable to
this case. In FMC Corp., the Supreme
Court explained that the deemer clause
exempts "self-funded ERISA plans from
state laws that 'regulate insurance' within
the meaning of the saving clause." Id
The ERISA plan at issue before us,
however, is not a self- funded plan; it is
an insured plan. The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the deemer clause
"makes clear that if a plan is insured, a
State may regulate it indirectly through
regulation of its insurer and its insurer's
insurance contracts." Id at 64, 111 S.Ct.
403. Rush is the insurer to the ERISA
plan at issue in our case, and therefore
the deemer clause does not apply. See
Wan 526 U.S. at 367 n. 2, 119 S.Ct.
1380 (stating that, because the plan at
issue in that case was not self-insured,
the deemer clause was "not at issue");
Phiwb, 124 F.3d at 859 n. 6 (explaining
that, because the plan at issue was an
insured plan, the deemer clause was
inapplicable).
4.
A state law that falls within the saving
clause nevertheless may be preempted if
that law conflicts with a substantive
provision of ERISA. See Pilo LAf9 481
U.S. at 57, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Rush argues
that § 4-10 of the HMO Act conflicts
with § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme. That provision
establishes the right of plan participants
or beneficiaries to sue "to recover
benefits" under the plan, "to enforce ...
rights" under the plan, or "to clarify ...
427
rights" under the plan. 29 U.S.C §
1132(a)(1)(B). Rush invites our attention
to a decision from the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, GOporate Health
Imurarw, Irc v Texas Depa'war ef
Imuranx, 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.2000), in
which the court considered an
independent review statute from Texas
that is quite similar to S 4-10 of Illinois'
HMO Act.
The Texas independent review statute,
like § 4-10 of the HMO Act, essentially
"allow[s] a patient who has been denied
coverage to appeal to an outside
organization." Id at 537. The law
requires HMOs to provide a mechanism
for patients to obtain an independent
review of the need for a course of
treatment. Specifically, the court
explained, the Texas statute states that
patients may appeal "adverse
determinations," which are defined as
determinations that a health care service
is not "medically necessary" or
"appropriate," to an independent
reviewer. Id (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Moreover, under the
Texas statute, the HMO must "comply"
with the independent reviewer's
determination of medical necessity. Id
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
In our view, 5 4-10 of the Illinois HMO
Act cannot be characterized as creating
an alternative remedy scheme that
conflicts with S 5 02(a). The independent
review scheme created by the Illinois
statute is not tantamount to the relief
offered under $ 502(a)(1)(B). As we
already have explained, the provisions of
5 4-10 of the H-MO Act have been
incorporated into Ms. Moran's insurance
contract. * Thus, a suit by her to
enforce the HMO Act's provisions is
simply a suit to enforce the terms of the
plan--pisdy the sort of suit that is
contemplated by § 502(a)(1)(B) "to
enforce rights" and "to recover benefits"
under the plan. Notably, the "sole
launching ground" for Ms. Moran's
claims to enforce S 4-10 of the HMO
Act remains S 502(a). Wan4 526 U.S. at
377, 119 S.Ct. 1380. * * * Rather than
providing an alternative remedy for Ms.
Moran to recover benefits, S 4-10 of the
HMO Act simply establishes an
additional internal mechanism for
making decisions about medical necessity
and identifies who will make that
decision in those instances when the
HMO and the patient's primary care
physician cannot agree on the medical
necessity of a course of treatment.
Rather than eliminate the review
procedures established by the plan, it
simply adds to the contract, by operation
of law, an additional dispute resolving
mechanism when, despite exhausting the
internal review system otherwise
provided by the plan, there remains a
disagreement between the plan's own
experts and the attending physician on
the issue of medical necessity.
Nor does the addition of this statutorily
mandated provision in the contract alter
impermissibly the deferential standard of
review required by the language of the
plan. Certainly, the administrator's failure
to abide by the decision of the outside
medical consultant on the issue of
medical necessity would constitute an
abuse of discretion. The statutorily
required provision of the plan requires
that the decision of the independent
review physician be followed, and it
would be an abuse of discretion on the
part of the administrator not to observe
the command of this provision.
However, the different outcome is not
because of a change in the standard of
review but because of a change in the
provisions of the contract. * * *
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We also believe that it is inaccurate to
say that § 4-10 of the HMO Act conflicts
with the fiduciary role of the
administrator of the plan. At the outset,
it is unportant to note that the provisions
of 5 4-10 of the HMO Act apply only to
disputes about whether a covered service
is medically necessary in a given case.
Other issues, most notably the issue of
whether a particular treatment is
covered, do not fall within the ambit of
the section. Moreover, as we have
already noted, even with respect to
medical necessity decisions, there is
nothing in § 4-10 of the HMO Act that
in any way abrogates the pre- existing
fiduciary obligations of the
administrator. Section 4-10 of the HMO
Act merely adds an additional obligation
that the fiduciary must observe.
In sum, 5 4-10 of the HMO Act requires
entities in the business of insurance to
provide additional safeguards to preserve
the integrity of the decision- making
process. Following the example of the
Supreme Court of the United States, we
believe that such requirements ought to
be treated as mandated contract terms
and treated as part of the insurance
contract. See Wan( 526 U.S. at 375-76,
119 S.C. 1380; see ao Phmb, 124 F.3d at
861. Unlike the situation in Pikr L JE, we
are not asked here to recognize a state
common law doctrine of general
applicability but a specific statutory
provision aimed at the regulation of the
insurance industry. As in Wan( we
simply accept the state-mandated
provision as a provision of the plan and
then enforce the contract. ***
D.
In this case, there no longer remains a
question of material fact that would
preclude judgment as a matter of law. As
we already have explained, Ms. Moran's
claim for reimbursement really is a claim
for benefits made under 5 502(a)(1)(B) to
enforce her rights under the plan.
Moreover, § 4-10 of the HMO Act, as
incorporated into the plan by operation
of law, entitled Ms. Moran to the
independent review conducted by Dr.
Dellon. Dr. Dellon determined, in
agreement with Ms. Moran's primary
care physician, that the surgery
performed by Dr. Terzis was "medically
necessary." Thus, Ms. Moran is entitled
to summary judgment in her favor.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
judgment of the district court.
REVERSED.
POSNER, Circuit Judge, with whom
Circuit Judges COFFEY,
EASTERBROOK, and DIANE P.
WOOD join, dissenting from denial of
hearing en banc. (Deleted).
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Supreme Court to Issue HMO Ruling
The Associated Press
Friday, June 29, 2001
Anne Gearan
The Supreme Court agreed Friday to
decide whether states can force managed
care health plans to accept an
independent
second opinion before refusing to pay
for some operations or other medical
care.
Thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have such patient protection
laws.
The court will hear the issue during its
next term, which begins in October.
In the meantime, Congress may grant
patients new ights to challenge poor or
nonexistent care, and clarify when and
how patients can sue in state court.
Congress is debating a patients' bill of
rights, and President Bush has said he
wants to sign a bill this year.
The HMO case was one of two the court
accepted Friday, the last time until fall that
the justices will add to the coming term's
docket. The court issued its last decisions
for the 2000-2001 term on Thursday, and
the justices began scattering for summer
teaching stints, conferences or vacations.
In the second case, the justices agreed to
consider whether 450 Lake Tahoe
landowners deserve compensation for a
temporary moratorium on land
development.
A federal appeals court ruled last year that
because the local ordinances banned
development for less than three years,
they were not severe enough to be
unconstitutional.
That case is Tahoe-Sierra Preservation v.
Tahoe Regional Planning, 00-1167.
The HMO case concerns patients' rights
under state laws, and whether a law
Congress passed in 1974 to regulate
benefit plans overrides various protections
passed by states.
Federal appeals courts have reached
opposite conclusions about whether the
national law trumps the state protection.
The court will review the case of an
Illinois woman who paid for a $94,000
operation herself after her HMO refused
to cover it. She claims Illinois' patient
protection law required the insurer to
abide by the recommendation of an
outside doctor.
Debra Moran, who was covered by her
husband's health plan, complained of
shoulder pain, numbness and other
problems in 1996. The Rush Prudential
prinary care doctor she saw, Arthur
LaMarre, tried a form of physical therapy.
When that did not relieve her symptoms,
Moran sought the opinion of a surgeon
who did not participate in her health plan.
That doctor confirmed LaMarre's
diagnosis of compressed nerves, and
recommended surgery.
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Rush Prudential said it was not bound to
accept the outside doctor's findings, and
rejected Moran's request to pay for the
operation. The insurer cited
recommendations against surgery from
two other doctors it consulted.
The insurer eventually offered to pay for a
less extensive operation, but Moran
insisted she needed the more complicated,
and more expensive, treatment.
She sued, and won a state court order that
Rush Prudential get another opinion. The
insurer complied, but again denied
Moran's request for full coverage.
The insurer got the case moved to federal
court so it could pursue the claim at issue
now - whether the state law guaranteeing
an independent external appeal is valid.
The insurer won the first round in federal
court, but the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Chicago reversed and ruled in
Moran's favor last year.
The Justice Department urged the court
not to take on this issue, saying that
Congress is poised to solve the problem
with national legislation.
The case is Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v.
Moran, 00-1021.
Copyright a 2001 The Associated Press
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Justices to Hear HMO Review Issue in Fall
Los Angeles Times
Saturday, June 30, 2001
David G. Savage
Before quitting for the summer, the
Supreme Court said Friday it will decide
next term whether states can set up
independent panels of doctors with the
legal power to review the medical
decisions of HMOs.
The question is at the heart of the current
debate over the patients' bill of rights in
Congress.
If lawmakers do not resolve the issue by
passing a new law this summer, the
justices will take it up when they return to
the bench in the fall.
Advocates for patients say the
administrators of health care plans should
not have the exclusive power to decide
what medical treatments will be provided.
HMOs appear to have that authority now.
Thanks to past rulings by the high court,
patients who are unhappy with their
HMOs' decisions cannot sue the plans for
damages. The justices have interpreted a
1974 pension law as shielding "employee
benefit plans" from being sued.
Undeterred, many states adopted a
fallback approach that gives disgruntled
patients the right to appeal when their
HMOs deny them treatment. Typically, a
panel of three doctors is entrusted to
review cases. If they agree the treatment
was medically necessary, they can order
the HMO to pay for it.
Last year, then-Texas Gov. George W.
Bush cited his state's independent review
board as an example of the right way to
balance the rights of patients and the
responsibilities of HMOs.
California and 36 other states have
adopted these independent review panels.
But the legality of the independent review
boards has been put in doubt.
Lawyers for the health insurance
companies in Texas went to court there to
challenge the state's power to establish
these boards. They argued that the 1974
federal pension law shielded their plans
from state interference.
In June 2000, the U.S. 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals in New Orleans agreed, saying
the state did not have the authority to
oversee HMOs. The appellate judges cited
the Supreme Court's ruling that shielded
HMOs from all state laws.
In October, however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Chicago came to the opposite
conclusion. The Illinois ruling came in the
case of Debra Moran, who had consulted
her HMO doctors for severe pain in her
shoulders and numbness in her limbs.
They recommended physical therapy; she
went to a specialist who recommended
surgery instead.
When the HMO refused to pay, she had
the surgery anyway and later appealed to
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the Illinois review board seeking
compensation for the $95,000 cost of the
procedure. But lawyers for her HMO
went to court to challenge the review
board's authority. They lost when the
judge ruled that Moran was simply trying
to obtain what her medical plan had
promised her.
The Texas and Illinois cases were
appealed to the Supreme Court, and the
justices announced Friday they will hear
the one from Illinois, Rush Prudential
HMO vs. Moran, 00-1021.
Meanwhile, the justices voted Friday to
take up another property rights case from
California. At issue is whether the
government must pay compensation to
property owners for a temporary
moratorium on development. In the past
the high court has said that landowners
are entitled to payment for a "temporary
taking" of their property.
But the courts in California have been
reluctant to hit environmental regulators
and planning agencies with damage
verdicts for the time in which they study a
proposed development.
Nonetheless, some landowners at Lake
Tahoe say they have an especially strong
case. Since 1981, they have been trying to
build homes there but have been blocked
by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
Santa Monica attorney Michael M. Berger
appealed the property owners' case to the
high court after the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals in San Francisco rejected their
claim for compensation.
Berger said the California judges have
ignored the Supreme Court's past ruling
on this issue.
The case is Tahoe Sierra Preservation
Council vs. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 00-1167.
Copyright a 2001 The Times Mirror
Company
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Also This Tenn:
99-1786 Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
Ruling Below (9' Cr., unpublished):
Reimbursement of Employee Retirement Income Security Act plan for payments that it
made to plan beneficiary, pursuant to plan provision and agreement with beneficiary giving
plan right to recover third party payments to beneficiary up to amount of benefits paid by
plan, is not equitable relief within meaning of 29 U.S.C §1132 (a) (3), which requires that
plaintiff seed equitable, rather than legal, relief; district court has power to award attorneys'
fees even in absence of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus fee award to beneficiary in
action by plan to recover third party payments to her is affirmed.
Question Presented: Did Ninth Circuit err by holding that federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over actions brought by ERISA plan fiduciaries to enforce recoupment
provisions of plan?
99-1996 J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc.
Ruling Below (Fed. Cir., 200 F.3d 1374, 68 U.S.L.W. 1480, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1440):
Seeds and plants grown from seed, Le., sexually reproduced plants, are patentable subject
matter within scope of 35 U.S.C $101, even though plant protection is also available underPlant Patent Act and Plant Variety Protection Act.
Question Presented: Are patents issued under 35 U.S.C §101 granting right to exclude
others from sexually reproducing plants or plant varieties, or from selling or using plants orplant varieties reproduced by means of sexual reproduction (by seed), invalid because PlantVariety Protection act and Plant Patent Act are exclusive means of obtaining federal
statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant varieties?
00-568 New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Ruling Below (TrarrnzssiarA as Pdicy Suidy Gnap v FERQ D.C Cr., 225 F.3d 667, 69U.S.LW. 1042):
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission electric utilit deregulation order that permits utilityto recover from wholesale customers "stranded costs" that were prudently incurred underregulatory regime upon showing that it had reasonably expectation of continued service tocustomer beyond contract ternm and that customer continues to use utilitiys transmisioservice but purchases power from new supplier under ope aces aifesl ingfo
dereulaio wi e m u r eeDen acess tariff resoltig fromderegulation is thin ag ncy's authority and is entitled to deference as reasonable
accommodation of competing interest; FERCs assertion of exclusive jurisdiction overfacilities that sell and transmit electricity at wholesale to customers who will resell electricity
end i nfactorjurisdico test to identify whether facilityengaged in "unbundled" retail sales of energy and delivery services is local distribution
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facility subject to state jurisdiction or facility engaged in interstate transmission subject to
FERC jurisdiction, is reasonable interpretation of Sections 201(a) and (b) of Federal Power
Act, which clearly and unambiguously give FERC jurisdiction over "transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce," while excluding from FERC jurisdiction "facilities used in
local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce."
Question Presented: Given that Congress in 1935 stated that federal regulation extends
"onlyto those matters which are not subject to regulation bythe states" (Section 201(a) of
Federal Power Act), and transmission of energy from generators to retail customers in same
state was then "subject to regulation by states" (as it has been since 1935), may FERC
preempt state jurisdiction over such intrastate retail transmissions of electric energy?
00-809 Enron Power Marketing, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Ruling Below (Tramnisicn A cass Pdicy Study Gap v FERC D.C. Cir., 225 F.3d 667,69
U.S.L.W. 1042):
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision to characterize electricity transmissions
bundled with generation and delivery services as part of retail sales subject to state
jurisdiction is permissible interpretation of Section 201 of Federal Power Act, which, while
giving FERC jurisdiction over transmissions in interstate commerce and sales at wholesale,
also clearly contemplates state jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales,
leaving FERC with policy choice, entitled to judicial deference, as to where lines between
those activities should be drawn.
Questions Presented: (1) Does FERC have jurisdiction under Federal Power Act to
regulate all transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, including interstate
transmission of electric energy that is sold to retail customers at "bundled" price? (2) Did
FERC have jurisdiction and obligation under FPA to eliminate pervasive "undue
discrimination" in provision of interstate electric energy transmission services by requiring
transmission-owning utilities to provide interstate transmission services on same terms to all
users, for all interstate transmissions, including transmissions bundled with retail sales? (3)
Did court of appeals err in ruling that FERC had discretion to interpret FPA as denying
FERC necessary jurisdiction to remedy undue discrimination it had found in provision of
interstate transmission?
00-878 Mathias v. Worldcom Technologies, Inc.
Ruling Below (IIlnas BeI T4phoe Ca v Wodam Tahndorgi, Inc, 7t' Cir., 179 F.3d 566):
Section 252(e)(6) of 1996 Telecommunications Act, which provides that "[in any case in
which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by
such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine
whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 and this section,"
does not restrict federal district courts' jurisdiction to review of interconnection
"agreements" between local exchange carriers, but extends to state agencies'
"determinations" implementing statute, including Illinois Commerce Commission's ruling
that carriers' interconnection agreements required payment of reciprocal compensation for
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calls to Internet service providers; Illinois Commerce Commission's participation in
regulatory scheme set out in statute waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court
with respect to its determinations under statute; even though Illinois Commerce
Commission is not party on appeal, its commissioners are, and in their official capacity, they
are Illinois Commerce Commission, and thus court, which has jurisdiction under Section
252(e)(6) to review actions of commission, will proceed on that basis.
Questions Presented: (1) Is state public utility commission's action relating to enforcement
of previously approved interconnection agreement under Section 252 of 1996
Telecommunications Act "determination under [Section 252]" and thus reviewable in federal
court under 47 U.S.C. 252(e)(6)? (2) Does state commission's acceptance of Congress's
invitation to participate in implementing federal regulatory scheme that provides that state
commission determinations are reviewable in federal court constitute waiver of 11"
Amendment immunity? (3) Can official capacity action seeking prospective relief against
state public utility commissioners for alleged ongoing violations of federal law in performingfederal regulatory functions under 1996 Telecommunications Act be maintained under Expart Young doctrine?
00-1307 Halter v. Sigmon Coal Co.
Ruling Below (Sgnrr Qd Ca v Apf, 4' Cir., 226 F.3d 291, 69 U.S.L.W. 1149, 24Employee Benefits Cas. 2830):
Successor in interest to coal operator that signed coal wage agreement is not "relatedperson" that may be assessed operator's liability for retired miners' health care benefitsunder 1992 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act.
Question Presented: Does 1992 Coal IndustryRetiree Health Benefit Act permit SocialSecurity commissioner to assign beneficiaries to successor in interest of signatory operatorthat is not longer in business?
00-1531 Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland
RuSlg lw(BdAdan zMar/a 4dnc v MCI WoddCcn 4' Cir., 240 F.3d 279, 69
State public service commision's approval of interconnection agreement pursuant to 1996Telecommunications Act does not waive state's I it Amendment immunity from suit infederal court concerning such agreement, and sovereign immunity exception of Ex aneYaeg 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allowing suits against state officials to redress ongoing violations
of federal law, is inapplicable; state conn ssions decision that construed interconnection
agreement between incumbent local telephone company and competing carriers to require
company to pay competing carriers reciprocal compensation for telephone calls made bycompany's customers to Internet service providers that have local telephone numbes butprovide access to interstate destinations through Internet was not cletermination" within
meaning of Section 252 of act, and thus companys complas nt coer tin wiehidoes not fall within category of suits idn [Iscmlaint against competing carrierscuodoes 28all within categ 331f s identified in Section 2 5 2 (e)(6) for resolution in federalcourt; nor does 28 U.S. §1331 confer jurisdiction on federal courts over these disputes.
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Question Presented: Does federal district court have independent subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C 51331 to determine whether state public utility commission's
action interpreting or enforcing interconnection agreement violates 1996
Telecommunications Act?
00-1711 United States v. Public Service Commission of Maryland
Ruling Below (BdlA tanticMar'arItnc v MCI Wo'MdCa 4 Cir., 240 F.3d 279, 69
U.S.L.W. 1494):
State public service commission's approval of interconnection agreement pursuant to 1996
Telecommunications Act does not waive state's 11' Amendment immunity from suit in
federal court concerning such agreement, and sovereign immunity exception of Ex Pane
Ywg, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allowing suits against state officials to redress ongoing violations
of federal law, is inapplicable; state commissions decision that construed interconnection
agreement between incumbent local telephone company and competing carriers to require
company to pay competing carriers reciprocal compensation for telephone calls made by
company's customers to Internet service providers that have local telephone numbers but
provide access to interstate destinations through Internet was not "determination" within
meaning of Section 252 of act, and thus company's complaint against competing carriers
does not fall within categoryof suits identified in Section 252(e)(6) for resolution in federal
court; nor does 28 U.S.C §1331 confer jurisdiction on federal courts over these disputes.
Question Presented: Does federal district court have independent subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §1331 to determine whether state public utility commission's
action interpreting or enforcing interconnection agreement violates 1996
Telecommunications Act?
00-952 Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Family Services v. Blumer
Ruling Below (Wis. Ct. App., 237 Wis.2d 810, 615 N.W.2d 647):
Wisconsin's use of "income first" rule requiring state to impute income of nursing home
resident, before imputing resident's resources, to resident's non-institutionalized (or
"community") spouse whose income is below minimum monthly maintenance needs
allowance (MMvNA established by federal law, thereby decreasing likelihood that
institutionalized spouse will qualify for Medicaid assistance due to insufficient assets,impermissibly conflicts with 42 U.S.C §1396r-5, which requires states to increase
community spouse's resource allowance first if community spouse's income is insufficient to
meet MMMNA.
Question Presented: Does "income first" requirement of Wisconsin Medicaid spousal
impoverishment statute, Wis. Stat. §49.455(8)(d), requiring that income of institutionalized
spouse be attributed to community spouse before excess resources are transferred to
community spouse, conflict with 42 U.S.C §1396r-5?
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